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This thesis intersects the literatures of critical security studies and material 
semiotics to explore the operation of the US military, and through it, the operation of 
contemporary security agendas. Based around fieldwork conducted with 1st Cavalry 
(US Army) after its deployment in Operation Iraqi Freedom Phase II, this thesis 
argues for the exploration of security studies through the spatial operation of 
violence. Emphasising spatiality, it is argued, allows for an openness -  and 
uncertainty -  in accounts of security that can otherwise see violence as 
overdetermined. This thesis demonstrates this uncertainty -  this experimentalism -  
in two respects, exploring both 1st Cavalry’s embrace of ontological multiplicity as part 
of its operation in Iraq, as well as the continuing interference of multiple modes of 
absence and presence in enacting m ilitaiy units in the battlespace. The thesis 
concludes by arguing for more detailed attention to be paid to violence that 
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INTRODUCTION
The recent adoption by the US military of the battlespace as the designated 
geographic location of violence illustrates more than the military’s fixation with new  
and ever better terminology.1 Rather, the advent of the battlespace (as opposed to the 
battlefield or the theater of operations) highlights an important shift in the way in 
which violence is conceived and enacted. In the words of the US Navy:
Revolutionary advances in the technologies of surveillance, communications, information 
processing, and weapon systems are increasing the pace and reach of warfare exponentially. Future 
w arfare will take place in an expanded battlespace, characterized by rapid, simultaneous, and 
violent actions across all dimensions -  air, land, sea, undersea, space, time, and the 
electromagnetic spectrum .2
1 For some early uses of the term, see, Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, 
Departm ent o f  Defense Dictionary o f M ilitary and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2002); Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Vision 2010  (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 1996).
2 Department of the Navy, N aval Doctrine Publication 6: N aval Command and Control (Washington, 
DC: Department of Defense, 1995), 4  (emphasis added).
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The spatial operation of violence -  long dominated by the inside/outside  
dichotom ies of state on state violence, emphasising boundaries, lines of conflict and 
so on -  has been expanded through the figure of the battlespace to include the more 
fluid, event-ful and relational operation of the networks In this, war is but one of 
many facets of (post-)modern society to be inflected with a discourse of networking, 
and in som e ways it might seem  that the spatial operation of violence 
straightforwardly reflects the ‘networked’ nature of the modern military. However, 
this thesis argues that it is not so much the advent of networks that has driven this 
alteration, but a complex adaptation of violence and space that defies simple 
description. In particular, this thesis argues that the altering of spatial operations of 
violence demonstrate the creative and experimental ability of violence to operate on 
its own terms, in ways that are not fully determined by either structure (including 
discourse) or agency. This provides both a challenge and an opportunity for current 
analyses of the contemporary security environment.
This thesis reads the altering spatial operation of violence through the micro­
practices of the US militaiy, particularly with regards to that paradigmatic post­
postmodern conflict, Iraq. This thesis creates a ‘thick’ description of a key moment in 
the enaction of this contemporary battlespace, utilising observations made during 
fieldwork with the US military, as well as study of contemporary US doctrine and 
practice.
While drawing initial inspiration from the field of critical security studies, with 
its emphasis on challenging the way in which the concept of ‘security’ is formulated 
through discourse (asking important questions such as ‘What is being secured?’ and
3 Anderson provides a neat summary of the traditional logic of the spatial operation of violence when he 
argues that: “In considering warfare, it appears to be a truism that wars must almost always begin at 
borders.” Ewan W. Anderson, "Geopolitics: International Boundaries as Fighting Places," in Geopolitics: 
Geography and S trategy, ed. Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan, 125-36 (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 1 3 4 -
2
‘What is being excluded?’), this thesis em phasises the exploration of battlespaces 
through the detailed sociological and anthropological observation often associated 
with material semiotics in Science and Technology Studies (STS).4 This reflects a 
commitment to unpicking the ‘grand narratives’ of security through attending to the 
‘m ess’ of the materiality of contemporary battlespaces.5 While ‘critical security 
studies’ in its many guises has raised important questions about the operation of 
discursive  formations of security, power, and space in reinscribing violent relations of 
power, such work has left unanswered questions regarding the implications of the 
multiplicity, divergence, and m ess of security practices  that become apparent when 
work attends to the materiality and historical specificity of contemporary 
battlespaces.6
This thesis acts as a provocation to the field of critical security studies. By 
collecting a novel configuration of literature and fieldwork, and in particular, by 
intersecting two sets of literature (an often STS-inflected literature on productions of 
spatiality with the literature on the contemporary organisation of violence) with a 
carefully observed set of descriptions of current battlespaces, this thesis provides 
clues as to the operation of contemporary security agendas. Its most important 
contribution, therefore, is in opening alternative routes for thinking about the 
exploration of the altering spatial operation of violence -  a phenom enon that has
4 For a sampling of critical security studies literature, see, David Campbell and Michael Dillon, ed., The
Political Subject o f  Violence (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); Keith Krause and 
Michael C. Williams, ed., Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (London: UCL Press, 1997). 
s On mess, see, John Law, After Method: Mess in Social Science Research (London: Routledge, 2004).
6 For a sampling of diverse philosophical approaches to critical security studies that nonetheless share 
this discursive emphasis, see, Giorgio Agamben, State o f  Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005); Michael Dillon, "Global Security in the 21st Century: Circulation, Complexity and 
Contingency," in International Security Program m e/N ew  Security Challenges Program m e Briefing 
Paper 05 /02 , 2-3 (London: Chatham House, 2005); David Campbell, Writing Security: United States 
Foreign Policy and the Politics o f Identity (Rev. Ed.) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1998).
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becom e compellingly apparent to both a specialist military audience and a general 
public fascinated by the dilemmas facing the US military in conflicts such as Iraq.
In light of its diverse origins, then, the key them es of this thesis represent points 
of convergence between the growing literature on new security agendas and the 
principles underlying material semiotics in STS -  that is, a commitment to 
multiplicity, fluidity, and uncertainty. Indeed, one of the key findings of this thesis is 
that the concerns of STS (mess, multiplicity, and distributed agency) are being 
instrumentalised (more or less effectively) by the US military as it attempts to 
respond to a ‘new world order.’
In particular, three key them es emerge that represent this convergence. Firstly, 
there is the need to discard the notion of fixed subjectivity in the face of an adaptive 
enemy and circumstance (from the perspective of new security agendas), and in the 
face of a ‘real’ that is emergent, relational, and heterogeneous (from the perspective of 
STS).
Secondly, the experim ental emerges as a primary mode of operation. Whether 
this is viewed from the perspective of the US military’s guiding lights in the Office of 
Force Transformation and the Joint Forces Command, or from STS arguments 
relating to the contingency and m essiness of the processes by which we make 
knowledge, experimentation as a mode of operation is both more open to vaiying 
textures of ‘the real,’ and more capable of repressing that variety through the effective 
adaptation of force to different conditions.
Finally, this thesis is haunted by the obduracy of materiality. New security 
agendas may attempt to re-engineer the world in their image but, in practice, reality
4
constantly eludes attempts to control it. Grand narratives, coherent formations, 
explicable ‘logics’ all fade before the brute force of an alterable battlespace.
The rest of this chapter serves as an introduction to the field from which the 
general problematic of the spatial operation of US military violence has emerged. It 
situates the thesis both generally in the upheavals in international relations over the 
past two decades, and in the more specific concerns dominating the US military 
community over the same period. Without staking a position with respect to these 
debates (indeed, these debates are largely outside the sphere of this thesis), this 
introduction acts as a frame of reference for the thesis.
Reformulating the security problematic
While this thesis addresses the specific configuration of the US military 
battlespace, particularly in Iraq, this battlespace is always/already embedded within 
the framework known as international relations. While international relations is seen 
as a theoretically evolved, academically rigorous discipline, security studies and its 
even more narrowly focused cousin, defence studies, have been seen as rather the 
poor relations in terms of theoretical complexity.7 This leads to a distinct temptation 
to allow the tools of international relations to encompass the concerns of defence and 
security studies.
This thesis eschews that approach, and chooses instead the opposite path: by 
focussing narrowly on defence issues -  that is, on specific (and at tim es quite 
technical) descriptions of the US military’s battlespace -  this thesis addresses the 
material existence of contemporary security agendas in a way sometim es ignored by
7 Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, "Preface: Toward Critical Security Studies," in Critical Security 
Studies: Cases and Concepts, ed. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, vii-xxi (London: UCL Press, 
1997), vii-viii.
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the more abstract formulations of the international relations community. As is readily 
apparent, the relationship between broader strategic (international relations) 
agendas and narrower defence and security agendas is not simply one of cause and 
effect, but is actually a recursive one: the military operates in an environment 
dictated by the strategic concerns of their political paymasters, but their operation 
(and their lim itations) also constitute the security environment in which they find 
themselves. Hence an exploration of the realm of defence and security studies on its 
own, more limited, terms holds promise for illuminating broader agendas.
This is not to say that this thesis holds firmly to boundaries between disciplines: 
in fact it is quite the opposite, with the thesis drawing extensively from sociology, 
anthropology, cultural studies, geography, and political philosophy. Rather, this 
thesis seeks to maintain the micro emphasis of defence and security studies, without 
subordinating it to any one of the persisting ‘grand narratives’ of international 
relations.
International Relations and the post Cold War world
Nonetheless, it is useful to understand the context from which this thesis has 
emerged. Fortunately, the field of international relations, despite loud proclamations 
of the end of the era of grand narratives, has its own orthodoxy, one which makes it 
simpler to situate events in world politics over the last 20 years.8 Indeed, it is 
common for theses to begin with a recitation of these orthodox truths. The recitation 
goes something like that which follows.
8 For an early statement on the end o f ‘grand narratives,’ see, John Lewis Gaddis, "International 
Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," International Security 17, no. 3 (1 9 9 3 )-
6
Firstly, there is a need to genuflect at the altar of the strategic certainties 
provided by the Cold War. Accordingly, during the Cold War, international relations 
were simple to describe (them versus us), and the accompanying military realities 
were also simple (containment, deterrence, cold wars with hot spots of variable 
strategic importance). The second phase of the recent history of international 
relations begins with the end of the Cold War, which heralded the collapse of these 
strategic certainties and foretold, in Robert Kaplan’s evocative and influential term, 
the “coming anarchy.”9 The internecine wars of the former Yugoslavia, the genocide 
in Rwanda, the countless civil (‘tribal’) wars under-way in countries throughout the 
African continent, all bore out the supposition that there was a (rather unpleasant) 
transition taking place in the world order. Agendas long suppressed by the Cold War, 
such as the aspirations of an emerging global civil society, sprung into life in this 
decade of activity, a decade whose strategic significance is perhaps best expressed in 
the all-too familiar terms of a tale “full of sound and fury, /Signifying nothing.”10 This 
all changed, apparently, with the collapse of the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001, 
and the beginning of the United States’ Global War on Terror, recently renamed the 
“long war.”11 Now international relations as a discipline is convinced that we are 
witnessing the beginnings of a new international ordering, although its contours are 
unclear and its meaning is contested.12
9 Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," The Atlantic Monthly February (1994), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/199402/anarchy.
10 William Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act 5, scene 5, lines 26-27.
11 Department o f Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review R eport (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2006), v.
12 However, the resurgence of the concept of empire has done much to fill in those contours. Michael
Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). See also, Derek 
Gregory, The Colonial Present (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004); Julian Reid, "War, 
Liberalism, and Modernity: The Biopolitical Provocations o f ‘Empire’," Cambridge Review o f  
International Affairs 17, no. 1 (2004).
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This formula, trotted out so often as to have achieved a somewhat mythic status, 
is a useful shorthand for indicating that in the realm of international relations, and, in 
particular, in the realm of US defence and security, som ething  has changed. From 
what, and to what, we are less certain.
The insight that change has taken place in the strategic environment has been 
embraced with enthusiasm by commentators in a variety of areas: from strategic 
analysts looking to influence the direction of a seemingly rudderless US foreign 
policy;13 to analysts concerned with the future shape and direction of the American 
defence industry;14 to a new generation of liberal peace theorists seeking to 
reformulate the possibilities of global peace in the framework of a global civil 
society;15 to critical theorists, keen as ever to expose the new generations of power at 
work inside the seem ingly neutral reformulation of the security problematic.16
While these debates refer to disparate concerns, there is nonetheless a common 
thread in these commentaries that identifies a kind of ‘holy trinity’ of themes 
providing impetus to the transformation of international relations, and by 
association, defence and security. Firstly, commentators emphasise the importance of 
globalisation  in altering the security dimensions of conflicts.17 In the words of Dalby:
«  Thomas P.M. Barnett, The Pentagon's N ew  Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century (New 
York, NY: Berkley Publishing Group, 2004); Colin S. Gray, The Sheriff: Am erica’s Defense o f  the New  
World Order (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004).
Ann R. Markusen and Sean S. Costigan, ed., A Defense Industry fo r  the 21st Century (New York, NY: 
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999).
15 Mary Kaldor, N ew  and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Oxford: Polity Press, 1999).
16 Gregory, The Colonial Present; Dillon, "Global Security in the 21st Century."
For a diverse range of this literature, see, Yee-Kuang Heng, War as Risk M anagement: S trategy and  
Conflict in an Age o f  Globalised Risks (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006); Barnett, The Pentagon's N ew  Map; 
Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the N ew  Wars: The Merging o f Development and Security 
(London: Zed Books, 2001); Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, "Global Liberal Governance: Biopolitics, 
Security and War," Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies 30, no. 1 (2001).
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The reconsideration of boundaries in terms of movement, territory, and identity is an important 
locus of discussion for attempts to think differently about world politics, if not international 
relations.18
The study of globalisation is often inflected by an emerging literature that gained 
prominence in the 1990s, the study of complexity, and especially the study of 
networks as complex systems. In the words of Annemarie Mol and John Law, 
complexity is present:
... if things relate but don’t add up, if events occur but not within the processes of linear time, and if 
phenomena share a space but cannot be mapped in terms of a single set of three-dimensional 
coordinates.1^
Globalisation, read in this light, can be seen as a complex phenomenon, by which the 
“network society,” famously identified by Manuel Castells, behaves with the emergent 
properties of complex adaptive systems made familiar by the study of biological 
system s.20
Secondly, commentators note an alteration in the nature o f  w arfare, or more 
accurately in the kinds of wars gaining strategic importance. Small (low-intensity) 
wars may always have been a feature of human existence, but the seeming end of the 
age of ‘great power’ conflict has seen a concomitant increase in the importance 
accorded to small-scale (civil) wars, terrorist actions, asymmetric warfare and the 
threatening behaviours of rogue states.21 Indeed, the very concept of security has been 
expanded by some authors to include such issues as resource scarcity,
18 Simon Dalby, "Political Space: Autonomy, Liberalism and Empire," Alternatives 30, no. 4 (2005): 419. 
^Annemarie Mol and John Law, "Complexities: An Introduction," in Complexities: Social Studies o f  
Knowledge Practices, ed. Annemarie Mol and John Law, 1-22 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002),
1.
20 Manuel Castells, The Rise o f  the N etw ork Society (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996). See also, 
Michael Dillon, "Network Society, Network-Centric Warfare and the State of Emergency," Theory, 
Culture and Society 19, no. 4 (2002).
21 Department of Defense, QDR 2006.
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overpopulation, environmental degradation, and the hotly contested topic of ‘human 
security.’22
Thirdly, and finally, commentators note that the m ethod o f  m aking w a r  has 
shifted, particularly in industrialised nations, with the increasing use of sophisticated 
technologies and associated doctrinal changes. This is in turn associated with the rise 
in asymmetric challenges. The use of information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) within the military, and the notable ability of industrialised nations to 
‘sanitise’ war through precision air strikes and careful management of media 
coverage, has led to sustained criticism of the nature of contemporary warfare, 
including Jean Baudrillard’s famous claim that the Gulf War “did not take place.”23
These them es are strongly correlated with the changes observed by international 
relations’ younger siblings in the defence and security studies community, although 
the m ilitaiy community’s response to changing world events, particularly during the 
1990s, had a markedly different emphasis.
Defence and security studies: a Revolution in Military Affairs?
If the chaos of the 1990s was reflected in the failure of international relations to 
come to terms with the conflicts it faced (or, more accurately, resulted in a cacophony 
of approaches that replaced each other in quick succession), then for the defence 
policy community there was a more sustained focus.24 Particularly in the United 
States, the defence policy community responded by obsessing over the fo rm  the
22 See, R.B.J. Walker, "The Subject of Security," in Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, ed. 
Keith Krause, and Michael C. Williams, 61-82 (London: UCL Press, 1 9 9 7 )-
2 3  jean Baudrillard, The Gulf War D id N ot Take Place (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1995). See also, Paul Virilio, Desert Screen: War a t the Speed o f Light (London: Continuum, 1991).
24 Colin Mclnnes, "A Different Kind of War? September 11 and the United States’ Afghan War," Review  
o f International Studies 29, no. 2 (2003): 165.
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military would take, without addressing the substance  of what they would be fighting 
-  that is, they concerned them selves with how  they would fight, not w h o .25
Specifically, the 1990s was the decade of the Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA), a term that according to one leading author at one time carried such cachet as 
to virtually guarantee the success of any project tied to it.26 While the RMA is a 
generic concept that refers to moments in history at which “a radical change in the 
character or conduct of war” is observable, in the 1990s the RMA concept became 
inextricably linked to the expected transformative impacts of information and 
communications technologies on the nature and actions of the militaries of the 
industrialised w orld .27 Developed during the 1980s when the Soviet military 
apparatus feared being outstripped by its smaller but more technologically advanced 
adversary, the concept gained currency in the US following the overwhelming 
supremacy displayed by US forces in the Gulf War of 1991.28
As noted insightfully by Theodor Galdi in his report on the RMA for the US 
Congress, the RMA concept actually houses two divergent schools of thought. The 
first operates at a strategic level, and sees the altering political, social and economic 
environment as creating a “need for completely different types and organizations for 
the application of military force in the future.”2? The emphasis here is on the 
fracturing impact of globalisation on the nation state, the altering nature of the
2 5  Frederick W. Kagan, Finding the Target: The Transformation o f American M ilitary Policy (New 
York, NY: Encounter Books, 2006).
26 Colin S. Gray, Strategy fo r  Chaos: Revolutions in M ilitary Affairs and the Evidence o f History 
(London: Frank Cass, 2002), 1.
2? Gray, Strategy fo r  Chaos, 4.
28 Paul Hirst, Space and Power: Politics, War and Architecture (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 139.
2 9  Theodor W. Galdi, "Revolution in Military Affairs? Competing Concepts, Organizational Responses, 
Outstanding Issues" (Congressional Research Service Reports, 1 9 9 5 )> http://www.fas.org/man/crs/95- 
1170.htm.
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conflicts in which the US is likely to find itself, and the changing nature of the 
organisation required to respond to this (particularly in terms of the need for smaller, 
more flexible, and more rapidly deployable units). In fact, this school of thought 
reflects rather accurately, if on a smaller scale, the larger concerns of the international 
relations community at the time, although it was couched in a ‘high-tech’ language 
that was heavily influenced by network theories from the computer and physical 
sciences. The election of the Bush Administration and, in particular, the ascent of 
Donald Rumsfeld to the post of Secretary of Defense saw the incorporation of this 
concept of the RMA into mainstream US defence thinking. In particular, the 
Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, published a few weeks after the 9/11 attacks 
(although researched and written in the previous year) emphasised the lack of 
strategic certainty in the post Cold War world, and the need to manage risks created 
by the networked nature of contem poraiy US s o c ie ty .3°
The second conceptualisation of the RMA is more narrowly focused on the 
impact of networking technologies on the US military’s operating techniques (that is, 
on the operational and tactical rather than strategic level), and views the organisation 
as a ‘system of system s.’31 The technologies of precision strike, command and control 
(C2) networking, and enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), 
are all said to have potentially revolutionary impacts on the operation of the US 
military, acting in concert to create a networked force that appears capable of almost 
anything. Merging well with the complexity Zeitgeist of the 1990s, theorists from 
influential military colleges and think tanks such as the RAND Corporation were able 
to utilise the image of the military as a ‘system of system s’ to make such startling (and 
slightly bemusing) predictions as:
3° Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review  R eport (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2001).
31 Galdi, "Revolution in Military Affairs?".
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The timelessness of Clausewitz will inevitably be revitalized by the incorporation of post-Newtonian 
scientific terminology, replacing that of the prevailing science of Clausewitz’s own era -  the branch 
of physics known as statics. It will be more biological. ‘Centers of gravity,’ ‘friction,’ and ‘mass’ will 
give way to nonlinear concepts, including those rooted in thermodynamics. The commanders of 
tomorrow will wrestle with ‘entropy’ and ‘phase states,’ while grasping ‘periodic and strange 
attractors’ as they search for ‘fractals’ and ‘emergence.^2
From these early flights of rhetoric, the RMA eventually came to acquire a 
doctrinal (and practical) mode of expression in the figure of Network-Centric Warfare 
(NCW). The following, drawn from a seminal article by influential NCW proponents 
Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and John Gartska, highlights the discourse’s origins 
in complexity theory, as well as its dependence on technological advances in the field 
oflCTs:
Network-centric warfare and all of its associated revolutions in military affairs grow out of and 
draw their power from the fundamental changes in American society. These changes have been 
dominated by the co-evolution of economics, information technology, and business processes and 
organizations, and they are linked by three themes:
• The shift in focus from the platform to the network
• The shift from viewing actors as independent to viewing them as part of a continuously 
adapting ecosystem
32 Thomas Czerwinski, "Command and Control at the Crossroads," Parameters 26, no. 3 (1996), 
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/96autumn/czerwins.htm. See also, David S. Alberts, 
and Thomas J. Czerwinski, ed., Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security (Washington, DC: 
National Defense University, 1997); David S. Alberts et al., Understanding Information Age Warfare 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Command and Control Research Program, 2001); John 
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, ed., In Athena's Camp: Preparing fo r  Conflict in the Information Age 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997).
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• The importance of making strategic choices to adapt or even survive in such changing 
ecosystems33
Since this article appeared, much work has gone into articulating a vision of what 
NCW might look like. One recent perspective argued that:
Network-centric warfare (NCW) is characterized by the ability of geographically dispersed forces to 
attain a high level of shared battlespace awareness that is exploited to achieve strategic, 
operational, and tactical objectives in accordance with the commander’s intent.34
The emphasis, then, is on creating a force that is able to operate in geographically  
non-contiguous battlespaces, while maintaining a synchronicity o f  effort through the 
extensive networking enabled by ICTs.
In the years following 9/11, while NCW has gone on to be rebranded (as Network- 
Centric Operations), it has also been subsumed under a much broader agenda known 
as fo rce  transform ation. The agenda of force transformation, given irresistible force 
by Secretary Rumsfeld, has been promoted vigorously from inside the Pentagon; by 
quasi-departmental organisations such as the Office of Force Transformation (OFT), 
established only a few weeks after 9/11 (and only recently disestablished as part of an 
attempt to ‘mainstream’ transformation); and by military organisations, such as the 
newly restructured Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), whose mission since late 2002
33 Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Gartska, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," 
Proceedings o f  the U.S. N aval Institute January (1998),
http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles98/PROCebrowski.htm.
34 Office of Force Transformation (OFT), Elements o f Defense Transformation (Washington, DC: Office 
of Secretary of Defense, 2004), 8.
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has been overseeing the transformation of the US armed services, particularly 
through concept development and experimentation.35
Force transformation is a remarkably broad agenda, covering the transformation 
of the Department of Defense’s way of doing business (including military support 
functions such as logistics and procurement); the transformation of the military’s way 
of working with others (such as government agencies, non-governmental 
organisations, international organisations, and military allies); as well as the 
transformation of the way in which the military fights.36 This final transformation 
includes recruitment, training, doctrinal innovations, and organisational changes, 
such as restructuring the US Army into a modular force with Brigades detached from  
Divisions through the placement of key auxiliary functions within their structure, 
enhancing their self-sufficiency and rapid deployability.37
In addition to providing an extensive agenda of reform for the immediate future, 
transformation is a process with its eye toward long-term strategy. In the words of the 
OFT, “while we might point to a beginning of transformation, we cannot foresee the 
end.”38 Indeed, the purpose of transformation is to maintain adaptability and 
flexibility in a security environment that is considered near impossible to predict. 
Frederick Kagan argues that it is precisely this non-committal stance toward the 
composition of the future that led to the failure of the US military to be prepared for 
the war in Iraq.39 Kagan is not alone in linking transformation to current US military 
dilemmas, with critics pointing to Secretary Rumsfeld’s desire for a personnel-light
35 Josh Rogin, "DoD Decides to Close Office of Force Transformation" (Federal Computer Week, 2006), 
http://www.oft.osd.miI/library/libra1y_files/article_522_FCW%20Article%200n%20OFT%20Closing.p
df.
36 Office of Force Transformation (OFT), Elements o f  Defense Transformation, 3.
37 See, United States Army, "The Army's Modular Forces" (2005), http://www.army.mil/modularforces.
38 Office of Force Transformation (OFT), Elements o f Defense Transformation, 1.
39 Kagan, Finding the Target.
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invasion of Iraq as both a reflection of his adherence to the transformation agenda 
and a leading cause of the US military’s current problems there.40 Indeed, the 
transformation agenda has been scaled back in light of the heavy burden of 
maintaining the current deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. In particular, the 
second Quadrennial Defense Review has been viewed as a retreat on the part of the 
Secretary of Defense, and his subsequent removal was viewed as nothing short of the 
death knell of transformation in some quarters.41 Nonetheless, the feeling remains 
among policy elites in Washington, that “transformation is the only game in town.”42 
Further, this thesis argues that while the present ‘transformational’ US m ilitaiy (or, 
rather, hybridised conventional-cum-transformational military) may not be 
optim ised for counterinsurgency operations, it is oriented to the ‘real’ in a more 
nuanced and concrete way than imagined by critics such as Kagan.
Critical security studies
While the fields of international relations and defence and security studies 
rushed to cope with the collapse of a certain world order, critical security studies took 
advantage of the opportunity to question old certainties in the field of security studies 
that were looking particularly wan in light of contemporary events.
Although critical security studies is hardly a homogenous field (in fact, it is 
hardly a continuous field of study at all), its key insight has been in identifying the
40 See, Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story o f the Invasion and Occupation 
o f  Iraq  (London: Atlantic Books, 2006), Chapters 1-6.
41 See, Department of Defense, QDR 2006; David S. Cloud, "Pentagon Review Calls for No Big Changes," 
N ew  York Times, February 2, 2006; Fred Kaplan, "Rumsfeld Surrenders: The QDR Dashes His Dreams 
of Military Transformation," Slate (2006), http://www.slate.com /id/2 i 3 5 3 4 3 /-
42 Cdr. Steve Kenny, in discussion with the author, 2005.
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possibilities inherent in reproblematising the concept o f ‘security.’43 Authors in this 
field have drawn on the them es outlined above and deployed them reflexively: that is, 
they have asked, ‘What is enabled by viewing security in this way?’ and, importantly, 
‘What is disabled?’.
Mark Duffield, for example, examines the reconceptualisation of the strategic 
environment by the industrialised nations during the 1990s. He argues that these 
nations came to discard, in parts, the traditional image of states as discrete, self- 
contained units, instead viewing states as embedded in a (globalised) network of 
social, political, and economic interactions.44 According to Duffield, this led to the 
inextricable linkage of the social and economic development agendas of the 
international aid community with the security agendas of their political paymasters. 
In a globalised world, where security is seen as a property of networks, achieving 
security in one place must be achieved through pacifying the dangers present in other 
places, and this pacification is best achieved through a development agenda that 
follows liberal capitalist modes of operation. Thus Duffield argues that:
... there is a noticeable convergence between the notions of development and security. Through a 
circular form of reinforcement and mutuality, achieving one is now regarded as essential for 
security in the other. Development is ultimately impossible without stability and, at the same time, 
security is not sustainable without development.^
43 Duffield, Global Governance and the N ew  Wars; David Campbell and Michael Dillon, "The End of 
Philosophy and the End of International Relations," in The Political Subject o f  Violence, ed. David 
Campbell and Michael Dillon, 1-47 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1 9 9 3 ); James Der Derian, 
"The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," in The Political Subject o f  Violence, 
ed. David Campbell and Michael Dillon, 9 4 -H 3  (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1 9 9 3 ); 
Walker, "The Subject o f Security"; Simon Dalby, "Contesting an Essential Concept: Reading the 
Dilemmas in Contemporary Security Discourse," in Critical Security Studies: Cases and Concepts, ed. 
Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, 3-32 (London: UCL Press, 1 9 9 7 )-
44 Duffield, Global Governance and the N ew Wars, 2-7,13-14.
45 Duffield, Global Governance and the N ew  Wars, 16.
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Here, Duffield joins an otherwise disparate group of authors in asking what old and 
new conceptualisations of security enable (empower) people, states and institutions 
to do.46
The key insight of critical security studies is that, in David Campbell’s words, 
“danger is not an objective condition,” and that, following Michel Foucault, any 
knowledge system surrounding the specification of such a condition is implicated in 
the creation of relationships of pow er.47 As this understanding of the relationship 
between power and knowledge acts as a foundation for much of that which follows, it 
is explored here in more detail.
According to Foucault, power is not merely juridical, repressive, or exercised 
solely through the State. Rather, power is an action upon the action of others. He 
therefore sees power as a potential in all relationships, a fact acknowledged in his 
methodological injunction to talk not of ‘power’ in the abstract, but rather of ‘power 
relations.’48
This view has a necessary result for the analysis of knowledge and the production 
of truth in our society: truth, and its correlate, knowledge, are always/already 
implicated in relationships of power. As Foucault argues:
... truth isn’t outside power, or lacking power;... truth isn’t the reward of free spirits, the child of
protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is
46 One of the earliest, and certainly most influential, pieces of work in this field, for example, explored 
the way in which discourses of security during the Cold War were used to establish a certain form of the 
‘American’ identity, in ways that were often quite independent of the Soviet threat. Campbell, Writing 
Security.
47 Campbell, Writing Security, 1.
48 "The Subject and Power," in Michel Foucault, Power: Essential Works o f  Foucault, 1954-1984,
Volume 3  (London: Penguin, 2002), 3 3 6 -3 9 -
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a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces
regular effects of p o w e r .49
For example, he argues that sexuality is only constituted as an area of inquiry because 
relations of power have established it as a possible object, while conversely power is 
only able to ‘take’ sexuality as a target because knowledge is capable of investing it in 
people -  capable of finding it, identifying it, measuring it.50 This mutually reinforcing 
connection is known as ‘power/knowledge.’ Power/knowledge orders the world in its 
own image, through creating power relations and systems of knowledge that classify 
and differentiate, that set out the limits of possibility for the existence of things.51
Similarly, security is a field of knowledge whose exercise is involved in extensive 
arrays of power relations -  including relationships between states, between the state 
and the individual, and relationships between individuals. While it may seem strange 
to identify a large-scale phenom enon such as a security with the identity of the 
individual, it is important to remember that security rests on basic assumptions about 
human behaviour -  assumptions that are able to be considered ‘truth’ as a result of 
the recursive interaction of power/knowledge. For example, Campbell and Dillon 
point to the placement of the ‘rational’ political subject at the heart of international 
relations theory, arguing that this version of subjectivity has created a situation in 
which it is very difficult for other (more inclusive, less violent) versions of political 
subjectivity to be exercised.52
49 "Truth and Power," in Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 
1972-1977 (New York: Pantheon Press, 1980), 131.
50 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History o f Sexuality, Volume 1 (London: Penguin 
Books, 1998), 98.
s1 Michel Foucault, The Order o f  Things (London: Routledge Classics, 2002).
52 Campbell et al., "The End of Philosophy," 1-5,4 1 -4 3 - Witness Hobbes’s origin myth in which rational 
men join together to ensure security within the anarchic state of nature for a foundational moment of the 
rational man in international relations: see, Der Derian, "The Value of Security," 98-99.
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Thus for critical security studies, the question has not been ‘How has the 
objective reality of international relations changed?’ but ‘How has the reformulation 
of security agendas altered relations of power?’. The advent of NCW, as well as the so- 
called neo-conservative agenda of the Bush administration, has led to a series of such 
discursive explorations of the construction of security.53 One author, for example, 
describes the construction of contemporary security agendas in terms of the ‘New  
Normal’:
The New Normal is a term used post-9/11 to signify a world destabilized by terrorism, economic 
fluctuations, and contagion prevention (notably SARS and Avian Flu). Significantly, the New 
Normal means that stability is no longer equivalent to normality. At best, everyday life is a 
managed instability .... The emergence of permanent and infinite war, with its unspecified enemy 
and immanentization of terror into everyday life, is constitutive of this New N orm al.54
While this thesis focuses less on the kinds of discursive analysis common in critical 
security studies, at its base it draws its essential provocation from this kind of 
question.
A map o f the work
The remainder of this thesis is divided into five chapters. The first two elaborate 
a conceptual ‘toolbox’ that enables the exploration of the US battlespace in the 
subsequent three chapters.
53 See, for example, Dillon, "NCW and the State of Emergency"; James Hay and Mark Andrejevic, 
"Introduction: Toward an Analytic of Governmental Experiments in these Times: Homeland Security as 
the New Social Security," Cultural Studies 20, no. 4-5 (2006).
54 Jack Bratich, "Public Secrecy and Immanent Security: A Strategic Analysis," Cultural Studies 20, no. 
4-5 (2006): 493 (emphasis original).
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The spatial operation of violence
The first chapter examines how, while the fields of international relations and 
defence studies are comfortable asserting that violence has changed, they are less 
clear about the means by which this change has come about. Rejecting traditional 
agent-centred or structural accounts of violence, this chapter makes it possible to 
think about violence as a force whose conditions of possibility, whose ordering 
practices, whose affinities and ‘passions’ are all altering and alterable. That is, this 
chapter makes the possible the study of violence as a force in its own transformation 
by opening out the study of violence’s spatiality (particularly, the study of the 
battlespace). Utilising the work of Michel Foucault, Henri Lefebvre, and Gilles 
Deleuze, this chapter outlines a particular understanding of spatiality, one that 
provides a useful mode of analysis for understanding violence as a creative and 
differentiating force.
Michel Foucault contributes the idea of spatial orderings, adding spatiality to the 
power/knowledge dyad and prompting analysis of the way in which spatiality helps 
establish the conditions of possibility for the exercise of violence. On the one hand, 
however, while Foucault’s work establishes the spatial logic of violence as an area of 
inquiry, it does not provide scope for examining the mechanisms by which this logic 
alters. On the other hand, Henri Lefebvre’s concept of the spatio-temporal introduces 
duration as a means by which qualitative difference can emerge. Lefebvre’s 
rhythmanalysis, as he terms it, allows violence to be analysed as a force whose 
conditions of possibility are found in the vicissitudes of both space and time. 
Lefebvre, however, remains wedded to a human-centred analysis, a result of his 
ambiguous but defining relationship with Marxism. This undermines his ability to 
explore the operation of violence as a force independent of (human or other) agency.
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It is Gilles Deleuze who comes closest to exploring the operation of violence in a 
m anner that is undetermined by agency or the grand narratives of structure. Deleuze 
and Guattari’s elaboration of the concept of the assemblage provides a method for 
analysing the openness -  the altering and experimental quality -  of US military 
violence. Whereas Foucault’s analysis is of a more or less coherent spatial logic of 
violence, Deleuze’s formulation is of the more playful and contingent spatial 
operation of violence.
A praxiography of the battlespace
The second chapter both extends and limits the implications of the previous 
chapter’s analysis. It extends the first chapter by articulating a series of qualities that 
define an ontology being described (at least partially) by each of the three authors. 
This account of an ‘alternative real’ undermines traditional notions of the real as ‘out 
there,’ independent from us, singular and definite. It replaces it instead with a real 
(and its accompanying orderings, subjectivities, and forms of agency) that emerges 
piecemeal, through practice. This account also argues that matter and meaning are 
inextricably intertwined, leading to the mess, multiplicity, and resistance found in the 
intransigent operation of the material world, and emphasises the importance of 
temporality -  the duration of praxis -  as the ‘location’ in which change emerges.
However, this chapter limits the implications of the first chapter by providing a 
methodology appropriate to this alternative real, one that dramatically reduces the 
scale and scope of academic ambitions to describe and understand the real. If the 
world exists in multiple textures, with interfering, alterable, and m essy conditions of 
possibility, then exploring that world will always be limited to the study of the real 
here, now, in this moment.
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In establishing praxiographic study -  that is, the study of prax is  or practice -  as 
the mode of operation for this thesis, this chapter also establishes the ethical 
imperatives informing this thesis. That is, this chapter seeks, if tentatively, to make a 
case for the importance of undertaking this kind of study, alongside more traditional 
kinds of studies of contemporary US battlespaces.
Interlude: the (no t-so-)d is tan t roar o f battle
This interlude prepares the reader for the movement from the polite world of 
ontological discussion to the unruly world of the violent streets of Baghdad. It situates 
the US military’s engagement in Baghdad in terms of its own competing conceptual 
(discursive) constructions of Network-Centric Warfare and urban warfare, before 
dragging the reader to the fight as it is being waged on the streets, where concepts are 
mired and hybridised in the shifting practices of violence.
CPOF: commanding the future
The third chapter creates a ‘thick’ description of a moment in a US battlespace. 
That m om ent is the use of a particular command and control technology, the 
Command Post of the Future (CPOF), by the 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom Phase II (2004-2005). This description is based on 
extensive interviews with soldiers from throughout the Cavalry, that took place in 
July 2005, six months after the Cavalry’s return from Iraq.
In particular, this chapter establishes an understanding of the operation of CPOF 
that undermines attempts to portray CPOF as a tool that ‘digitises’ the battlespace 
into a clean and singular picture. Rather, it demonstrates that CPOF was implicated 
in enacting multiple battlespaces, each ordering violence along its own particular 
configuration of power/knowledge/space.
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Addressing m ultip lic ity in the event-fu l city
While Law submits that an insistence on (ontological) singularity is productive, 
the fourth chapter suggests that 1st Cavalry’s engagement with (ontological) 
multiplicity in the form of multiple battlespaces in CPOF was equally productive.55 It 
explores how CPOF was used to tame, correlate, and ultimately m obilise  the 
multiplicity of the battlespace to enable it to fight its war in a novel and unique way.
In particular, the assemblage of CPOF-1st Cavalry-Baghdad assembled (mobilised) the 
CPOF user according to an affective response to the event (hence, the event-ful city). 
This chapter argues that the ‘scanning’ of the battlespace multiple engendered by the 
CPOF assemblage enabled a mode of ordering violence that was new in US military 
engagements (albeit a mode that was constantly interrupted by the complicated, 
messy, and noncoherent spatiality of the city of Baghdad).
Being present in Baghdad
The fifth and final chapter explores a different texture of 1st Cavalry’s engagement 
in Baghdad. Instead of exploring its interaction with ‘the battlespace’ as a general 
plane of activity, it explores the varying ways in which units were enacted as points of 
presence (and absence) through CPOF. This chapter argues that, while CPOF enacts a 
unit as a point of mobile presence, that enaction (that presence) relies on a series of 
excluded relations. This chapter explores the way in which these relations can return 
to interfere with the enaction of the mobile agency so sought after by the US military. 
Significantly, this chapter establishes the difficulty of controlling agency, even when 
operating in a way that attempts to take advantage of the contours of the alternative 
real outlined in Chapter Two.
55 See, Law, After Method, 66.
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Conclusion
This thesis concludes by returning to the themes articulated in this introduction, 
which establish a point of departure for more nuanced study of US military behaviour 
in the future. In particular, the conclusion draws together the various ways in which 
the objects of study in these chapters variously engage in the rejection of the fixed 
subjectivity, embrace experimentalism as a mode of operation, and are stymied by the 
obdurate operation of materiality. It concludes by articulating the need for more of 
this kind of tentative, halting study of the US military, and not less, rejecting 
arguments that such approaches are quietist and/or defeatist.
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CHAPTER ONE 
The spatial operation of violence
Violence itself both reflects and accelerates the experience of society as an incomplete project, as 
something to be made.s6
IN-COMING: Preliminary thoughts on organising violence
The first few rounds land within fifteen feet of the fighting hole Johnny Rotten and I are digging. 
Johnny is the first to yell Incoming, and we crouch in our half-dug hole.
The rounds explode beautifully, and the desert opens like a flower, a flower of sand. As the rounds 
impact, they make a sound of exhalation, as though air is being forced out of the earth. Sand from 
the explosion rains into our hole. Because we’d been deep in the labor of digging our fighting hole, 
and the chance of an enemy attack seemed remote and even impossible, our flak jackets, helmets, 
weapons, and gas masks are stacked in an orderly fashion a few feet behind our position. More 
rounds land nearby, and someone yells Gas! Gas! Gas! -  this being what you’re supposed to yell 
when you have good reason to believe a chemical or biological attack is in progress. Now Johnny
56 Allen Feldman, Formations o f Violence: The N arrative o f  the Body and Political Terror in Northern  
Ireland  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 5 -
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yells Fuck, what you’re supposed to yell when rounds are incoming and someone yells Gas! Gas! 
Gas! and your gas mask is a few feet behind you, out of reach. I too yell Fuck. Then I crawl on my 
belly to our gear, and as delicately as possible, I throw it all to Johnny and I crawl backward to the 
safety of our half-hole, and we don and clear our gas masks ....
Either because the CP has a chemical detector, or someone simply feels that no chemicals have 
been delivered via the incoming artillery, the all clear is called, and we remove our gas masks. The 
artillery assault e n d s .57
2 Royal Tank Regiment (RTR) battlegroup used the imagery [provided by Blue Force Tracker] 
extensively in order [to] analyze and plan routes for maneuver for the Challenger 2 main battle 
tank. The method in which this was conducted is that commanders could survey an area of interest 
at small scale and then focus on specific areas at far greater scale. Thereafter, imagery was used to 
identity likely obstacles such as berms and ditches and these could even be measured to define 
what impact they were likely to have on the movement of a squadron of tanks. The ability to 
undertake this type of planning, particularly, for urban and suburban areas meant that maneuver 
could be undertaken more rapidly, knowing where the likely impediments [w e r e j .s8
In military language, the letter ‘X’ often indicates a technology, yet to be named -  it signifies what 
is called a ‘test-bed,’ a place for new equipment to be tried, then advanced or retired. Fighter jets 
and robotic crafts are often first given X designations before they are fully developed. Some 
projects, like Boeing’s X-45, now called the Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle, get battlefield trials 
before they are named. [W ar X] points at three issues: that humans have been using technology... 
both to save and extend them selves.... When humans connect to a gun that magnifies their vision, 
allows them to see, sight, and shoot in the dark, over walls and around corners, they have extended 
their capabilities: What has been the cost of that extension? As well, X designates a generic human 
creature who can fit into any machinery and represents the standardization of life for war. The final 
reason for the X is that so much of the technology I discuss is experimental. There are suits of
57 Anthony Swofford, Jarhead: A Soldier’s S tory o f Modern War (London: Scribner, 2003), 189-90.
58 office of Force Transformation (OFT), A Network-Centric Operation Case Study: US/UK Coalition 
Combat Operations During Operation Iraqi Freedom  (Washington, DC: Office of Secretary of Defense, 
2005), 6-10.
27
powered armour, robotic tanks, rotorcraft that can outdo all previous helicopters for agility and 
power, uninhabited vehicles in the air, underwater, on the ground: all of these create an 
environment for themselves.59
Above are three disparate accounts of the organisation of violence in the 
‘postm odern’ battlespace, particularly that of Iraq.60 There is difficulty in matching 
such accounts to each other, but opportunity as well. For these accounts, individually 
and taken together, represent something about the nature of US interventions in Iraq 
that is integral to the subject matter of this thesis: they illustrate the extent to which 
Iraq is a ‘testing ground’ for US military behaviours. They illustrate the uncertainty -  
and the innovation -  of the US project in Iraq on a number of conceptual levels.
In rhetorical parlance, the phrase ‘testing ground’ has lost any speculative 
meaning it might have had, and now acts as a cynical shorthand used by those who 
know that leaders have already made up their minds w h at to do, and just wish to 
perfect the means of how .61 It may, however, be useful to reinvigorate the notion of 
testing for a moment. Experimentation implies an institutional openness to the 
malleability of method and result that opens, perhaps, a toehold for critical access (to 
be distinguished from critical purchase, which must still be gained at an ontological 
and not epistemological level). In this sense, Iraq is a testing ground not only for the 
bodies of Marines like Anthony Swofford, but also for the functionalism of 
technologies like Blue Force Tracker that so excite the desk officers at the Office of
59 Tim Blackmore, W arX : Human Extensions in Battlespace (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2005), 3-4 -
60 It should be noted that Anthony Swofford’s account refers to his involvement in Operation Desert 
Storm (1991) and not Operation Iraqi Freedom (beginning 2003).
61 For a particularly ferocious -  and pre Operation Iraqi Freedom -  account of this kind, see, Editorial 
Board, World Socialist Website, "Iraq -  a Testing Ground for US Militarism" (International Committee 
of the Fourth International, 1998), http://www.wsws.org/news/1998/mar1998/iraq-mo4.shtml.
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Force Transformation, as well as for the new relations between humans and 
technology brought about in the experimental deployment of evolving technologies.
This thesis argues that this testing ground is not being driven simply by agent- 
centred experimentation, or even the slow colonisation of one sphere of power (for 
example, the US homeland) with the structures and processes discovered in another 
(for example, Iraq). Rather, this thesis argues that the project of violence -  its 
conditions of possibility, its ordering practices, its affinities and its passions -  are 
altering and alterable. The need to realise the opportunity presented by this openness 
is particularly acute when following a methodological ethos committed to 
interference. Interference begins with a careful identification of practices that are 
more or less harmful, and implies a commitment to no singular outcome, but rather 
an ongoing commitment to the alteration of harmful practices.62 If violence is open, 
then it too can be the subject of such interference.
However, as indicated above, there is difficulty in such a project as well. To think 
of violence as forming a ‘testing ground’ requires a way of thinking about violence 
that goes against centuries of tradition. Violence holds the dubious distinction of 
being one of the few categories of human experience to be overlooked by critical 
social scientific inquiry over the past few decades. It has emerged as a strange lacuna 
around which discussions take place. As Hannah Arendt argues, the silence 
surrounding violence itself:
... shows to what an extent violence and its arbitrariness were taken for granted and therefore 
neglected; no one questions or examines what is obvious to all. Those who saw nothing but violence 
in human affairs, convinced that they were “always haphazard and serious, not precise” (Renan) or 
that God was forever with the bigger battalions, had nothing more to say about violence or history.
62 This methodological impulse is addressed in the following chapter.
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Anybody looking for some kind of sense in the records of the past was almost bound to see violence 
as a marginal phenomenon.^
That is, traditional accounts of the emergence of violence tend to emphasise the 
determining role played by agency (violence as an instrument) or structure (violence 
as an inevitable result of certain conditions, for example, scarcity -  be it material or 
political) in explaining the operation of violence. 64 Worse still, some abandon the 
exploration of ‘m eaning’ altogether, throwing their hands in the air in the face of the 
seem ingly intractable irrationality of violence.65 As a result, traditional accounts have 
difficulty exploring violence as a productive  fo rce  in its own righ t.66 Structural and 
agent-centric accounts view all violence as being of a piece -  only put to different 
ends, or arising from different structures. Here, in discussions of violence, and as has 
been pointed out by critical thinkers in many different arenas over the past decade, 
structure and agency are different sides of the same coin. However, if we take 
seriously the prospect that violence alters over time, that it has tendencies that can be 
explored to differentiate this kind of violence from that, then we can begin to accord 
significance to the experimental practices of violence found in Iraq, redeeming them  
from the grand narratives currently so popular of empire or moral decay that seem so
63 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (San Diego, CA: Harvest Books, 1970), 8.
64 Paradoxically, this often includes post-structuralist discursive accounts of security and society, which 
can reduce violence to a discursively determined ‘exercise’ of power. See, for example, David Campbell, 
Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics o f  Identity (Rev. Ed.) (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 201-202. The pervasiveness of the agent-centred mode of violence 
is unsurprising when we consider the psychological imperatives for getting soldiers on the battlefield. As 
Tim Blackmore argues:
The spectre of control denies the reality of war’s chaos .... In order to keep soldiers on the battlefield, they must 
be trained to believe that they can successfully take charge in combat.
Blackmore, War X, 16.
65 For an excellent summary of the ‘traditional’ literature, see, Anna Simons, "War: Back to the Future," 
Annual Review  o f Anthropology 28 (1999).
66 ‘Productive’ here is used according to the sense that Foucault gives it when he describes power as 
‘productive’:
In fact power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth.
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f the Prison (London: Vintage Books, 1995), 194-
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inadequate in the face of the subtly nuanced differences to be found in violence 
practiced here as opposed to there.
Nonetheless, saying that violence has an internal ‘power’ to differentiate itself 
that cannot be explained through deterministic accounts (or through the 
abandonment of critical inquiry in the face of irrationality) is insufficient to create a 
vocabulary that adequately describes its operation -  its tendencies and the process of 
its differentiations. This thesis articulates one such vocabulary, opening a route for 
exploring the operation of violence, its conditions of possibility, its alteration and so 
on. This is the route opened by a spatial exploration of violence, an interrogation of 
what might be termed the spatia l logic o f  violence.
This chapter develops an argument that links spatialising practices and the 
exercise of force. Using three authors -  Michel Foucault, Henri Lefebvre, and Gilles 
Deleuze -  spatialising practices and violence are linked in a way that denies primacy 
to the agency of the subject (Foucault), and to the ‘agency’ of structure (Lefebvre), 
leaving them linked instead as part of a dynamic, experimental and differentiating 
assemblage (Deleuze).
This chapter firstly serves to outline the conception of spatialising practices that 
underlines this thesis, establishing the significance of spatiality as an analytical tool.
It links the features of spatiality, as established by each author, to the exercise of force 
in a way that undermines deterministic accounts of violence, enabling the following 
chapters to explore violence as a force that is ‘open’ or ‘experimental.’ In particular, 
this thesis proposes a conception of space that is relational, em ergent, and politically  
im portan t. This conception of space draws on an upswell of work in post-structuralist 
and critical geography. For example, in one of the important and influential works on 
space in recent years, Doreen Massey articulates three propositions about space from
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which she proceeds. Firstly, she argues that space is the product of interrelations, and 
thus cannot be understood in essentialist term s.67 Secondly, she argues that space is 
“the sphere of the possibility of the existence of multiplicity in the sense of 
contemporaneous plurality.”68 This in turn implies the importance of thinking space 
as political, if we conceive of the political as the interaction o f  difference and  
heterogeneity .69 Finally, she argues that space is a process -  that it is always 
undergoing construction through the relations that form its substance.70 While the 
conceptualisation of space offered here is framed slightly differently, it is apparent 
that there are strong resonances between an account of space as relational, political, 
and emergent as proposed here, and that proposed by Massey.
As indicated, in this chapter space and its links to violence are considered 
through the contributions of Michel Foucault, Henri Lefebvre, and Gilles Deleuze. 
Each of these authors offers an iteration of a mode of thinking about the three 
qualities of space identified (space as relational, emergent, and politically important), 
highlighting insights made possible by spatial explorations in these terms.
Specifically, Foucault contributes the idea of spatial orderings, and in so doing, 
undermines the concept of subjectivity, proposing instead that the (ontological) limits 
of the conditions of possibility for violence be explored through an understanding of 
its spatial logic. Lefebvre performs a spatio-temporal analysis (a rhythmanalysis), a 
mode of analysis which introduces duration as somewhere (or, more accurately, 
somewheri) in which qualitative difference can emerge. That is, spatio-temporality 
allows for violence to be conceived of as truly open to change. Yet, as Foucault limits 
his analysis by shying from exploring the creative potential of the m om ent of battle 
(preferring instead to focus on the limits of possibility established by its space),
67 Doreen Massey, For Space (London: SAGE Publications, 2005)* 9 -to*
68 Massey, For Space, 9.
69 Massey, For Space, 10-11.
7° Massey, For Space, 9,11-12.
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Lefebvre s conception of violence and space is limited by his commitment to an 
(admittedly nuanced and sometimes ambiguous) Marxist humanism. It is Deleuze 
(with Guattari) who comes closest to expressing spatialising practices and violence as 
a conjunction that expresses and engenders difference and heterogeneity. His 
conception of the war machine sees spatialising practices and violence as intimately 
related -  as elements, in fact, of a dynamic, self-differentiating assemblage.71 We see, 
then, the progression of violence from being ordered through a spatial logic to 
operating as an integral component of a spatio-temporal environment.
While each of these author’s analyses are explored through the lens of space (as 
relational, emergent, and politically important), the emphasis of this review remains 
the articulation of a vocabulary capable of describing the tendencies of violence in a 
way that creates a meaningful understanding of its material organisation and its 
productive (and uncertain) nature. As the focus is on spatiality, the account of the 
authors’ works are necessarily partial, and the supporting literature used is lim ited.72
Having thus established the ways in which spatiality can open out the 
organisation of violence as a subject of critical inquiry, the following chapter 
establishes certain methodological and ontological imperatives that bring the scope of 
the inquiry dramatically ‘inwards.’ The move from the general interrogation of a 
spatial logic of violence to a more modest exploration of a specific spatial operation of
71 As becomes apparent, these authors -  whose personal relationships are well documented -  use space 
in similar ways in their work, despite their often divergent interests.
72 For Foucault and Deleuze, most supporting literature tends not to focus on the materially spatial (as 
opposed to metaphorically spatial) implications of their work. See, however, Stuart Elden, M apping the 
Present: Heidegger, Foucault and the Project o f  a Spatial H istory (London: Continuum, 2001). For 
Lefebvre, the opposite is true, but the overly spatialised focus of much of the supporting literature poses 
its own problems for this thesis, which seeks to understand Lefebvre’s conception of time and  space. For 
a good summary of this problem, see, Stuart Elden, "Politics, Philosophy, Geography: Henri Lefebvre in 
Recent Anglo-American Scholarship," Antipode 33, no. 5 (2001).
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violence (the US battlespace in Iraq) is important, and should be kept in mind when 
reading the accounts of Foucault, Lefebvre and Deleuze, all of whom, to some degree, 
adopt ‘big picture’ accounts of their subjects.73
Spatial orderings: bounding the conditions of possibilities of 
violence
There are a number of ways of thinking about the relationality of space. In 
particular, the ‘kind’ of relations considered important and the way these relations 
‘form’ space are important clues that provide an explanatory vocabulary for the 
organisation of violence. While Foucault, Lefebvre and Deleuze all conceptualise 
spatiality and relationality in (slightly) different ways, they draw on a similar 
understanding of relationality as thoroughly imbued with power in a way that can 
best be explained in the context of carefully explored spatiality. For Foucault in 
particular, the concept of spatial orderings helps explain exactly how  
power/knowledge is implicated in the process of creating relationships between the 
knower and the known.74 The spatial aspect of these relationships (which are not 
lim ited to relationships between human subjects) is, in fact, so tightly aligned with 
power/knowledge that it is possible to think of power/knowledge as only two sides of 
a three-sided mobius strip, power/knowledge/space.
The following section opens with a sketch drawn from one of Foucault’s earliest 
works, The O rder o f  Things, a work which, while ostensibly a study of abstract fields 
of knowledge far removed from the concreteness of relationships in space, actually
73 See, for example, John Law’s gentle criticism of Foucault: “perhaps,” he suggests, Foucault is right in 
that there are larger limits set by systems of power/knowledge on the possibilities of knowledge, but 
Law’s inspiration is the “more modest” suggestion that “particular and specific sets o f inscription 
devices” set the limits to the possibilities of knowledge. John Law, After Method: Mess in Social Science 
Research (London: Routledge, 2004), 3 5  (emphasis original).
74 These relationships are not merely relationships of subjection, but also incorporate relationships of 
subjectification (by which the ‘subject’ comes to know and thus create themselves).
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illustrates the way in which spatiality is woven into the very core of the operation of 
power/knowledge. This argument is at the core of all that follows in this thesis. Using 
spa tia l orderings  to explore the organisation of violence undermines explanations 
that point to the determinative role of agency in directing violence, showing that, if 
anything, agency is as likely a result of violence as its ca u sed  This insight is made 
concrete with the reading that follows from Discipline and Punish. This classic work 
by Foucault has often served as a starting point for critical theorists of space because 
of its exemplary description of the space of the Panopticon. In this thesis, however, 
the work is used to provide an insight into the operation of violence -  specifically, the 
operation of the European armies of the 18th century emerge from particular, 
identifiable spatial relations, bound together in historically specific ways, to form a 
distinct mode of organising violence.
Aphasic orderings and the ‘fa ilu re ’ o f space75
It appears that certain aphasiacs, when shown various differently coloured skeins of wool on a table 
top, are consistently unable to arrange them into any coherent pattern; as though that simple 
rectangle were unable to serve in their case as a homogenous and neutral space in which things 
could be placed so as to display at the sam e tim e the continuous order o f  their identities or 
differences as well as the semantic field  o f  their denomination. Within this simple space in which 
things are normally arranged and given names, the aphasiac will create a multiplicity of tiny, 
fragmented regions in which nameless resemblances agglutinate things into unconnected islets; in 
one corner, they will place the lightest-coloured skeins, in another the red ones, somewhere else
75 The use of the word ‘ordering’ here is deliberate: it indicates the transitive and incomplete nature of 
the process. This is in recognition of both Foucault’s commitment to recognising the inherent and 
necessary resistance to the operation of power/knowledge, as well as to the philosophical and 
methodological commitments made in the following chapter acknowledging the partial and changeable 
nature of a seemingly coherent external reality. See, Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The 
H istory o f  Sexuality, Volume 1 (London: Penguin Books, 1998), 95-96; Law, After Method.
7 6  ‘Aphasia’: “loss or impairment of the faculty of symbolic formulation and of speech due to a lesion of 
the central nervous system.” The Macquarie Dictionary, 3rd ed., s.v. “aphasia.”
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those that are softest in texture, in yet another place the longest, or those that have a tinge of purple 
or those that have been wound up into a ball. But no sooner have they been adumbrated than all of 
these groupings dissolve again, for the field of identity that sustains them, however limited it may 
be, is still too wide not to be unstable, and so the sick mind continues to infinity, creating groups 
then dispersing them again, heaping up diverse similarities, destroying those that seem clearest, 
splitting up things that are identical, superimposing different criteria, frenzied, beginning all over 
again, becoming more and more disturbed, and teetering finally on the brink of a n x ie ty .77
The aphasiac’s inability to reproduce simple orders in the wool on the table top 
indicates not just the failure of power/knowledge (the failure to order) that 
accompanies the failure of language, but also vividly illustrates the importance of 
spatiality in the ordering process. The space of the table, so neutral and readily 
divisible to the normal brain, is, according to Foucault, inherent in that which 
undermines the activity of the aphasiac.
The key to understanding the aphasiac’s dilemma is to understand how ordering 
occurs in and through spatial relations. As Foucault astutely notes, it is not that the 
aphasiac cannot make distinctions between the kinds of wool (indeed, it seems 
divisions are too plentiful, too fruitful) but rather that ‘in order to order’ we need to 
be able to both  divide and create difference, and  bring together difference into an 
overarching similarity. These relationships (of division, of joining -  of ordering) are 
spa tia l in their nature. They must be brought into relation with another object -  the 
surface of the table. Yet for the aphasiac, the spatiality of this relationship fails: once 
the multiplicity of their divisions reaches the table they are incapable of remaining 
still, of cohering with other orderings, of maintaining internal stability -  thwarted by 
the topology of this seemingly neutral ‘space’ that, for the aphasiac, is a space that is 
twisted to prevent the aligning, hinging and distribution of the similarity and
77 Michel Foucault, The Order o f  Things (London: Routledge Classics, 2002), xix-xx (emphasis added).
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difference that their own (mis)ordering has identified. Foucault here urgently 
reminds us of our need to create stable spatial relationships if our ordering processes 
are to display both differences and “the semantic field of their denom ination.”
Implicit in Foucault’s account -  although not perhaps articulated in quite this 
way -  is the idea that space cannot be conceived as simply an empty ‘container’ in 
which things are neutrally laid out (in Casey’s evocative terms, “a totality of 
extension.”)?8 There are only larger or smaller things, in relation to each other. What 
we think of as empty space is actually the unevenness of the ground, the complexity of 
the built environment, the scrub and the bush, not to mention the people and cars 
and airplanes, and the weather.^ This is what is meant when it is said that space is 
relational: we may think of the table as the space on which ordering takes place, but it 
is also an active participant in that ordering -  it forms relations with the objects being 
placed on it, and those relationships inflect the ability of objects to form particular 
orders. An object’s organisation depends on the topography, chorography, and yes, 
som etim es even geography, of the ‘bigger’ object which frames it.80 What Foucault 
illustrates through the aphasiac’s experience is that there are certain spatial 
relationships that ‘work’ and others that do not, and that these interfere with the 
formation of relationships of power/knowledge (the process of ordering).
78 Edward S. Casey, Representing Place: Landscape Painting and M aps (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), 353.
79 For a discussion of different ways of thinking about ‘space,’ see, Edward S. Casey, The Fate o f  Place: A  
Philosophical H istory  (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997).
80 Issues of scale are discussed in the following chapters. The difference between topography, 
chorography, and geography appears from a distance to be one of scale. Topography generally refers to 
the precise features of a region or locality, chorography refers to the study of regions, while geography 
implies the study of the earth as whole (or at least parts of the earth considered in a whole-earth 
context). However, there are also subtle differences in these concepts that in particular relate to the 
mode of interaction assumed with the object of study. See, Casey, Representing Place.
37
This is not to say that there is a ‘real’ space ‘out there,’ that stands in contrast to 
the operation of power/knowledge which may attempt to suborn space to its own 
purposes but must ultimately bow to the supremacy of its materiality. Put another 
way, the aphasiac is not ‘wrong’ in their ordering choices because the ‘real’ spatiality 
of the pieces of wool does not align to their own (mis)ordering. This would be to 
assume that the spatiality of the wool is ‘essentially’ determined in relation to the 
tabletop. Rather, Foucault implies that certain kinds of power/knowledge ‘work’ 
(function) with certain kinds of spatial relationships. Think again of the aphasiac. 
What if, instead of being told the tabletop must be the space of their ordering, they  
were allowed to choose their own ‘background’ spatiality? Might a three-dimensional 
organisation have allowed the aphasiac to create a more stable series of relationships? 
Might they even have chosen to express the ordering in a mobile space (a space-time), 
perhaps by way of computer simulation? As Foucault goes on to ask:
On what ‘table,’ according to what grid of identities, similitudes, analogies, have we become 
accustomed to sort out so many different and similar things?81
As Foucault goes to great lengths to show in this work, whichever ‘table’ it is to which 
we are accustomed, its spatiality is deeply implicated in the historically specific 
nature of the contemporary modes of ordering (or, in other words, the contemporary 
operation of power/knowledge).
The O rder o f  Things is concerned with exploring the ‘conditions of possibility’ of 
knowledge, with understanding the limits to what we can think and how these are 
established by what Foucault calls the episteme. These limits are established by 
m odes of order, which are historically specific, materially concrete and non-
81 Foucault, The O rd e r  o f Things, xxi.
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intentionally driven apparatuses of power/knowledge that pervade society.82 
However, as shown in this discussion, order is also a mode of spatiality that organises 
relationships according to its historically specific logic. As Foucault argues:
Order is, at one and the same time, that which is given in things as their inner law, the hidden 
network which determines the way they confront one another, and also that which has no existence 
except in the grid created by the glance, an examination, a language; and it is only in the blank 
spaces of this grid that order manifests itself in depth as though already there, waiting in silence for 
the moment of its expression.^
The grid here is not a spatial metaphor but a historically realised spatial technique: a 
particular way of arranging and understanding the arrangement of ‘things’ in space.84 
Different societies experience order through different spatial relationships. Massey, 
for example, notes the disarray caused among the Aztecs by the arrival of the Spanish 
in the city of Tenochtitlan, because their direction was from that of “acatl” and the 
year was the first of Reed.85 This mode of spatial and temporal ordering was a result 
of the Aztec’s own conditions of possibility, a power/knowledge arrangement that 
informed relationships in such a way that the spatiality of relationships (in this case, 
what Westerners would perceive through compass direction) could send 
reverberations through the entire Aztec political structure.
Foucault alerts us to the importance of the spatiality of relationships in ensuring 
the functionality of power/knowledge. There is no simple determination of 
materiality over  mental conceptions of space — there is, in fact, no such sustainable 
distinction. As Stuart Elden notes:
82 Thus, in every culture, between the use of what one might call the ordering codes and reflections 
upon order itself, there is the pure experience of order and its modes of being.
Foucault, The Order o f Things, xxiii.
83 Foucault, The Order o f Things, xxi.
84 "Space, Knowledge, and Power," in Michel Foucault, Power: Essential Works o f  Foucault, 1954-1984, 
Volume 3  (London: Penguin, 2002), 363, cited Elden, Mapping the Present, 119.
85 Massey, For Space, 1-3 -
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Foucault understands both physical and mental conceptions of space to be merely parts of a greater 
whole, abstractions from the more fundamental level of the lived experience.86
It is in this lived experience -  where we experience the modes of being of order — that 
different kinds of relationships of power/knowledge/space form different kinds of 
societies. Foucault’s work on power/knowledge/space establishes the importance of 
spatiality as an analytical tool. It shows that analysing spatiality helps us understand 
the nature of the power relations present in a given circumstance, the contours of the 
field of knowledge at play -  the conditions of order’s possibility. The following 
example, drawn from Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, elaborates a spatial 
vocabulary for exploring the conditions of possibility of the exercise of violence. It 
also illustrates, however, the limitations inherent in Foucault’s formulation with 
respect to the creative and productive effects violence might have on that spatial 
ordering.
Disciplinary societies and clockwork armies: the spatial orderings of 
discipline and violence in the 18th century
Discipline and  Punish: The Birth o f  the Prison  gives an account of the origins of
the disciplinary mechanism of power. The book tells the story of how in the 17th
century a series of institutions, behaviours, power relations and areas of knowledge
emerged that invested in man what Foucault terms the modern soul. The modern
soul, to be distinguished from the religious soul, makes the individual consubstantial
with his behaviour (no longer an individual who engages in sex with men, but a
homosexual, and so on), so that it is possible for the first time to address power
toward the body as an individual.
The man described for us [by these new scientific and humanist knowledges], whom we are invited 
to free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection much more profound than himself. A ‘soul’
86 Elden, M apping the Present, 119.
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inhabits him and brings him into existence, which is itself a factor in the mastery that power 
exercises over the body. The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the 
prison of the body.8?
Thus, as Elden astutely notes, the subtitle of Discipline and Punish refers not to the 
birth of the penal institution of the prison, but rather to the birth of the ‘soul.’88 
Foucault is not investigating a particular space  of power/knowledge (the prison, the 
Panopticon), rather he is investigating a particular configuration  of 
pow er/know ledge/space (the disciplinary relation). He does this through exploring a 
series of institutions that emerged roughly contemporaneously and which operated in 
similar ways, including the newly reformed ‘clockwork army’ of the 18th century.89
As Christopher Duffy notes in his comprehensive review of militaries in the Age 
of Reason, the 18th century marked a significant break in military history, with the 
inauguration of the first large standing armies in Europe since the Roman Empire. 
The political process by which standing armies became possible was closely linked to 
both the defeudalisation of army structures and the increasing centralising tendencies 
of the absolute monarchs of the time, who standardised their forces by removing the 
power of colonels and captains to raise, administer, clothe and train their troops 
“according to individual fancy.”
The armed forces of Europe were therefore transformed into bodies that were more stable and 
responsive to manipulation than anything known since Classical times. Weapons and clothing
87 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 30.
88 Elden, M apping the Present, 135.
89 The phrase ‘clockwork army’ is drawn from Manuel de Landa’s reading of the organisation of the army 
of Frederick the Great in the middle of the 18th century. Manuel de Landa, War in the Age o f  Intelligent 
Machines (New York, NY: Zone Books, 1991), 127. Foucault himself uses the metaphor in Discipline and 
Punish only once, and then not in reference to the military but to the Lancaster method of teaching. 
However he does make frequent use of machinic metaphors when describing the military. Foucault, 
Discipline and Punish, 162-69. See, also, Azar Gat, A History o f M ilitary Thought: From the 
Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 58-61.
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became largely standardised within armies in the later seventeenth century, and in the eighteenth 
century the central bureaucracy worked out prescribed codes relating to the conduct of war.90
Of particular significance in this new military arrangement was the innovation of 
the drill, perfected in the armies of Frederick the Great. The drill served the dual 
purpose of training mind and body for battle as well as providing order to the time of 
idle soldiers.
Foucault, through a reading of the military developments of this time that largely 
accords with that provided by Duffy, gives an account of the disciplinary mechanism  
within the military that tracks the ordering (power/knowledge) of the disciplinary 
m echanism  through bodies, their relation to each other and to the whole, and  their 
position ing in tim e. This thoroughly spatial account of the military apparatus 
provides a number of key insights into the limits of possibility for the exercise of 
violence. Firstly, it emphasises that violence results from everyday practices  of 
power/knowledge that can be far removed from the battlefield (as it then was). This 
insight is particularly useful in the context of the micro-study that forms the 
substantive core of this thesis, where everyday practices of the military seem to bear 
little relation to the activity of killing, and nonetheless thoroughly imbue the 
(experimental) quality of violence. This insight is extended in the following section, 
where Lefebvre’s conception of the ‘unfolding’ of the unexpected from the everyday is 
intimately bound up in his conception of the temporality of space.?1 This ‘unfolding’ 
or becoming is extended in the following through the work of Deleuze. Secondly, 
Foucault’s analysis illustrates a number of different spatial trajectories that can be
90 Christopher Duffy, The M ilitary Experience in the Age o f  Reason (Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth 
Editions, 1987), 15.
91 The importance of the everyday in the work of Henri Lefebvre is often overlooked in commentaries 
emphasising his spatiality. Yet Lefebvre’s final, and perhaps most insightful, book on space has also been 
considered to be the fourth volume in his occasional series on everyday life. See, Henri Lefebvre, 
Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life (London. Continuum, 1992).
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implicated in the organisation of violence by power/knowledge. This provides the 
beginnings of a vocabulary for describing the relation between violence and 
spatialising practices.
Foucault identifies the disciplinary mechanism as inscribing the individual in 
relations along four trajectories of power/knowledge/space. Firstly, he identifies the 
importance of the spatial distribution of bodies according to a cellular, segmented 
pattern. Foucault refers to this as the “individuality-cell,” and its significance lies in 
the way it individualises the body while maintaining it as part of a coherent whole.92 
Foucault argues that this pattern finds its particular form in the military through the 
system of rank, an individualising and yet totalising practice. Far from being a simple 
‘m ental’ or ‘ideological’ construct, rank is also a material and spatial distribution.93 It 
is rank that determines the spatial distribution of bodies when it comes to living 
arrangements, to the drill, as well as in battle. Crucially, rank establishes the body in 
relation to others.
Discipline is an art of rank, a technique for the transformation of arrangements. It individualizes 
bodies by a location that does not give them a fixed position, but distributes them and circulates 
them in a network of relations.94
This, then, is one key trajectory along which violence can be organised. How are 
bodies treated? Are they taken as individuals or en masse? If they are taken as 
individuals, how are they then held in relation to each other? For the 18th century 
military, individuals were held in constant relation to one another through 
hierarchical rank. While hierarchical rank is still an important aspect of
92 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 161, also 141-49*
93 As English participants on the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War discovered when fighting for 
the revolutionary militias; George Orwell s reaction, in particular, is a wonderful testament to the 
ambiguity he felt in having to rely on class solidarity rather than rank to ensure action was taken. George 
Orwell, Homage to Catalonia (San Diego, CA: Harvest Books, 1969), 27-29.
94 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 149-
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contemporary military experience, as we shall see there is presently a decentralising 
tendency in the US military that does not hold fixed the network that keeps (ranked) 
bodies circulating in relation to each other. In contemporary doctrine, the importance 
of bodies often varies according to the contingency of their circumstance — who is 
closest, who can act, who has weapons still loaded.95
Secondly, Foucault identifies a particular ‘kind’ of body being disciplined: it is a 
body whose natural movements have an efficiency that can be harnessed by the 
disciplinary impulse, a body that Foucault refers to as the “individuality-organism.”96 
The knowledge of ‘natural’ bodily poses enables the power relation of discipline to 
take as its target the natural efficiency of the movements of the body, particularly in 
its use of tools, which were treated as organic extensions of that body (see, for 
example, the new role of the rifle in drill).97 This is particularly significant in light of 
the importance of new technologies to the RMA: the trajectory Foucault is identifying 
here is not simply that of the body’s relation to itself but also its relation to its 
technologies or weapons.
Thirdly, Foucault identifies a particular temporality at work, a temporality in 
which “movements are integrated, one upon another, and which is oriented towards a 
terminal, stable point,” what he calls elsewhere the “individuality-genesis.”98 The drill 
is an example of this temporality par excellence, being an overall action broken down 
into segments. These segments are practised through extensive repetition 
individually, and then recombined in linear tim e.99 This segmentation then re­
combination, or re-formation, in linear time forms a particular organisation of
95 See the following discussion of swarming, 230-31.
95 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 161, also 149-56.
97 See, also, Duffy, The Age o f Reason, 104-5.
98 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 160,161, also 156-62.
99 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 157-158. See, also, Duffy, The Age o f  Reason, 111-15.
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violence that is genetic (in the original sense of the word, as referring to the origins 
and development of something). As we shall see in the discussion of Lefebvre, this 
kind of linear temporality is only one of many forms of temporality, all of which can 
inflect the organisation and operation of violence.
The significance of temporality becomes even clearer in the final aspect of the 
disciplinary mechanism that Foucault identifies. These are the newly devised means 
of com posing the forces of these bodies (‘cellularised,’ ‘organicised,’ and ‘geneticised’) 
into a greater whole, an “art of constructing ... in which the product of the various 
forces is increased by their calculated combination.”100 This art of combination, 
emerging in the self-consciously scientific expression of the art of tactics at the time, 
has various implications for the 18th century military, particularly for the practice of 
command. Duffy, for example, notes that the careful composition of linear formations 
and decisions regarding the deployment of troops at that time were made on the basis 
of calculations laid down by philosophers of war.101 This is highly significant: if the 
force of an army is seen to derive from its own internal organisation, and not from the 
intake of energy from the outside, say, then the organisation of violence is 
substantially different: violence may well inscribe itself across the landscape in ways 
that ignore the particularity of battle.102 Indeed, in the 18th century, despite the chaos 
that ensued once battle had begun, engaging in battle required a careful dance 
between forces, the steps of which were known by all. Further, it was the ‘light forces,’ 
not inculcated in the contemporary discipline of the drill (such as the wild Cossacks, 
pressed into service by different nations at various points), who were treated with
100 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 167, also 162-69.
101 Duffy, The Age o f  Reason, 189-91.
102 One has to wonder if this is not a part of what happened in those bloody and immobile early years of 
World War I. Certainly command and control practices emphasising the maintenance of an offensive 
posture over the knowledge of ground conditions have been implicated in the extraordinarily high 
mortality rate of British troops. See, Peter Doyle and Matthew R. Bennett, "Military Geography: Terrain 
Evaluation and the British Western Front 1914-1918," The Geographic Journal 163, no. 1 (1997): 23.
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som ething akin to fear by their own commanders, who distrusted their wanton ability 
to take circumscribed battles to the level of wide-spread slaughter, destroying 
intended targets of command and plunder.1^
Here, then, is a thoroughly spatial account of the disciplinary mechanism, and, 
through this, of the organisation of violence in the 18th century. The everyday 
organisation of the military inflects directly the organisation of violence, although 
Foucault shies from examining the moment of battle himself. He does, however, note 
that thanks to this (spatialised) disciplinary relation, when it comes to battle, the 
soldier becom es “a fragment of mobile space, before he is courage or honour.”104 The 
spatial relations that the military took onto the battlefield were cellular, organic, 
genetic  and com binatory  (in the mechanical sense of the addition of forces, and not 
in the contemporary sense of the alteration of existing forces through mixture).
Spatial relations on the 18th century battlefield consisted neither of the interconnected 
and mutually recursive relations that make up the ‘networked’ and contingent 
spatiality of today; nor did they consist of the chaotic mixture of two entities releasing 
their pent-up violence en masse. Violence was released in a relatively ordered fashion.
The expression of violence was circumscribed as a result of discipline (violence is 
organised more peaceably, perhaps?) but in Foucault’s account this is not (merely) 
through the exercise of discourse but (also) through the spatiality of bodies:
The ‘m ilitaire’-  the military institution, military science, the militaire himself, so different from
what was formerly characterized by the term ‘homme de guerre’ -  was specified, during this period,
1 0 3  Duffy, The Age o f  Reason, 12-13, 268-73. Duffy notes that in some conflicts, particularly in the 
American War of Independence, irregular forces were commonplace, undermining the historically 
sweeping nature of the claims of Foucault regarding the disciplinary nature of the armies of the 18 
century.
104 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 164.
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at the point of junction between war and the noise of battle on the one hand, and order and silence, 
subservient to peace, on the other. 10s
Implicit of course in this is the prospect that the m ilitaire  will at some point be 
unable to balance the noise of battle and the silence of peace: spatiality is by no 
means certain, discipline fails. This is one of the advantages of trying to understand 
how violence is expressed spatially, because spatial relations show confusion and 
resistance -  like the aphasiac, perhaps, some generals attempt to impose their 
version of order on a spatiality that resists.
At points, Foucault’s work even alerts us to the difficulty of pulling spatial 
relations into these, and not different, forms. The work of creating and implementing 
drills; the work of enforcing discipline in the face of food shortages or the anarchy- 
inducing properties of over-abundant alcohol rations; the persuasive work of 
expounding this philosophy (this ‘science’) of war over other, more established 
accounts; not to mention the unspoken work of boots in mud, and steel on steel -  in 
all of these the spatial relations established are only partly determined by the spatial 
ordering identified. In a particularly compelling example, Duffy notes that even the 
best-disciplined units were good for one or two campaigns at the most: casualties, 
and more importantly, fea r , got in the way of a unit ever fighting as a well-oiled 
machine again.106 Material arrangements created the relationships which ordered 
violence, but also opened routes for different spatial orderings, or for no discernable 
order altogether. And it is not simply a matter of materiality messing things up: 
Foucault particularly alerts us to the contemporaneous coexistence of other spatial 
orderings, including the very orderings that this arrangement was attempting to 
replace.
105 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 168.
106 Duffy, The Age o f  Reason, 245-50. The ‘passions’ as an influence on the creative evolution of violence 
is discussed with respect to Deleuze, below.
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Spatial orderings offer a compelling insight into the way in which 
power/knowledge operates. It is an insight of tendency — that is, a tendency to 
circumscribe violence within these limits, and not those. Foucault identifies a number 
of trajectories along which we might differentiate particular organisations of 
power/knowledge/space: in particular, he identifies the relationship of the body to 
the whole; the ‘kind’ of relationship the body has with itself and with its tools or 
weapons; the temporality in which spatial relations are implicated; and the mode of 
combination of different forces. These facets are all explored in some way in the 
following chapters in relation to the contemporary battlespace, allowing insight into 
the particular nature of US military violence in Iraq.
However, where Foucault fails (and this is not least because violence was not the 
target of his analysis) is in exploring the creative and experimental properties of 
violence once ‘unleashed.’ By shying from the moment of combat, Foucault conducts 
an analysis that gives away too much to space and too little to time.
Rhythmanalysis: the emergence of novelty in the everyday
Foucault provides an account of spatial orderings that explores the way in which 
violence is organised on the battlefield through specific kinds of relations. However, 
despite the usefulness of this account in accounting for the everyday nature of the 
organisation of violence, there is still little room for the openness, or the productivity, 
of violence. The everyday is a little too everyday — a little too repetitive. If violence is a 
force in Foucault’s account, it is a force like any other, one which is limited by 
power/knowledge/space in its expression. In fact Foucault does not even grant 
violence the capacity to be a force in this sense. As Deleuze puts it, in Foucault.
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Violence expresses well the effect of a force on something, some object or being. But it does not 
express the power relation, that is to say the relations between force and force, ‘an action upon 
action.’10?
This is perhaps why he chooses to focus on the organisation  of the army, as though 
the violence that followed would be instrumental (precisely the argument that this 
thesis resists).108
Foucault’s limiting reading of violence is hardly fatal to using his spatial 
orderings to understand the organisation of violence: it is certainly true that 
power/knowledge/space play an important role in establishing everyday practices 
that construct a particular form of violence (a particular style of battle, for example). 
However, to open space for the exploration of the productiveness of violence it is 
necessaiy to discuss the temporality of the space in which it takes place, for it is in 
tim e  that violence unfolds its differentiating powers. As Feldman argues:
Sites of legitimation and authorization suppress historicity through linear, teleological, 
eschatological, or progressive temporalities. Action, however, unfolds time as difference and as 
radical heterogeneity.109
It is in this context that the epigraph to this chapter was chosen, and bears repeating 
prior to engaging Lefebvre’s work on emergence and space:
Violence itself both reflects and accelerates the experience of society as an incomplete project, as 
something to be made.110
107 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault (London: Continuum, 1999 ). 25 (emphasis original).
108 This is certainly the conclusion drawn by Julian Reid, who discusses Foucault s attempts to codify 
the relationship between war and politics.” Julian Reid, Deleuze s War Machine. Nomadism Against the 
State," Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 32, no. 1 (2002). 61.
109 Feldman, Formations o f  Violence, 2 (emphasis added).
110 Feldman, Formations o f  Violence, 5.
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Lefebvre seeks to understand the linkage between the everyday (and the everyday 
production of space) and the emergence of difference. This section begins by 
exploring Lefebvre s understanding of space, before outlining his conception of 
temporality in terms of his Nietzschean-inspired understanding of difference and 
repetition. It then examines Lefebvre’s work on the lived everyday, which ultimately 
em phasises its spatio-temporal, or rhythmic, construction, and it concludes by 
exploring Lefebvre’s rhythmanalysis of the military practice of dressage. Lefebvre’s 
account here is particularly useful given the overlaps in content and insight with 
Foucault’s work on discipline.111
While Foucault utilises ‘the spatial’ as a mode of analysis, Lefebvre explicitly sets 
out to interrogate ‘space’ as a concept, although his sociological method integrates 
conceptual development with concrete, historical analysis. It is in one of the best 
known of Lefebvre’s works -  The Production o f  Space -  that the most extended of 
these interrogations takes place. Following is a brief examination of how Lefebvre 
conceives of space, in a way that both distinguishes him from Foucault and highlights 
the opportunities presented by his thought.
The Production o f  Space, like much of Lefebvre’s work, rests on the assertion of a 
dialectic. Although Lefebvre was a Marxist, it has been noted that his work as a 
sociologist and philosopher is so interesting “because his Marxism is so bad, is so 
heterodox.”112 In this, his reworking of the (Hegelian-)Marxist form of dialectical 
materialism is no exception. Lefebvre seeks to disrupt the teleological progression of
in Lefebvre, however, wss far from fond of Foucault s work, which he considered to be both fashionably 
anti-humanist and lazy in its use of spatial concepts. Stuart Elden, Understanding Henri Lefebvre.
Theory and the Possible (London: Continuum, 2004), 23; Henri Lefebvre, The Production o f  Space 
(London: Basil Blackwell, 1991)* 3 "4 *
112 Andy Merrifield, "Henri Lefebvre: A Socialist in Space,” in Thinking Space, ed. Mike Crang, and Nigel
Thrift, 167-82 (London: Routledge, 2000), 178. See, also, Elden, "Lefebvre in Recent Anglo-American
Scholarship", 809-10; Robert Beauregard, "Positioning Urban Theory," Antipode 35, no. 5 (2003).
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dialectical history through a more complicated understanding of the dialectic, the 
dialectique de triplicite, in which the synthesised third term is not a result of 
‘progression’ but engages in recursive relations with the initial two term s.113 This 
notion has been interpreted by many postmodern geographers to mean that the 
either/or logic of binarism has been enlarged to include “a much larger logic of 
‘both/and also.’”114 As Elden notes, however, Lefebvre’s dialectic is not about the use 
of a third ‘inclusive’ term, but rather refers to a three-way process in which the 
‘synthesis’ can impact recursively on the two conflicting terms. This is significant in 
terms of Lefebvre’s understanding of temporality, which is never straightforwardly 
linear. ns As with much else in Lefebvre, space emerges from a dialectic, one whose 
specific form inflects many of his analyses, including his dialectics of time and of the 
everyday. This dialectic is that of space as perceived', space as conceived; and space as 
lived  -  Vespace pergu, congu, et vecu .116
Lefebvre also terms ‘space as perceived’ spatia l practice. Spatial practice refers to 
the space that is ‘secreted’ by the everyday operation of society in space. As Lefebvre 
argues:
The specific spatial competence and performance of every society member can only be evaluated
empirically. ‘Modern’ spatial practice might thus be defined -  to take an extreme case -  by the daily
life of a tenant in a government-subsidized high-rise housing project.11?
It is spatial practice that performs the lion s share of the task of repetitively producing 
(re-producing) social space each day. Spatial practice stands in contrast with 
representations o f  space  (space as conceived): this refers to the authorised or 
abstract conceptualisations of space that exist within a society. Specifically, Lefebvre
u3 Lefebvre, The Production o f  Space, 417-18. 
n4 Elden, Understanding Lefebvre, 37. 
n5 Elden, Understanding Lefebvre, 170.
116 Lefebvre, The Production o f  Space, 37 -3 9 - See, also, Elden, Understanding Lefebvre, 190.
n7 Lefebvre, The Production o f  Space, 38.
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refers to the conceptualised space o f ‘technocrats’ and scientists; that is, to the spatial 
abstractions created by those in whom neocapitalist society invests the power to 
declare understandings of, and engage in the reshaping of, space, be it through the 
declaration of scientific laws or the practices of urban planning.118 It is from the 
interaction between these two aspects of space that the third aspect of space emerges, 
space as lived  (what Lefebvre anti-intuitively names ‘representational space’). While 
som e authors describe representational space as “symbolic meaning enacted in 
spatial form ,” this thesis endorses an interpretation closer to that proposed by Stuart 
Elden, who describes this space as “real-and-im agined .”119 Indeed, an overemphasis 
on “symbolic m eaning” can lead to precisely the abstract tendencies that characterise 
the representations of space that Lefebvre ascribes to the second part of the dialectic. 
In particular, these abstract tendencies can lead to academics attempting to ‘read’ 
space-as-lived, whereas, in reality, space-as-lived tends “toward more or less coherent 
system s of non-verbal symbols and signs.”120
It is out of this dialectic that ‘space’ as we know it is produced  as both a mental 
and material object -  not as those things separately, but rather as both together. It is 
important to recognise that for Lefebvre this is a historically specific analysis of space 
— m odern  or social space is produced in this way. This means that the concept of 
production remains connected to its Marxist origins, and the production of space is 
closely tied to the way in which we as humans are alienated from the space that we 
produce.121 The nature of Lefebvre’s analysis becomes clear in the following passage, 
where the phrase ‘social space’ should not be read as specifying down from a more
118 Lefebvre, The Production o f  Space, 38.
119 Helen Liggett and David C. Perry, "Spatial Practices: An Introduction," in Spatial Practices: Critical 
Explorations in Social/Spatial Theory, ed. Helen Liggett and David C. Perry, 1-12 (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
SAGE Publications, 1995), 7\ Elden, Understanding Lefebvre, 190 (emphasis original).
120 Lefebvre, The Production o f  Space, 39 (emphasis added).
121 For a discussion of Lefebvre’s interpretation of alienation and production, see, Elden, Understanding 
Lefebvre, 39-46.
52
general concept of space, but rather should be read as the emergent product of the 
dialectics of space ( everything that is produced either by nature or by society”):
The form of social space is encounter, assembly, simultaneity. But what assembles, or what is 
assembled? The answer is: everything that there is in space, everything that is produced either by 
nature or by society, either through their co-operation or through their conflicts. Everything: living 
beings, things, objects, works, signs and symbols. Natural space juxtaposes -  and thus disperses: it 
puts places and that which occupies them side by side. It particularizes. By contrast, social space 
implies actual or potential assembly at a single point, or around that point.122
Space, then, in Lefebvre is relational in the sense of being an assemblage: unlike 
the posited ‘natural’ space (of which there are few examples in Lefebvre’s work), 
where things are not necessarily connected in material or mental ways, social space 
finds its form in the way that things are brought together through production. As for 
Deleuze, discussed following, a question is raised as to the form of that assemblage. 
Unlike Deleuze, there is a strong role for human agency in understanding and altering 
the form of that assemblage. However, to understand this process in Lefebvre, it is 
important to see space as emergent. The temporality in which Lefebvre views the 
dialectical production of space as occurring (the same temporality inherent in his 
recursive dialectic) is vital to understanding the form of assemblage that results. In 
the words of Andy Merrifield:
Now, in Lefebvre’s hands, space becomes redescribed not as a dead, inert thing or object, but as 
organic and fluid and alive; it has a pulse, it palpitates, it flows and collides with other spaces. And 
these interpenetrations — many with different temporalities — get superimposed upon one another 
to create a present space.123
It is in the context of this pulsating, palpitating flowing spatio-temporality that 
violence can emerge as a truly differentiating (and creative) force.
1 2 2  Lefebvre, The Production o f  Space, 101 (emphasis original).
123 Merrifield, "Henri Lefebvre," 171 (emphasis original).
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Temporality, difference, repetition, the theory o f moments and the everyday
The history of space does not have to choose between ‘processes’ and ‘structures,’ change and 
invariability, events and institutions. 124
Repetition and difference
We have already seen the non-teleological bent of Lefebvre’s work in his
dialectique de triplicite, and Stuart Elden explores Lefebvre’s understanding of 
history in terms of its Nietzschean origins.125 Nietzschean time (perhaps better read in 
this context as history) according to Lefebvre is the:
... theatre of universal tragedy, as the cyclical, repetitious space-time o f  death and o f  life, [and] has 
nothing in common with Marxist time -  that is, historicity driven forward by the forces of 
production.126
This is not to say that Lefebvre rejects outright the Marxist insight that capitalist 
production has formed its own determinedly linear temporality, particularly in its 
measurement of production through progressive time. Rather, this temporality, 
which he astutely notes involves the repetition  of “mechanical gestures” as part of 
accumulative processes (something he terms “the linear repetitive”), is subsumed
124 Lefebvre, The Production o f  Space, 174.
1 2 5  Elden, Understanding Lefebvre, 170. In addition to Lefebvre’s published works, this section draws 
strongly on Elden’s reading of Lefebvre. This is because many of Lefebvre’s publications are not available 
in English translation, while most commentaries focus either exclusively on The Production o f  Space or 
on the volumes of everyday life (although there is an increasing set of commentaries on Rhythmanalysis, 
recently published in English). Elden’s work is almost unique in spanning the entire lifetime of 
Lefebvre’s work. See, however, Rob Shields, Lefebvre, Love and Struggle (New York, NY: Routledge,
1 9 9 9 )-
126 Lefebvre, The Production o f  Space, 22 (emphasis added).
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within a broader temporality — something equivalent perhaps to the temporality of 
‘history.’12?
History for Lefebvre, then, is repetitive, with both cyclical and linear 
temporalities (progressions, actions, social behaviours) composed through repetition. 
In Nietzsche, however, the “cyclical, repetitious space-time of death and life,” or the 
eternal return, is not an argument about the return of the past via repetition so much 
as an understanding of the temporality of the future, or change. The future emerges 
via the differential repetition of the past. As Elizabeth Grosz argues:
The eternal return is not the return of a seasonal, cyclical rhythmicality (with which it is commonly 
confused), for it is an imperative for the future, a future that is in continuity, through divergence 
and elaboration, that is, through difference from rather than through any linearity, causal or 
otherwise, with the present.128
Similarly for Lefebvre, repetition is not the simple similitude of abstract repetition:
Not only does repetition not exclude differences, it also gives birth to them; it produces them. 
Sooner or later it encounters the event that arrives or rather arises in relation to the sequence or 
series produced repetitively. In other words, difference.129
Lefebvre notes that while “repetitions generate differences... not all differences are 
equivalent.”130 Lefebvre is drawing here on an essentially Bergsonian distinction 
between ‘differences in kind’ (qualitative difference) and ‘differences in degree’ 
(quantitative difference).131
1 2 7  Henri Lefebvre, Critique o f Everyday Life, Volume II: Foundations fo r  a Sociology o f  the Everyday  
(London: Verso, 2002), 340; Lefebvre, Rhythmanalysis, 8.
128 Elizabeth Grosz, The Nick o f  Time: Politics, Evolution, and the Untimely (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2004), 157.
129 Lefebvre, Rhythmanalysis, 7 (emphasis original).
13° Lefebvre, The Production o f  Space, 372.
131 Lefebvre, Everyday Life, Vol. II, 342- In relation to Lefebvre s oscillating position with regard to 
Bergson, Elden draws attention to the contrasting positions of Rob Shields and Gregory Seigworth:
Elden, Understanding Lefebvre, 10-11 n. 8. See, Shields, Lefebvre, Love and Struggle, especially 118;
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Through his conception of temporality and, in particular, its relation to change, 
Lefebvre wishes to reinstate “discontinuity, grasping it in the very fabric of the ‘lived,’ 
and on the loom of continuity, which it presupposes.”132 Here, Lefebvre rejects the 
idea of smooth (even if creative) evolutionary change as much as he rejects rupture 
and revolutionary change. Rather, he proposes that we view change through the 
mechanism  of u involution.”133 Involution gives change its own  duration, makes it 
p resen t through its own beginning, middle, and end -  that is, through its own 
history. 134
Lefebvre’s temporality is marked by repetition and difference, in which the 
emergence of difference in kind  (‘creative evolution’ or produced  difference) must be 
understood through the duration of the lived  and not merely resulting from the 
operation of abstract forces. The ‘lived’ (as the sphere in which change must emerge) 
for Lefebvre is not a simple state of reality, but is bound up precisely with the 
emergence of (social) space from the dialectic of l ’espace pergu, con<ju, et vecu (space 
as perceived, conceived, and lived). Change emerges from dialectics of time and space 
acting together. For example, an overview of one of the questions that haunts 
Lefebvre’s work follows: the way in which industrial production, a mode of producing 
time and space that is thoroughly imbued in the “linear repetitive” and the production
Gregory J. Seigworth, "Banality for Cultural Studies, Cultural Studies 14, no. 2 (2000). 244* 261 n. 17- 
Given Lefebvre’s Nietzschean inspiration, however, it is hardly surprising that his work accords in some 
ways with Bergson. For a detailed discussion of the continuities in the work of Bergson, Nietzsche, and 
Darwin, see, Grosz, The Nick o f Time.
132 Lefebvre, Everyday Life, Vol. II, 3 4 2-
133 Lefebvre, Everyday Life, Vol. II, 3 4 5 - Although the translation does not specify, it seems likely
Lefebvre is referring here to involution in the biological sense of the term, rolling up or folding in on 
itself.” The M acquarie Dictionary, 3 rd ed., s.v. “involution.”
*34 Lefebvre, Everyday Life, Vol. II, 3 4 5 -
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of hom ogeneity, can nevertheless give rise to urban space-time, a condition that far 
from being homogenous, “actually appears as the differential.”135
Under the reign of historical time, differences induced within a given mode of production 
[quantitative differences] coexist at first with produced differences promoting the demise of that 
mode [qualitative differences]. A difference of the latter kind is not only produced — it is also 
productive. Thus those differences within medieval society that foreshadowed a new mode of 
production had themselves accumulated during the general process of accumulation; at last they 
precipitated a tumultuous transition and eventually shattered existing societies and their mode of 
production.^6
Daily life, the everyday, and everydayness: the emergence o f difference
How, then, can we understand the emergence of these ‘tumultuous transitions’
from the gradual accumulation of induced differences? Lefebvre suggests that at least 
one site for the emergence of difference is in the everyday, the site of much of the 
ordering of violence. Gregory Seigworth identifies a dialectic operating in Lefebvre’s 
conception of the everyday, and goes so far as to suggest that it is through this 
dialectic that the excess, the virtuality, the “curious vitality” of Lefebvre’s writings 
exists.137 The dialectic takes the familiar perceived, conceived, lived (perqu, conqu, 
vecu) form as: daily life (everyday life as it exists in its concrete materiality); the 
e veryd a y  (everyday life as a concept — not, as in daily life, the concrete existence that 
has always been, but as a historically produced plane of existence); and everydayness  
(also called, ‘the extra-daily’ or the ‘extra-everyday’.) Everydayness “addresses the 
way that [the] plane [of the everyday] (of immanence) is lived: a single and boundless 
space-time for living.”138
13s Elden, Understanding Lefebvre, 146 (emphasis original).
J36 Lefebvre, The Production o f  Space, 37 3 -
1 3 7 Seigworth, "Banality for Cultural Studies, 2 4 4 > 231-32.
w8 Seigworth, "Banality for Cultural Studies," 245-46.
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Seigworth, while perhaps overlooking the complicated recursive relationship 
between the synthesis and the opposing two terms inherent in the dialectique de 
triplicite, argues that it is in the third term of the dialectic that we see the true 
operation of time -  in the sense of the operation of duration  (as also found in 
Bergson and Deleuze), a duration in which it is possible for radical otherness to 
unfold.139 Indeed, for Seigworth, it is everydayness that “extends its thirdness across 
and into” the other dialectics that mark Lefebvre’s work, enabling it to be “‘the space’ 
of all spaces, the ‘life’ of all lived.”140 While not going to this extreme, this thesis 
accepts the reading that Lefebvre’s historical sociology demands an extrapolation of 
everyday life and everydayness because of its implication in the production of space 
and time, and because of its implication in the emergence of radical difference. As we 
shall see in Lefebvre’s R hythm analysis, which is an exploration of precisely this 
everydayness, alteration (the emergence of difference) is bound up with the 
repetition of the rhythms of the everyday giving rise to the ‘m oment’ of change.141
These moments form a part of “the history of the individual.”142 At one level this 
reflects Lefebvre’s ongoing Marxist (and humanist) concern with promoting 
disalienation. At another level, however, it need not reflect only a humanist concern 
with the individual as an agent of change. The moment is not simply a ‘psychical’ 
decision: it emerges from the space-time in which it operates. As Lefebvre argues:
!39 Seigworth, "Banality for Cultural Studies," 248. Regarding Seigworth’s reading of Lefebvre’s dialectic, 
it is worth noting that he cites with approval Rob Shields.and Edward Soja, who read Lefebvre as 
endorsing a radical thirdness, or exteriority, that emerges from dialectical interaction. Seigworth, 
"Banality for Cultural Studies," 247-48. On this, see, Elden, Understanding Lefebvre, 170.
140 Seigworth, "Banality for Cultural Studies," 251.
141 For a detailed description of Lefebvre’s theory of moments, see, Lefebvre, Everyday Life, Vol. II, 
Chapter 6.
142 Lefebvre, Everyday Life, Vol. II, 3 4 4 - The concept of the moment as presented in Rhythmanalysis is 
much more impersonal. See, Lefebvre, Rhythmanalysis, Introduction.
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Moreover, the history of the individual in his everyday life cannot be separated from the social 
sphere. Narrow and limited though it is, it is part of other, broader works.143
Were space and time not structured as they are (through repetition, through 
difference, through everyday life, through everydayness), then the individual would 
not encounter the ‘moment.’ Further, the individual who encounters the moment is 
not simply a traditional rational political ‘subject.’ Rather, in the sphere of ‘the lived’ 
Lefebvre lays much emphasis on the body  of the individual as a source of ‘excess’ or 
innovation -  as a driver of change. The body’s privileged position in this regard 
derives from its position at the interface of the pergu and the congu, from its primacy 
in the lived :
For the body indeed unites cyclical and linear, combining cycles of time, need and desire with the 
linearities of gesture, perambulation, prehension and the manipulation of things -  the handling of 
both material and abstract tools. The body subsists precisely at the level of the reciprocal 
movement between these two realms; their difference -  which is lived, not thought, is its habitat.144
As Kristen Simonsen argues, the body here is not simply a material object but an 
active participant in shaping duration. Lived experience:
... comes from the excessive energies of the body, from creative activity and from the level of 
affection -  involving need and desire, passion and sexuality, images and the spoken w o r d .143
We have already seen how Lefebvre views space and time as active participants in 
and  products of the processes of everyday life, and further how he identifies their 
importance in the process of differentiation. The emphasis on the body as the 
interface (of both the dialectics of space and the everyday) through which difference 
emerges sees Lefebvre conceive of his final project (R hythm analysis) in terms of the
143 Lefebvre, Everyday Life, Vol. II, 3 4 4 -
144 Lefebvre, The Production o f  Space, 203.
143 Kirsten Simonsen, "Bodies, Sensations, Space and Time: The Contribution By Henri Lefebvre," 
Geografiska Annaler: Series B Human Geography 87, no. 1 (2005): 7.
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body s role in space and time. As he foreshadows the project in The Production o f  
Space:
The formal theory of difference opens of itself onto the unknown and the ill-understood: onto 
rhythms, onto circulations of energy, onto the life of the body (where repetitions and differences 
give rise to one another, harmonizing and disharmonizing in turn).^6
It is therefore in R hythm analysis  that Lefebvre combines his thought on space and 
time into an exploration of everyday life, with the work serving as a culmination of 55 
years of academic work, and incorporating many themes present in his earlier work, 
from his work on urban landscapes to his ongoing series on the critique of everyday 
life.147
Rhythmanalysis: spatio-temporal emergence and the art o f dressage
Everywhere where there is interaction between a place, a time and an expenditure of energy, there 
is rhythm .^8
In the prior discussion of Lefebvre’s understanding of space as emergent, it is 
apparent that Lefebvre looks for change to unfold in the sphere of the everyday (and, 
in particular, in the sphere of the lived  everyday, as opposed to its concrete or 
conceptual abstractions) through repetition and difference. This provides important 
clues as to how to understand the spatial organisation of violence, and in particular to 
the openness of violence and its capacity for transformation. Lefebvre expresses his 
project of rhythmanalysis in this way in the opening pages of The Critique o f  
E veryday  Life, Volume II:
146 Lefebvre, The Production o f  Space, 37 3 -
1 4 7  Elden, Understanding Lefebvre, 170.
!48 Lefebvre, Rhythmanalysis, 15 (emphasis original).
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The critique of everyday life studies the persistence of rhythmic time scales within the linear time of 
modern industrial society. It studies the interactions between cyclic time (natural, in a sense 
irrational, and still concrete) and linear time (acquired, rational, and in a sense abstract and 
antinatural). It examines the defects and disquiet this as yet unknown and poorly understood 
interaction produces. Finally, it considers what metamorphoses are possible in the everyday as a 
result of this interaction. ^ 9
Rhythmanalysis, then, is explicitly political, in the sense of making use and 
encouraging the production of difference in space-time. This section explores 
Lefebvre’s rhythmanalysis of dressage, which receives only brief treatment in the text 
R hythm analysis  but which has been chosen specifically because of the similarities to 
the work of Michel Foucault discussed above.
As suggested previously, for Lefebvre, rhythmanalysis proceeds from the body. In 
R hythm analysis, however, the analysis of rhythms goes beyond the restoration of the 
body in critical thought, and is used to undertake an extensive critique of the ‘thing,’ 
or thing-ness, itself. All that is seemingly ‘present’ and immobile in social space is 
replaced with the ongoing presence of rhythms.^0 This allows Lefebvre to reprise his 
analysis of repetition and difference in a way that seems very close to Deleuzian 
(Bergsonian) ‘becoming’:
If there is difference and distinction, there is neither separation nor an abyss between so-called 
material bodies, living bodies, social bodies and representations, ideologies, traditions, projects and 
utopias. They are all composed of (reciprocally influential) rhythms in interaction.^
Things differ in kind through the internal variation of rhythms. However, for all their 
diversity of expression, Lefebvre analyses rhythms through a limited, but general, 
vocabulary: repetition (and difference); the interference of the cyclical and the linear;
1 4 9  Lefebvre, Everyday Life, Vol. II, 4 9  (emphasis removed), cited Elden, Understanding Lefebvre, 197.
*5° Lefebvre, Rhythmanalysis, 10.
Lefebvre, R hythm analysis, 4 3 -
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and the pattern of birth, growth, peak, decline, and end.152 Following, the discussion 
of Lefebvre s rhythmanalysis of dressage illustrates the critical possibilities of an 
account of the everyday spatial organisation of violence that takes into account its 
temporality, or its emergence.
Dressage: education, learning, training
To enter into a society, group or nationality is to accept values (that are taught), to learn a trade by 
following the right channels, but also to bend oneself (to be bent) to its w a y s . ^ 3
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault uses dressage to discuss the way in which the 
body is rendered ‘docile’ by power/knowledge, such that the ‘analysable’ body (as 
understood by knowledge) can be joined to the ‘manipulable’ body (the target of 
power).
The great book of Man-the-Machine was written simultaneously on two registers: the anatomico- 
metaphysical register, of which Descartes wrote the first pages and which the physicians and 
philosophers continued, and the technico-political register, which was constituted by a whole set of 
regulations and by empirical and calculated methods relating to the army, the school and the 
hospital, for controlling or correcting the operations of the body.... And yet there are points of 
overlap from one to the other. La Mettrie’s L’Homme-machine is both a materialist reduction of the 
soul and a general theory of dressage, at the centre of which reigns the notion of ‘docility’, which 
joins the analysable body to the manipulable body. ^ 4
Bringing these two bodies together through the ‘modern soul’ is, for Foucault, the 
essence of the disciplinary relation. As we saw in the previous section, this process is 
carried out through specific forms of spatial relations! specifically, it takes place 
through a spatiality that is cellular, organic, genetic, and com binatory. While there is
*5* Lefebvre, Rhythmanalysis, 15.
*53 Lefebvre, Rhythmanalysis, 39.
1 5 4 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 136 (emphasis original).
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a temporality built into this arrangement, it is singular in the sense of being able to 
be thought in isolation from the temporalities of other orderings — even if it coexists 
with them.
Foucault’s analysis of dressage as the joining  of the ‘analysable’ body to the 
‘manipulable’ body through power/knowledge/space finds echoes in Lefebvre’s 
analysis of dressage, albeit in the familiar form of a dialectic. Here, dressage is the 
‘synthesis’ of a dialectic referring to knowledge and control. This dialectic is identified 
by the three terms education, learning, and dressage. Again, we see echoes of the 
form pergu, congu et vecu. As Lefebvre puts it:
Knowing how to live, knowing howto do something and just plain knowing do not coincide. Not
that one can separate them. Not to forget that they go together.
(Le savoir-vivre, le savoir-faire, le savoir tout court ne coincident pas.fss  
This line, nearly lost in the brevity of Lefebvre’s account of dressage, sits at the core of 
what distinguishes his thought from Foucault’s.
For Foucault, the disciplinary relation imprisons the body (more or less 
effectively) inside the ‘soul,’ a soul which is created and known, investigated and 
made consubstantial with the body through an entire power/knowledge/spatial 
apparatus that ‘knows’ the body, ‘knows’ its efficiencies and its weaknesses: “The 
human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and 
rearranges it.”1^  By emphasising the creation of this particular kind of person (the 
materially souled person), engaged in particular power (and spatial) relations,
!55 Lefebvre, Rhythmanalysis, 39 ,107 n. 24.
156 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 138.
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Foucault lim its the process  of discipline to the process of ‘education’ and ‘learning.’157 
As Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift argue in a different context:
Then ... and again a characteristic of Foucauldian thought, bodies are reduced to embodiment 
degree zero; shorn of many of their performative capacities, unconscious thought, emotions, 
passions, even violence, they present a peculiarly passive stance to the world. Even so, it is clear 
that everyday life also consists of many unconscious body movements which have been inculcated 
into us from an early age.^8
While Amin and Thrift may be overstating the case with regards to Foucault’s 
inattention to the body, it is true that in Foucault, at least in Discipline and Punish, 
the body does not have the same ‘agency’ as the process of education and learning. 
There is no space or time -  no everydayness -  in which the body can reiterate 
education and learning in a way that generates difference. For Lefebvre, on the other 
hand, dressage is precisely the lived  (and hence bodily) experience of the education 
and learning identified by Foucault as a process. This lived experience should be 
distinguished from the knowledge of w h at to do and a knowledge of how  to do it, 
although it is of course a result of these, and in turn impacts on their exercise. For 
Lefebvre, dressage is a (result of) process; it has its own duration and its own rhythm.
Lefebvre describes dressage as the bending of the body to the particular and 
historically specific rhythms of the group -  the particular rhythm of walking, the 
particular style of gesture. It is the educated unconscious, where the unconscious is 
not a “substance hidden behind the scenes” but “that which goes on in the body: in 
our material and social bodies.”159 Dressage, then, is the incorporation of the group
*57 Note that while Foucault’s analysis may limit the process of discipline, it does not limit its outcomes: 
Foucault, as always, recognises that there is an inherent resistance to such orderings, a resistance often 
located in the body. See, Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended (London: Allen Lane, Penguin 
Books, 2003), 280-81.
158 Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift, Cities: Reimagining the Urban (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), 104.
!59 Lefebvre, R hythm analysis, 4 4 -
into the unconscious broadly defined: not as part of a ‘mob mentality,5 but rather 
through the incorporation of the general rhythm into our ‘natural’ gestures.160 
“Humans break themselves in [se dressent] like animals,” says Lefebvre 
contem ptuously.161
How, then, does dressage work? Lefebvre identifies the particular form of 
temporality of dressage as a combination of the linear with the cyclical -  “a linear 
series of imperatives and gestures repeats itself cyclically.”162 There is an explicit 
“science” involved -  particularly in the breaking in process  (when dressage is ‘learnt’) 
-  often in institutional settings. This science carefully composes the rhythms of the 
lived experience so that it controls the duration of the lived and  propagates itself 
(“Needs and desires produce themselves in the interaction”). l63 Time is divided into 
three: the controlled repetition of linear series; the complete stop to allow for repose; 
and the provision of diversions, rewards and distractions. It is a trinity of activity- 
repose-entertainment. Together these form the rhythm of dressage.
It would be a mistake to note only instantaneous attitudes. Or a series of movements (a film). It’s 
the training that counts: that imposes, that educates, that breaks-in.16^
However, Lefebvre spends much of this short chapter discussing the ways in 
which dressage is lived alongside/as part of rhythms that stand in opposition to its 
operation. In particular, Lefebvre discusses the way natural rhythms — odours, the 
rhythms of a wom an’s body — resist the clinical, and masculine, virility of the
160 Chapter Five will explore the extension of the idea of a collective unconscious to include an 
unconscious that is distributed’ through so many technological agents. See, Nigel Thrift, Remembering 
the Technological Unconscious by Foregrounding Knowledges of Position," Environment and Planning 
D: Society and Space 22, no. 1 (2004 ).
161 Lefebvre, R hythm analysis, 3 9 -
162 Lefebvre, R hythm analysis, 3 9 -
163 Lefebvre, R hythm analysis, 41.
164 Lefebvre, R hythm analysis, 4 1-
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rhythms of dressage. In a delightful expression of the partial way in which this 
resistance is expressed, Lefebvre notes:
Of course the femininity upheld by the meanings of vital rhythms, interior and exterior to dressage,
did not resist in a single block. It occasionally fainted, in order subsequently to rebel.165
Further, while the body in Lefebvre may be a site of the ‘excess’ of vitality over 
conditioning, it is also strongly influenced by its social context (“the body subsists at 
precisely the level of the reciprocal movement between these two realms”).166 It is in 
this context that Lefebvre speaks of the ‘failure’ of the military model of dressage 
(with its triadic temporality) in the context of the colonies, and resistance on the part 
of the Protestant countries rebelling against the Catholic church.167 Finally, Lefebvre 
identifies the operation of other “sectors” with their own specific rhythms that 
interfere with those of dressage: the urban rhythm, the rhythm of transport, the 
rhythm of culture “which is more or less functionalised and linked to market 
conditions.”168
Hence, while Foucault’s soldier is ‘made’ through the specific spatiality of 
power/knowledge relations, Lefebvre’s dressage is already a more ephemeral 
construct (assemblage), unfolding through varying temporalities and spaces as a part 
of a multiplicity of rhythms (and excessive ‘passions’) which together comprise the 
body. To understand dressage is to examine the spatio-temporal elaboration of a 
specific power/knowledge relation, a relationship Foucault would identify as 
disciplinary. For Lefebvre, the identification of the rhythms of dressage allows him to 
explore its mechanisms of operation (a triadic temporality, a combination of cyclical 
and linear), its fault-lines (women’s bodies, for example -  malodorous as they are),
l6s Lefebvre, R hythm analysis, 42 (emphasis original).
166 Lefebvre, The Production o f  Space, 203-
167 Lefebvre, R hythm analysis, 42, 41.
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its complication (the interference of other rhythms), and its alteration. On this final 
point, Lefebvre s account offers a departure from Foucault, returning to echo his 
theory of m oments as emerging from the everyday:
Dressage puts into place an automatism of repetitions. But the circumstances are never exactly and 
absolutely the same, identical. There are changes, be they only by the hour or the season, the 
climate, light, etc. Dressage fills the place of the unforeseen, of the initiative of living beings. Thus 
function the ways of breaking-in humans: military knowledge, the rites of politeness, business. 
Space and time thus laid out make room for humans, for education and initiative: for liberty. A 
little room. More of an illusion: dressage does not disappear. In the street, people can turn right or 
left, but their walk, the rhythm of their walking, their movements [gestes] do not change for all 
that.169
Alteration, then, occurs from within the bounds of dressage, and they are not 
necessarily qualitative differences.
Here, one cannot help but be reminded of Deleuze’s account of “control societies” 
wherein the sites of confinement that characterise a disciplinary society are replaced 
by “ultrarapid forms of apparently free-floating control.”1?0 In control societies, 
change forms a p a r t  of the apparatus of control:
Controls are a modulation, like a self-transmuting molding continually changing from one moment 
to the next, or like a sieve whose mesh varies from one point to another....
In disciplinary societies you were always starting all over again (as you went from school to 
barracks, from barracks to factory), while in control societies you never finish anything business, 
training, and military service being coexisting metastable states of a single modulation, a sort of 
universal transmutation.1?1
169 Lefebvre, Rhythmanalysis, 40-41 (emphasis original).
1 7 0  Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, 1972-1990 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1995), 178.
w  Deleuze, Negotiations, 178-79 (emphasis original).
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Does this mean that dressage removes the possibility of change? Not quite: it 
means simply that creativity, according to Lefebvre, “proceeds from the liberty and 
individuality that unfurl only in conditions that are external (to them ).”1?2 The lacuna 
in which creativity can unfurl can emerge from the dissonance of competing rhythms; 
or, from the ‘becoming irregular’ of rhythms that precedes and follows revolutions. As 
Lefebvre argues:
Disruptions and crises always have origins in and effects on rhythms: those of institutions, of 
growth, of the population, of exchanges, of work, therefore those which make or express the 
complexity of present societies. One could study from this perspective the rhythmic changes that 
follow revolutions. Between 1789 and 1830 were not bodies themselves touched by the alterations 
in foods, gestures and costumes, the rhythm of work and of occupations?173
Here, we see the originality of revolutionary violence -  its innovative capacity, its 
capacity to disrupt rhythm, to transform and alter rhythm, to produce and to destroy.
Rhythmanalysis offers compelling insights into the way in which tendencies of 
organised violence might be entrenched or challenged: cyclical and linear rhythms; 
interferences and resistances; peaks and troughs -  they all matter in establishing 
spatial tendencies. Spatial orderings might matter in organising matter, but violence 
is also subject to the vicissitudes of time. If we analyse violence through space, then 
Lefebvre’s work forces us to attend to the complicated and dialectical interactions of 
the way we practise space and the way we think it, interactions best understood in 
terms of the way we Hvb space, which in turn forces us to think temporally. Here 
Lefebvre urges us to be aware of the body’s role at the interface of conceived and 
perceived space, as well as to be aware of the historically specific nature of the 
everyday. The temporality of the space of Lefebvre -  its vitality, the way it “pulses ...
172 Lefebvre, R hythm analysis, 43.
173 Lefebvre, R hythm analysis, 44 (emphasis original).
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palpitates ... flows and collides — is an essential component of his thinking.174 This is 
the vocabulary he gifts his readers: a vocabulary capable of addressing the spatio- 
temporality of violence.
Difference as political: the war machine and the outside of power
Stuart Elden offers us an analysis of Lefebvre and Foucault that sees these two 
authors, different though they are, as two sides of the same (Heideggerian) coin. For 
Elden, Foucault elaborates the relationship between history and space (establishing 
the lim its of the conditions of possibility for ‘history’), while Lefebvre illustrates the 
relationship between politics and space through his exploration of the production of 
space in modern capitalism (establishing the vitality and openness of spatial 
practices).175
Given that Foucault uses power relations to investigate society, rather than the Marxist productive 
relationship, and that power relations are in and through space, we can see that questions o f  space 
are inherently p o li t ic a l ... Lefebvre suggests ‘there is a politics of space because space is political.’ 
Following Heidegger [and Foucault], we might suggest that ‘there is a politics of space because 
politics is spatial.’176
Yet the above description of the work of Foucault and Lefebvre suggests an 
inadequacy in their accounting. If politics is spatial in Foucault, then it is not a 
spatiality that unfolds through time: or rather, the tem porality o f  h istory is 
unconnected to the tem porality  o f space. If space is political in Lefebvre, then the 
politica l is lim ited  to the Marxist productive relationship, no matter how broadly 
defined -  space is political only insofar as it is produced and, importantly, insofar as 
it relates to the human.
!74 Merrifield, "Henri Lefebvre , 171*
175 Elden, Understanding Lefebvre, 189.
176 Elden, M apping the Present, 151 (emphasis original).
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While Foucault and Lefebvre provide a vocabulary with which to think the spatial 
organisation of violence (from Foucault, the relationship of the body to the whole; the 
body to itself and its tools; the mode of combination of forces) and the spatio- 
temporality of the organisation of violence (from Lefebvre, its mechanisms of 
operation, rhythmical fault-lines, temporal interferences, and transformations), they 
have nonetheless failed to think space-tim e-politics together. It is the contention of 
this section of this thesis that Deleuze thinks precisely in this way. Politics, here, is 
obviously not the political process as narrowly defined. Politics instead is the struggle 
to create novelty, to produce difference. If we are to understand violence as open and 
experimental, then we must understand violence as political in this sense. Foucault 
and Lefebvre have linked space to violence in ways that illustrate some political 
potential, but each conception is limited in some way. Deleuze, on the other hand, 
acts to:
... endow philosophy with an explicitly political vocation, defining it as the creation of ‘untimely’ 
concepts. Philosophy is untimely and ‘worthy of the event’ when it does not simply respond to 
social events as they appear but rather creates new concepts which enable us to counter-actualise 
the significant events and processes that define our historical present.177
The political in the thought of Deleuze (and Guattari) is too large a topic to be 
covered in this thesis, however, and this section will focus solely on the account of 
‘space as politicaF that emerges from Deleuze and Guattari s discussion of the war 
machine in A Thousand Plateaus .1?8 In particular, this section will explore the way in 
which one of the key concepts of Deleuze and Guattari, the assem blage , opens out the 
contingent, the possible, and therefore the political, for analysis, no matter how
177 Paul Patton, Deleuze and the Political (London: Routledge, 2000), 132-33 (emphasis added).
178 While the chapter on the war machine was co-authored with Felix Guattari, it is fair to say that many 
of the concepts with which this account is elaborated are drawn from, and elaborated further in,
Deleuze’s singular philosophy. On commentary and the division of labour between Deleuze and Guattari, 
see, Manuel de Landa, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2002), 8 .
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ephemeral that account may prove. It will then explore the ‘war m achine/ and the 
innovative account of violence it allows. For Deleuze and Guattari the seemingly 
destructive purpose of organised violence (the elimination of the enemy in war) is 
only an incidental result of an essentially productive  assemblage, the war machine. 
Violence in their view is truly removed from the instrumentalist or structuralist 
accounts of its exercise: violence is a distinctive assemblage -  not the ‘result’ of an 
assemblage, or the purpose of an assemblage, but the assemblage i t s e l f .^9
Assemblages: affects, abstract machines and discussing the ephemeral
The challenge is to show that ‘nature’ consists of a field of multiplicities, assemblages o f  
heterogeneous components (human, animal, viral, molecular, etc.), in which ‘creative evolution’ 
can be shown to involve blocks of becoming.180
In the work of Lefebvre explored so far, and to a lesser extent, in that of Foucault, 
the emphasis of analysis has been on the political subject -  that is, on the human. 
Lefebvre’s rhythmanalysis, the least humanistic of all his endeavours, is still 
grounded in an exploration of the body’s interactions with the rhythms that surround 
it (as Amin and Thrift put it, “everyday urbanism is marked by a certain humanism,
179 In fact, the war machine is an abstract machine which operates to generate assemblages-as-violence 
like nomadism. The distinction between the abstract machine and the assemblage is (crudely) presented 
in this thesis as that between the “content adequate to the Idea and the material construction of that 
form. This is not Platonic idealism, however, as the abstract machine is in no way pre-determ inative of 
the form of assemblage: an abstract machine (also termed body without organs) is always subject to 
processes of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. This distinction has been elaborated in much 
greater detail -  see, de Landa, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, especially Chapter One; Keith 
Ansell Pearson, Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition o f Deleuze (London: Routledge, 1999 ), 
especially Chapter Three. This thesis avoids discussing this distinction in depth as it draws its ontological 
principles from elsewhere, as shown in the following chapter, and uses Deleuze simply as a spur to 
thought. See, Law, After Method, 4 i~4 2-
180 Ansell Pearson, Germinal Life, 171 (emphasis added).
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evident in the powers of reflexive wanderers and rhythmanalysts”).181 Foucault’s 
account of subject formation may be impersonal in the sense that the subject is de­
centred in favour of analyses of power/knowledge/space, nonetheless the emphasis 
remains on the formation of the political subject per se.182 Perhaps it is for this reason 
that despite Foucault’s spatialisation of power relations, he never truly accounts for 
the political nature of space. Space is not limited to the human, nor that which relates 
to the human.
For Deleuze and Guattari, the assemblage operates as a way of thinking beyond 
the human. This is the key distinction that Keith Ansell-Pearson notes between 
Deleuze’s early interaction with Bergson and his Bergsonism post-Guattari:
In his collaborative work with Guattari, Deleuze is no longer addressing the ‘becoming’ of the 
human as a question of its ‘evolution’ as an individuated biological organism  .... The ‘human’ is 
now understood solely and strictly in terms of it being a component in a machinic assemblage.1^
Machinic assemblages, comprising a promiscuous arrangement of heterogeneous 
elem ents, are, in turn, held together by what Ansell-Pearson terms ‘transversals,’ 
“which them selves are special kinds of components that play the role of specialized 
vectors of deterritorialization.”18* The assemblage concept, abstract as it seems, is 
highly concrete. It refers to the material ways in which these diverse elements are 
brought together — and held together — in complex ways. As Marcus and Saka put it:
181 Amin et al., Cities, 26.
1 8 2  -phis emphasis only increased in Foucault’s final works on the cultivation of the self in the last two 
volumes of the History of Sexuality series: Michel Foucault, The Use o f Pleasure: The H istory o f  
Sexuality, Volume 2 (London: Penguin Books, 1992); Michel Foucault, The Care o f the Self: The History 
o f  Sexuality, Volume 3  (London: Penguin Books, 1990).
183 Ansell Pearson, Germinal Life, 140 (emphasis original).
184 Ansell Pearson, Germinal Life, 171.
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Assemblage is a topological concept that designates the actualizations of the virtual causes or causal 
processes that are immanent in an open system of intensities that is under the influence of a force 
that is external (or heterogeneous) in relation to it.l8s
The immediate effect of viewing the organisation of ‘life’ in this way is that 
agency is de-centred. The mind, for example, is not viewed as an inside that looks 
‘out,’ but rather is part of (a number of) systems involving the body and the ‘world’ -  
“complex material systems which cut across individuals (assemblages) and which 
traverse phyletic lineages and organismic boundaries (rhizomes).”186 As they are 
discussing this in contradistinction to the traditional perspective of evolutionary 
biology, Deleuze (and Guattari) confront the issue of how, then, to address the study 
of ethology. Ethology, the study of animal behaviour in their natural environment, 
has been used to help understand the process of evolution.187 If animals are no longer 
seen as discrete units to be examined, or links in a (linear) evolutionary chain, then 
how should the study of their behaviour, and more importantly, their evolutionary 
adaptation and change, be approached? Deleuze and Guattari suggest that an 
‘ethology’ of assemblages -  an understanding of the behaviour of assemblages -  can 
be sought through exploring the affective interaction  of assemblages and their 
components. In the words of Amin and Thrift, who seek to understand the city as a 
Deleuzian assemblage, “the city should be seen as a kind of force-field of passions that 
associate and pulse bodies in particular ways.”188 Deleuze and Guattari note the way 
in which affect (which is asocial but not pre-social — unqualified emotion, 
unsocialised desire) is both a result of and a condition of assemblages:189
185 George E. Marcus, and Erkan Saka, "Assemblage," Theory, Culture & Society 23, no. 2-3 (2006): 103.
186 Ansell Pearson, Germinal Life, 171.
l8? The M acquarie Dictionary, 3rd ed., s.v. “ethology.”
188 Amin et al., Cities, 84.
189 Intensity [affect] is asocial, but not presocial -  it includes social elements but mixes them with elements 
belonging to other levels of functioning and combines them according to a different logic.
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Assemblages are passional, they are compositions of desire. Desire has nothing to do with a natural 
or spontaneous determination; there is no desire but assembling, assembled, desire. The 
rationality, the efficiency, of an assemblage does not exist without the passions the assemblage 
brings into play, without the desires that constitute it as much as it constitutes them.1?0
Thus the body, which in Foucault is a site  of intense political engineering, and in 
Lefebvre is the (passional, excessive) interface of rhythmic construction, in Deleuze 
becom es enrolled  in assemblages through the operation of affect.
The ethological approach seeks to define a body not in terms of organs and functions, and as 
characteristics of species and genus, but rather in terms of ‘affects’ (which are not mere feelings or 
affections, but harmonies of tone, colour, etc.).1?1
This has profound implications for the political. As Claire Colebrook argues, it 
provides an impetus for a politics that is “pre-personal:”
We tend to think of politics primarily as ideology -  the thoughts, ideas or attitudes from which we 
act and move; but that acting moving self is produced, Deleuze and Guattari argue, from  affect.1?*
If affect is autonomous (and pre-personal) then there is a need to refer to a 
“m icropolitics, which attends to the passional connections among bodies.”1^  This 
politics is explicitly spatial: assemblages are assembled in and through space, and 
their duration  is concretely linked to that spatiality. On this point, Marcus and Saka 
note that assemblage is a useful concept precisely for its ephemerality: the
Brian Massumi, Parables fo r  the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2002), 30 (emphasis original).
!9° Gilles Deleuze, and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia Vol. 2 
(London: Continuum, 2004), 440-41*
J9i Ansell Pearson, Germinal Life, 179.
^  Claire Colebrook, Deleuze: A Guide fo r  the Perplexed (London: Continuum, 2006), 55 (emphasis 
original).
x?3 Colebrook, Deleuze, 55 (emphasis original). See, also, “The Autonomy of Affect, in Massumi, 
Parables fo r  the Virtual, 23-45*
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insubstantial duration of an assemblage is what allows the concept to mediate “two 
classic varieties of modernist thought”:
The one [that] indulges and even celebrates the intractably unpredictable and contingent in rapidly 
changing contemporary life; the other [that] hopes for an understanding of the structural principles 
of order (and disorder) within the play of events and processes.1^
The key quality of assemblage, then, is its ability to hold in tension these two critical 
impetuses. It is the same quality that allows for an analysis of violence that does not 
subordinate it to the determinism of structuralism or the despair of anarchical 
descriptions.
The assemblage leads, however, to a ‘strange’ kind of analysis that, as is explored 
in the following chapter, allows an entrance into the multiplicity and 
contemporaneity that both saturates the ‘real’ world and is found so rarely in 
academic accounts.
It [assemblage] generates enduring puzzles about ‘process’ and ‘relationship’ rather than leading to 
systematic understandings of these tropes .... It offers an odd, irregular, time-limited object for 
contemplation. Whoever employs it does so with a certain tension, balancing, and tentativeness 
where the contradictions between the ephemeral and the structural, and between the structural and 
the unstably heterogeneous create an almost nervous condition for reason.195
The ways in which assemblage is implicated in the political nature of spatiality 
become clearer when the concept is used to explore the work of Deleuze and Guattari 
on the war machine. Their “Treatise on Nomadology in A Thousand Plateaus is 
extraordinary in the originality of its conception of the organisation of violence as 
paradoxically both independent of and intimately tied to two seemingly diametrically
1 9 4  Marcus et al., "Assemblage", 103,104.
195 Marcus et al., "Assemblage", 104.
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opposed political formations (abstract machines-cum-assemblages), that of the 
nomad and that of the State (which nonetheless appropriate one another’s forms of 
violence with often unexpected results).
The war machine: making violence durable
Paul Patton argues that the war machine makes its appearance in Deleuze and 
Guattari as “a general name for those social assemblages that are outside and hostile 
to the state.”196 While it is true that Deleuze and Guattari view the war machine as 
external to the State, and that they argue that the war machine acts as a force 
preventing State formation in nomadic societies, it is misleading to imply that such 
assemblages come into being in order  to resist the State. Rather, Deleuze and 
Guattari refer primarily to the positive project of the war machine -  a positive project 
that is intrinsically and wholly spatial.
We have seen that the war machine was the invention of the nomad, because it is in its essence the 
constitutive element of smooth space, the occupation of this space, displacement within this space, 
and the corresponding composition of people: this is its sole and veritable positive object (nomos). 
Make the desert, the steppe, grow; do not depopulate it, quite the contrary. If war necessarily 
results, it is because the war machine collides with States and cities as forces (of striation) opposing 
its positive object... .197
The war machine, then, is an abstract machine that drives the formation of specific 
assemblages (of which nomadic societies are perhaps the originary but certainly not 
the only example) that constitute a particular kind of (smooth) space.
This leads to a puzzle, and one that is significant in light of the subject matter of 
this thesis. Why is this abstract machine termed the w ar  machine, when war is a 
secondary characteristic of its operation? Firstly, in Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis,
196 Patton, Deleuze and the Political, 111.
*97 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 460 (emphasis original).
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the war machine has a unique relationship with violence — a relationship that 
produces and organises violence in an entirely creative context. The violence of the 
war machine is not the paltry, rigidly delimited internal violence available to the State 
(“police” violence, as Deleuze and Guattari term it derisively, is violence as 
determ in ed  by  the law ), rather the war machine refers to “a w a y  o f  m aking violence 
durable, even unlim ited.”"8 The act of ‘making violence durable’ is primary in 
understanding why nomadology’s abstract machine is a w a r  machine, and this is why 
it is so significant for the purpose of this thesis -  this is the creative operation of 
violence. There are, of course, other reasons why the war machine is so-named. As 
Patton points out, war may be a secondary function of the war machine, but given 
that nom adism  and the war machine act as the outside, or Other, to the State form, 
when the war machine encounters striating State forms there is inevitable conflict.1"  
Further, the war machine is integral to the formation of State warfare despite its 
externality to the State: it is only by means of the appropriation of the war machine -  
an appropriation that is always partial, always troublesome -  that the State comes to 
be capable of the creative violence that marks war.200
The ways in which the war machine m akes violence durable  results from 
particular tendencies Deleuze and Guattari identify in assemblages associated with 
the war machine, tendencies that can elaborate further a spatial vocabulary useful for 
analysing violence. Deleuze and Guattari discuss these tendencies in a number of 
contexts, although this section of the thesis focuses on just tw o .201 Firstly, it discusses 
the spatial tendencies of the war machine, that is the creation and occupation of
*98 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 4 9 4 > 4 3 7  (emphasis added).
!99 Patton, Deleuze and the Political, 114.
200 Deleuze et al., A T h o u sa n d  Plateaus, 3 9 1 -9 3 - See, also, Reid, "Deleuze’s War Machine," especially 65- 
67.
201 Other ways in which Deleuze and Guattari illustrate the tendencies of the war machine are through 
the numbering principles of nomadism, and the distinction between ‘nomadic’ and Royal science. See, in 
particular, Deleuze et a.\.,A Thousand Plateaus, 4 3 2 -3 3 > 400.
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sm ooth as opposed to striated space; the qualities of movement and speed. Secondly, 
it discusses the elaboration of these tendencies with respect to the difference between 
the assem blages of the weapon and the tool.
Smooth and striated spaces: absolute and relative movements, measure and 
rhythms
The ways in which assemblages smooth and striate space are integral to 
understanding Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualisation of the operation of violence. 
The kind of violence associated with nomadism and the war machine (creative, 
durable violence) cannot be separated from the kind of space which is being 
produced. Alterations in one are alterations in the other. This is not an issue of 
causation, as in Foucault, where power/knowledge/space establishes the conditions 
of possibility for the exercise of violence. Rather, this is the complication (enrolment) 
of space and violence in the same assemblage. The following section explores the 
relation between the competing abstract machines (the State and the war machine) 
and violence through identifying the spatial qualities, the kind of movement and the 
rhythm of each machine’s operation. Each of these elements adds to our 
understanding of the operation of violence, with violence in smooth space (violence 
that sm oothes space) engaged in an essentially creative and open form of the exercise 
of force, something that the State manages to coopt only partially. Deleuze and 
Guattari’s argument provides a non-humanistic account of the introduction of 
qualitative change in violence and through violence. Therefore, the following section 
outlines both a vocabulary for describing a relationship between violence and 
spatialising practices, and poses a properly politicised question that underlies the 
following thesis: how can US military developments, from Vietnam to the Revolution 
in Military Affairs, be seen in terms of the State s appropriation of the war machine?
Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between two kinds of space that are created 
through and for two opposed forms of abstract machine, the State and the war
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m achine.202 On the one hand, the State is associated with the production of stria ted , 
or metric, space. This is the linear, Euclidean space with which science is so familiar. 
It is the space of points and solids: space as measured out “in order to be 
occupied. 203 As Marcus Doel insightfully points out, it is a space with which many so- 
called postmodern geographers of networks are as familiar as traditional geographers 
of solid entities such as States, seas, regions, and continents:
Both the ‘old’ and the ‘new1 ways of dealing with space — rigid and fluid spaces, gridded and 
networked spaces, absolute and relative-cum-relational spaces, Euclidean and non-Euclidean 
spaces, abstract and lived spaces -  invariably rest upon an inconsistent, unbecoming, and ill- 
mannered image of thought: pointillism .2°4
Striated space, resting on the point (the vanishing point of perspective, the (0 ,0)  
point at the meeting of the x  and y  axes, the nodes of a network), stands in 
contradistinction to smooth space, which is the space of the nomad (and the war 
machine). As Deleuze and Guattari describe the importance of lines (vectors) rather 
than points in the life of the nomad:
A path is always between two points, but the in-between has taken on all the consistency and enjoys 
both an autonomy and a direction of its own. The life of the nomad is the intermezzo. Even the 
elements of his dwelling are conceived in terms of the trajectory that is forever mobilizing them.2°s
202 This distinction does not imply that the two spaces exist alone, independent of one another.
We must remind ourselves that the two spaces in fact exist only in mixture: smooth space is constantly being 
translated, transversed into a striated space; striated space is constantly being reversed, returned to smooth 
space. In the first case, one organizes even the desert; in the second, the desert gains and grows, and the two 
can happen simultaneously.
Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 5 24 -
2°3 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 399.
204 Marcus A. Doel, "Unglunking Geography: Spatial Science After Dr Seuss and Gilles Deleuze, in 
Thinking Space, ed. Mike Crang and Nigel Thrift, H7 -3 5  (London: Routledge, 2000), 125 (emphasis 
original).
2°5 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 4 1 9 -
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Unlike striated space, smooth space is not measured or counted (“space is occupied 
without being counted ), rather the nomadic assemblage distributes people (and 
animals, dwellings, oases) in such a way as to create a space that cannot be ‘parcelled’ 
up but only moved through.206 The nomadic assemblage (which includes/produces 
the nom ads and their movements) produces a smooth space in which the nomad can 
live and move:
The nomads are there, on the land, wherever there forms a smooth space that gnaws, and tends to 
grow, in all directions. The nomads inhabit these places; they remain in them, and they themselves 
make them grow, for it has been established that the nomads make the desert no less than they are 
made by it. They are vectors of deterritorialization. They add desert to desert, steppe to steppe, by a 
series of local operations whose orientation and direction endlessly vary.2°7
Note that the nomads are not agents  creating smooth space through demarcation 
and appropriation, but vectors  that occupy (and extend) a space through their 
movement. Their mode of operation is as part of an assemblage that is pulled 
together through the affective affinities of a particular kind of movement. This is the 
m ovem ent Deleuze and Guattari call “absolute” movement, where the movement is 
not relative to one point (the beginning) or another (the end), but refers instead to the 
“absolute state of a moving body occupying a smooth space.”208
Such absolute movement has a peculiar relationship to the traditional conception 
of war. Where Clausewitz famously coined the aphorism that war is the pursuit of 
politics by other means, Deleuze and Guattari note that Clausewitz actually views war 
(violence) as a ‘pure Idea’ (a force distinct from Clausewitz’s limited conception of 
politics) that is then subm itted  to State aims, and for which States are better or worse
206 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 399, 420.
2°7 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 421.
208 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 426.
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conductors.209 Thus, according to Deleuze and Guattari, the absolute war that 
Clausewitz warns of as inherent in the tendencies of war-making is not the ‘total war’ 
of the 20th century:
Rather absolute war is different from both limited and total war because it is not necessarily 
conditioned by a relation between reason and violence.210
Absolute movement, then, is the movement associated with such ‘absolute’ war: 
m ovem ent is not relative to distinct tactical and strategic (in other words, striated) 
spaces, but is experienced fluidly, as part of a vector of total, creative violence. 
Absolute movement is one of the characteristics identified by Deleuze and Guattari as 
marking the possibility of open, experimental violence, a violence not determined 
through the agency of the State (or even the nomad), but which is implicated in an 
ongoing differentiation of both the ‘agent’ and the violence.
Enrolment in assemblages producing smooth space in war, as in all assemblages, 
is unwitting, and often unpleasant. It is not violence that can necessarily be 
subordinated to reason or purpose. Open and experimental it may be, but its ‘success’ 
is judged on its own terms, according to its own affective ‘logic.’ To take a highly 
specific example, Herman Rapaport identifies this kind of absolute movement in the 
behaviour of the US military during the Vietnam War (when helicopters were 
famously compared to the horses of cavalry), where their military strategy was 
unwittingly (unwillingly) ‘deterritorialized’ by the Viet Cong.211 By refusing the United 
States’ (striated) teleology of war (‘battles culminate in victory or defeat’), refusing 
their combative purpose (‘all battles have strategic m eaning), the Viet Cong denied 
the US the ability to striate the space of Vietnam according to strategic logic, leaving
2°9 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 463. This has been elaborated further, see, Reid, Deleuze s War 
Machine," 67-71.
210 Reid, "Deleuze's War Machine," 70.
211 Herman Rapaport, "Vietnam: The Thousand Plateaus," Social Text 9/10 (1984): 138-39-
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the country amorphous and impenetrable to the military assemblage. Unable to 
control space through its space, the US military acted as nomads might, but could not 
accept that such an approach would never to lead to victory as defined in State terms 
of reason and control. As Rapaport describes it:
[Civilians taken for interrogation] were eventually let go, dead or alive, only to face relocation again 
as refugees, perhaps even after the fall of Saigon, an activity that mimicked the soldiers who were 
suddenly ‘dropped’ in various ‘strategic’ zones, pulled out, living, wounded, or dead, rested for a 
time, and ‘dropped’ somewhere else, some place detached from every other place, shuttled back to 
base or left in the field (who knew where?) in that land without places, that body devoid of any real 
parts.212
Absolute m ovem ent then, but not by choice and, unwilling (or unable) to occupy 
smooth space as absolute movement, and to accept the ensuing political 
consequences, the US floundered in ways that are familiar to all.
The affective capacities of the movements of smooth and striated space are tied 
closely to their rhythm s. As Deleuze and Guattari argue in relation to the rhythm of 
the war machine:
This element of exteriority... will give time a new rhythm: an endless succession of catatonic 
episodes, or fainting spells, and flashes or rushes.213
Rhythm, Deleuze and Guattari note, is “never the same as measure.”21* Whereas 
Lefebvrian rhythms are demarcated as cyclical or linear, with change emerging 
through repetition, for Deleuze and Guattari rhythm is not primarily understood 
through repetition, but in terms of whether or not the rhythm is responding to 
m easure .215
212 Rapaport, "Vietnam: The Thousand Plateaus," 140.
213 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 393.
214 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 401.
2 15 Measure in music is a form of striation -  even the word implies metrication, counting, demarcation.
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There is indeed such a thing as measured, cadenced rhythm, relating to the coursing of a river 
between its banks or to the form of a striated space; but there is also a rhythm without measure, 
which relates to the upswell of flow, in other words, to the manner in which a fluid occupies a 
smooth space.216
Deleuze and Guattari engage in a detailed discussion of the importance of rhythm as 
part of the war machine in their elaboration of Paul Virilio’s argument relating to the 
flee t-in -bein g .217 Here, we see how rhythm can alter with the striation and smoothing 
of space, and how, paradoxically, ‘complete’ State striation of the sea could result in a 
State-entity, the fleet, that is capable of absolute movement -  of smoothing space.
For Deleuze and Guattari, the sea might be seen as a smooth space par 
excellence, difficult to demarcate, impossible to control (certainly without 
technologies and sciences capable of understanding its operation). However, they 
describe how the State, on encountering the sea, operated as a force of striation. This 
process is difficult and historically specific, involving an entire scientific and 
commercial apparatus:
The commercial cities participated in this striation, and were often innovators; but only the States 
were capable of carrying it to completion, of raising it to the global level of a ‘politics of science.’ A 
dimensionality that subordinated directionality, or superimposed itself upon it, became 
increasingly entrenched.218
Hence the sea was striated by counting, ordering, and measuring that which was 
unknown and had been unknowable (“with ... fixed routes, constant directions, 
relative movements, a whole counter-hydraulic of channels and conduits ).219 Yet 
according to Virilio, the striation of the sea, that ultimate victory of the State form 
over smooth space, had unexpected results:
216 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 401.
21? See, Paul Virilio, Speed and Politics (New York, NY: Semiotexte, 1986).
218 Deleuze et a l, A Thousand Plateaus, 529 (emphasis original).
219 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 427.
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The multiplication of relative movements, the intensification of relative speeds in striated space, 
ended up reconstituting a smooth space for absolute movement. As Virilio emphasizes, the sea 
became the place of the fleet in being, where one no longer goes from one point to another, but 
rather holds space beginning from any point: instead of striating space, one occupied it with a 
vector of deterritorialization in perpetual motion.220
That is, technological improvements in sea-faring, navigation and communications, 
not to mention the commercial and colonial assemblages in which the sea was 
involved, meant that State fleets actually came to form vectors of deterritorialisation, 
rather than to exist as points on established routes. Today, these fleets no longer 
occupy points (go from place to place), rather they roam the sea. This is exemplified 
in “the perpetual motion of the strategic submarine,” which must terrorise nuclear 
opponents through occupying any territory  a t all (occupying territory without 
counting it), rather than a specific point which might be countermanded.221 Violence 
goes from being controlled and subject to reason, to being open and creative (and 
absolute -  think D r Strangelove  writ large).
We have here the rhythmic composition of an assemblage (striated space, 
counted and measured, assembled through the rhythm of the fixed movement, 
cyclical returns and so on) altering such that the rhythm no longer responds to the 
m easure  of the sea’s striation. This example illustrates a number of the key features 
of Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of smooth and striated space, including the role 
of measure and rhythm, and the capacities of the State contra the war machine. The 
assemblage now responds to the rhythm of the “vortical movement that can rise up at 
any m om ent” -  that is, the assemblage responds to the rhythm of becoming  found in 
smooth space, and in so doing produces  smooth space.222
220 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 427 (emphasis original).
221 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 530.
222 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 401.
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What is this vortical movement that has altered the rhythm of (what we can 
loosely term) the State-sea assemblage, that is, that has produced qualitative 
difference? It is not simply the vortical movement o f ‘the sea,’ whose movement had 
been happily ‘non-vortical’ in the context of ‘predictable’ (striated) trade routes for 
hundreds of years. Rather it is the vortical movement of the sea as enrolled in an 
assem blage  with the faster, more mobile, more independent (and into the 20th 
century, better co-ordinated through radio) ships and submarines of the great State 
naval apparatuses (“the multiplication of relative movements, the intensification of 
relative speeds”). The alteration of rhythm is a result of the changing composition of 
the assemblage, warning again of the ephemerality of the assemblage as an object of 
study. The fleet-in -being  is the successful appropriation of the war machine by the 
State in the context of the seas, the appropriation of the war machine’s production of 
smooth space, paradoxically of course “for the purpose of controlling striated space 
more completely.”223
This discussion opens a way for thinking of the emergence of qualitative 
difference in violence, but it does not explain the assertion made previously, that the 
privileged relation of smooth space to the war machine makes violence durable. 
Smooth space produces/is produced by particular qualities of absolute movement 
and fluid rhythms (those without measure), qualities that help describe the 
organisation of particular manifestations of (creative) violence, manifestations that 
have been both successful (on the sea) and unsuccessful (in Vietnam) from the 
perspective of the State. The following is an elaboration of the tendencies of weapon- 
assemblages as opposed to tool-assemblages indicates the way in which smooth space 
has the ability to prolong the moment of violence, thus making it durable. This 
durability helps explain the constant impetus to alter, to change. This section also
223 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 530.
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provides a series of markers for identifying an assemblage’s tendency with respect to 
the war machine and the State (the war machine tends to enrol weapons, the State 
tends to enrol tools). Further, it gives a more complicated account of the continual 
interplay between weapons and tools -  an interplay that points to the political 
significance of assemblages as the State apparatus appropriates and is appropriated 
by the war machine.
W eapon-assemblages: projection, speed, affect
It is the machine that is primary in relation to the technical element: not the technical machine, 
itself a collection of elements, but the social or collective machine, the machinic assemblage that 
determines what is a technical element at any given moment, what is its usage, extension, 
comprehension, etc.224
Deleuze and Guattari offer an extended analysis of the differential tendencies of 
the assemblages in which tools and weapons are enrolled/made. As they note, 
however, a tool can become a weapon and a weapon can become a tool. In fact, it is 
the continual interaction of the State form and the war machine in constituting these 
tool or weapon assemblages that sees their functioning as politically vita l 
(differentiating, creative of difference), rather than stale and pre-determined:
The man of war may at times form peasant or worker alliances, but it is more frequent for a worker, 
industrial or agricultural, to reinvent a war machine. Peasants made an important contribution to 
the history of artillery during the Hussite wars, when Zizka armed mobile fortresses made from 
oxcarts with portable canons. A worker-soldier, weapon-tool, sentiment-affect affinity marks the 
right tim e, however fleeting, fo r  revolutions and popular wars. There is a schizophrenic taste fo r
224 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 439.
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the tool that moves it aw ay from  work and tow ard free  action, a schizophrenic taste fo r  the 
weapon that turns it into a means fo r  peace, fo r  obtaining peace .225
Deleuze and Guattari identify at least five tendencies that distinguish weapons- 
assemblages (as part of the war machine) from tool assemblages (as part of the State). 
Firstly, Deleuze and Guattari identify the direction  of weapons as one of projection .226 
This is not merely true of ballistic weapons, but also of weapon assemblages such as 
the horseback rider. Here, Deleuze and Guattari note that the horseback rider-as- 
warrior is distinct from the horseback rider-as-hunter because of the m ode  of his 
direction:
Whereas in the hunt the hunter’s aim was to arrest the movement of wild animality... what the 
warrior borrows from the [hunted] animal is more the idea o f the motor than the model of the prey. 
He does not generalize the idea of the prey by applying it to the enemy; he abstracts the idea of the 
motor, applying it to himself.22?
Absolute speed, then, is the driver of the war machine. The weapon projects, whereas 
the tool introspects, “prepares matter from a distance, in order to bring it to a state of 
equilibrium.”228 It is in projection that violence can be made durable.
For example, Deleuze and Guattari identify the animal breeding and training 
undertaken by the nomads as a distinct mode of capturing and conserving the 
projective capacity of the animal, prolonging this capacity, orienting it, and provoking 
it in turn.
Animal breeding and training are not to be confused either with the primitive hunt or with 
sedentary domestication, but are in fact the discovery of a projecting and projectile system. Rather
225 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 4 4 4  (emphasis added).
226 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 436-38.
227 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 437 (emphasis added).
228 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 436.
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than operating by blow-by-blow violence, or constituting a violence ‘once and for a ll/ the war 
machine, with breeding and training, institutes an entire economy of violence, in other words, a 
way of making violence durable, even unlimited.... The economy of violence is not that o f the 
hunter in the animal raiser, but that o f  the hunted animal. ... Whence becoming-animal in the war 
machine.229
Violence in this assemblage must be seen as ongoing and creative: the “becoming- 
animal” of the war machine is precisely its ongoing alteration, an alteration driven on 
(projected) by the captured (but not constrained or controlled) energy of the hunted 
animal.
State appropriations of the war machine tend to bring this projection inward, 
controlling speed and making it relative. These assemblages add weight and gravity in 
the form of defensive and attacking postures, and by striating space such that 
“opposing forces can come to an equilibrium.”230 This bears comparison with 
Foucault’s account of the careful composition of forces in 18th century battles, or to 
the lines in World War I that had to be held according to a strategic logic that defied 
the lived comprehension of bodies on the ground.231 It is telling that in the 18th 
century, the ‘wild Cossacks’ (feared by their own commanders for disrupting the 
careful balance of forces) were drawn from a social structure of semi-nomadic origin 
— their horsemanship was an act of projection disrupting/enacting a war machine the 
State was attempting to tightly control.232
The distinction between the appropriated (State) and the ‘out of control’ war 
machine helps mark the second differential tendency that Deleuze and Guattari use to
229 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 4 3 7  (emphasis original).
23° Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 438.
23! See n. 102, above.
2 3 2  por a discussion of the Cossacks in eighteenth century military forces, see, Duffy, The Age o f Reason,
271, 274-75.
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distinguish between weapons-assemblages and tools-assemblages, that of speed  
versus g ra v ity . The relationship between speed and gravity, as in the case of the 
relationship between smooth and striated space generally, is one of altering/alterable 
tendencies. In World War I, for example, it was the striation of space by the State 
form, and the State form’s abstraction of speed as a ‘property’ of projectiles (rather 
than a creative form) that created immobility and deadlock (gravity). However, as 
Deleuze states:
it was the tank that regrouped all of the operations in the speed vector and recreated a smooth
space for movement by uprooting men and arms.233
In fact, the tactical use of tanks was initially conceived of in explicitly naval terms, 
recreating a ‘sm ooth’ space akin to the sea across which a mechanised army might 
travel “barely hindered by either geography or logistics.”234
The third tendency that differentiates weapons-assemblages from tools- 
assemblages is what Deleuze and Guattari call the “m odel.”233 Here, they are referring 
specifically to two ideal models of the motor: one of w ork  and one offree  action. 
Work is the linear repetition of energy expenditure, and the tool’s function is relative 
displacement of the point of effort according to the laws of gravity.236 We see here 
echoes of Lefebvre’s analysis of capitalist production as “the linear repetitive.”23? By 
contrast free action is the “vortical occupation of a space that constitutes the absolute 
movement of the weapon.”238 This is not to credit the weapon with “a magical power
233 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 438.
234 Gat, H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, 549. Indeed, one of the great British strategic thinkers of tank 
warfare, J.F.C. Fuller, would enter and “outrageously” win the Naval Prize Essay competition in 1920. 
Gat, H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, 5 4 9 - See, also, Deleuze et a l, A Thousand Plateaus, 626 n. 76.
235 Deleuze et a l, A Thousand Plateaus, 444.
236 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 438.
237 Lefebvre, Everyday Life, Vol. II, 340.
238 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 438.
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in contrast to the constraints of tools,” rather it is to say that the weapon acts: “as 
though [it] were moving, self-propelling, while the tool is m o v e d .”239
The tool is essentially tied to a genesis, a displacement, and an expenditure of force whose laws 
reside in work, while the weapon concerns only the exercise or manifestation of force in space and 
time, in conformity with free action.240
The fourth tendency relates to the fo rm  o f  expression. Deleuze and Guattari note 
that weapons-assemblages tend to express themselves outside of traditional semiotic 
system s, particularly in the quintessential nomadic form of art, jew elry-m aking, 
which conveys meaning through an “affective semiotic.”2'*1 This stands in opposition 
to tools, which tend to find expression through systems of signs, of which writing is 
but the ultimate and most coherent expression.242 This tendency is an expression of 
the final tendency identified by Deleuze and Guattari, the “passional or desiring 
tonality” of an assemblage.243 In Deleuzo-Guattarian thought, the passions are both 
what drive and emerge from the process of assembling, yet ‘the passions’ are not 
them selves undifferentiated:
Passions are effectuations of desire that differ according to the assemblage: it is not the same 
justice or the same cruelty, the same pity, etc.244
In particular, Deleuze and Guattari identity the weapons-assemblage as mobilising 
affect, while the tool-assemblage mobilises feelings. According to Massumi, feelings 
(em otions) can be distinguished from affect (intensity) in the following way:
239 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 439, 438.
240 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 439.
241 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 444.
242 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 4 4 3 -4 4 -
243 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 444.
244 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 441.
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An emotion is a subjective content, the soeiolinguistic fixing of the quality of an experience which is 
from  that poin t onw ard defined as personal. Emotion is qualified intensity, the conventional, 
consensual point of insertion of intensity into semantically and semiotically formed progressions, 
into narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning. It is intensity owned and 
recognized.2^
Emotion is strongly associated with the individual subject, while affects are 
impersonal: not in the sense of a ‘mob mentality,’ but rather as an excess o f ‘feeling’ 
over content. However there is no barrier between the two. Affects ‘become’ emotion 
when enrolled in “semantically and semiotically formed progressions”; emotions can 
be enrolled into affective assemblages through mutual sympathies.246
This interplay is particularly acute because of the State’s appropriation of the 
essentially affective form of the w arrior. Unlike the warrior, the desiring tonality of a 
w orker  is that of feeling:
The work regime is inseparable from an organization and a development of Form, corresponding to 
which is the formation of the subject. This is the passional regime of feeling as ‘the form of the 
worker.’ Feeling implies an evaluation of matter and its resistances, a direction ... to form and its 
developments, an economy of force and its displacements, an entire gravity.^?
When the State appropriates the war machine, it attempts to “assimilate the 
education of the citizen to the training of the worker to the apprenticeship of the 
soldier.”248 That is, it attempts to make a w orker  from the man of war. This is what 
Foucault describes with the disciplining of the soldier, or, more precisely, the creation 
of the m ilitaire  from the hom me de guerreJ** Yet Foucault’s unwillingness to unfold 
the process in time, his unwillingness to acknowledge the existence of forces
245 Massumi, Parables fo r  the Virtual, 28 (emphasis added).
246 Massumi, Parables fo r  the Virtual, 28.
247 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 441.
248 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 441.
2 4 9  Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 168.
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im personal toward and uncaring o f the p o litica l  subject -  forces, that is, of creative 
becom ing -  sees him  stop his account short of allowing for the playful variability in 
Deleuze and Guattari.
It is in this context that Julian Reid differentiates Deleuze from Foucault in term s 
of their conceptualisation of the relationship betw een power and desire. For Foucault, 
desire is never exterior to power. Transgression, for example, is sim ply part of the 
power m echanism  inciting desire. For Deleuze, on the other hand, while desire is not 
external to power, its crea tive  force m eans that “power ... incorporates the scope for 
societies to explore their productive potential of desire as a m eans to transform  its 
system s.”250 Acts of resistance may then be ‘futile,’ in the sense that creative 
becom ings invoked by desire are ultim ately reterritorialised through power, but this  
“does not underm ine the purpose o f their undertaking.”251 This difference becom es  
significant with respect to war. For Deleuze and Guattari while the man of war may be  
disciplined into the form of a ‘soldier’ (worker), the worker m a y  also  becom e a m an  
o f  w a r  as part of:
... new figures of transhistorical assemblage (neither historical nor eternal, but untimely): the 
nomad warrior and the ambulant worker. A somber caricature already precedes them, the 
mercenary or mobile military adviser, and the technocrats or transhumant analysts, CIA and IBM. 
But transhistorical figures must defend themselves as much against old myths as against 
preestablished, anticipatory disfigurations. ‘One does not go back to reconquer the myth, one 
encounters it anew, when time quakes at its foundations under the empire of extreme danger.’ 
M artia l a rts  an d  sta te-o f-th e-art technologies have value only because they create the possib ility  
o f  bringing together w orker an d  w arrio r m asses o f  a n ew  type. The sh ared  line o f  f lig h t o f  the  
w eapon and the tool: a pure possib ility , a m u ta tio n 2*2
2*° Reid, "Deleuze's War Machine," 72.
251 Reid, "Deleuze's War Machine," 74.
252 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 445 (emphasis added).
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It is in this light that we might look at the transformations of the RMA. Indeed, 
Eyal Weizman has already begun a military ethnography of the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict in precisely these terms. Not only has he examined the logic of Israel’s 
security policy through the spatiality of the built environment but he has also 
interviewed Israeli Defense Force strategists who explicitly  draw on Deleuzo- 
Guattarian language to form their tactical approach.253 The IDF, considered one of 
the m ost ‘networked’ and advanced military powers, explicitly seeks to capture the 
creative powers of projection  and speed  through behaviours such as ‘mouse holing’ 
(literally walking through walls by blowing holes in the adjoining walls of houses 
inside the Palestinian territories, thus avoiding the striated spaces of the streets and 
alleys).254 On discussion with a leading IDF general, Weizman notes that:
... his position is that the IDF must replace presence in occupied areas with the capacity to move 
through them, or produce in them what he calls “e ffe c ts .”255
Weizman notes the devastating effect violence of this kind has on Palestinian 
communities: the surgeon-like ability to remove walls -  or entire floors -  of buildings
253 Eyal Weizman, "Strategic Points, Flexible Lines, Tense Surfaces, Political Volumes: Ariel Sharon and 
the Geometry of Occupation," The Philosophical Forum 35, no. 2 (2004); Eyal Weizman, "Walking 
Through Walls" (paper presented at Urbicide: the killing o f  cities, Durham, November 24-25, 2005); 
Eyal Weizman, "Lethal Theory” (Center for Research Architecture, Goldsmiths College, University of 
London, 2006), http://roundtable.kein.org/node/415.
254 Note that the speed of IDF operations is precisely the kind of absolute speed referred to by Deleuze 
and Guattari: in ‘actual’ terms (in ‘counted’ time), the tempo of operations can be slow, but it is the 
absolute speed of becoming rather than the relative speed of teleological time that is important to the 
IDF. Compare the following statement made by Weizman to that of Deleuze and Guattari:
In contrast to the traditional military paradigm, IDF operations in urban areas are not based on speed and do 
not seek fast and decisive results. Operations are days if not weeks long, and operate at a rather slow pace as the 
infiltrated forces spend most of their time waiting for opportunities or for the enemy to make mistakes.
Weizman, "Lethal Theory," 64.
The nomad knows howto wait, he has infinite patience. Immobility and speed, catatonia and rush, a ‘stationary 
process,’ station as process -  these traits of Kleist’s are eminently that of the nomad.
Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 420.
255 Weizman, "Lethal Theory," 60 (emphasis original).
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does not make violence less violent,’ rather it leads to the alteration of the Palestinian 
comm unity’s way of life in entirely different ways.256
Here we see the political potential of Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of 
violence fulfilled. Violence in their account is organised as (part of) an assemblage, an 
assemblage that must be understood spatially. Importantly, the ‘kind’ of spatiality in 
which the assemblage is enrolled has important effects on the nature  of the violence. 
The political potential lies in the constant possibility for assemblages to become- 
other, to become enrolled in different rhythms. It is important, however, that 
nomadic, creative expressions of violence are not confused with ‘better’ violence: it 
may be that creative violence upsets a tyrannical regime, or it may be that it renders 
further dysfunctional a persecuted community such as the Palestinians. The question 
is not ‘better’ or ‘worse’ violence, but rather a way of interrogating the different 
outcomes of different assemblages. To put it another way, the ethical impulse comes 
from ‘outside’ the critical process (as exemplified so vividly by the IDF’s 
appropriation of Deleuze and Guattari), but the political must be thought of in terms 
of the possibilising of becoming that results from the creative possibilities of affect.
Deleuze and Guattari offer a way of thinking the spatial operation of violence that 
provides possibilities for a politics of change. While the following chapter will ‘read 
down’ the scope of their claims, their articulation of a vocabulary for understanding 
the spatial operation of violence through the figure of the assemblage provides a 
highly important innovation that rounds out the accounts of the spatiality of violence 
given by Foucault and Lefebvre above.
256 N0te that Israel’s recent incursions into Lebanon were markedly less successful in a context where 
their ability to project themselves was limited by both military and political realities, and the demand for 
speed in counted time was paramount.
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Conclusions
This chapter proposes that the operation of violence should not be understood in 
simply instrumentalist terms, but rather should be understood as a flexible and 
emergent process in which violence alters and is altered by its own conditions of 
possibility. It proposes that one way of gaining critical access to this process is 
through an examination of the spatia l operation of violence, and proceeds to explore 
the ways in which space proffers such access.
The work of Michel Foucault illustrates how spatiality is crucially implicated in 
ordering power/knowledge relationships. While Foucault conceives of violence as 
derivative of power/knowledge, his examination of power/knowledge’s expression 
through/im plication in appropriate spatial relations opens a novel way of thinking 
about the organisation of violence. In particular, he establishes a vocabulary that can 
describe how violence is organised spatially. Foucault both effectively deconstructs 
subjectivity and identifies power/knowledge/space as establishing the limits of the 
conditions of possibility of the exercise of violence. In so doing, he makes it possible 
to break out of agent-centred and structuralist accounts of violence. That is, Foucault 
makes it possible to think meaningfully of a spatia l operation  of violence at all.
Henri Lefebvre, on the other hand, views space as emerging from a specific, 
repetitious temporality that defies teleological description. Lefebvre instead provides 
an account of difference as produced through a dialectical (involuted) process 
involving the concrete conditions of space (space as produced) and time (the 
repetitious everyday). He explores the emergence of this difference primarily in terms 
of the body, itself conceived of as a composition of competing rhythms (some 
‘passional,’ others produced, others ‘natural’). Through his rhythmanalysis, Lefebvre 
provides a vocabulary that can address the spatio-temporal operation of violence.
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Lefebvre, then, is significant for injecting mutability into the spatial organisation of 
violence identified by Foucault.
For Gilles Deleuze (and Felix Guattari), the political impetus to think the 
‘untim ely’ is met through an examination of (spatial) assemblages, whose (desiring) 
composition enables an understanding of how the spatiality, mode of movement, and 
rhythmic composition of an assemblage can alter in a way that unleashes or contains 
the creative forces of violence. Violence is an assemblage in its own right, one whose 
appropriation by the State is never complete and always subject to transformation 
and the emergence of difference.
Utilising this conception, and the spatial vocabulary developed through the 
iterations of each author, this thesis examines the experimental practices of violence 
that have taken place in the US military’s intervention in Iraq. In this thesis, violence 
is experimental in three related senses. Firstly, it is experimental in that, like 
experimentation in the lab, it produces effects. Secondly, it is experimental in that 
these effects are not produced on demand, rather (as in the lab) an uncertainty of 
result is built into the generation of these effects. Finally, violence is experimental in 
that, although it is sufficiently stable to form the subject of inquiry, it comes and goes 
and may change its appearance along the way. The following chapter establishes a 
method for exploring the experimental practices of violence through their spatiality -  
a method which, it should be added, dramatically reduces the scale of inquiry.
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CHAPTER TWO 
A praxiography of the battlespace
Lighten our darkness. Deliver us this day from the obviousness of our simplicities.^?
What kind o f real?
Let this chapter begin by reprising the account provided in the last, this time with 
a specific question in mind: what kind  of real is being explored by Foucault, Lefebvre, 
and Deleuze? This may seem like a strange question. It may, in fact, be surprising to 
think of different ‘kinds’ of real: we are accustomed to thinking of the ‘real’ as ‘out 
there,’ independent from us, singular, definite.258 The real is the real is the real, the 
Western scientific argument goes (though which science, which West, are perhaps 
questions we should ask): we may know it to better or worse degrees, but the ‘real’ 
itself -  the stuff of which it is made -  stays the same. Its nature is unchanging.
257 John Law, Aircraft Stories: Decentering the Object in Technoscience (Durham NC: Duke University 
Press, 2002), 62.
258 John Law, After Method: Mess in Social Science Research (London: Routledge, 2004), 24-25.
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Nevertheless, the previous chapter began, in a way, with an appeal to a different 
kind of real. It began with an assertion of openness, specifically an assertion of the 
openness of the organisation of violence. As noted, such an assertion flies in the face 
of conventional understandings of violence, where its organisation is not open at all, 
but is over-determined (by human agency, by social structures, even by anarchy). To 
undermine these conventional understandings of violence is to undermine our usual 
account of the real: a suggestion of openness undermines the singularity, the definite­
ness, the independence (from us, from our accounting) of the reality of violence. 
Nevertheless, despite the dangers associated with undermining such a persuasive and 
well-entrenched account of the real, the previous chapter began with the assertion 
that violence was not determined simply by agency and structures, but could also be 
understood as experimental, undetermined, and creative (note the ‘also’ -  human 
agency, structures, anarchy, they all have their place in this story, albeit in rather 
changed forms).
Such an assertion is not entirely unprecedented. As is explored later in this 
chapter, there are now entire disciplines devoted to exploring openness in its many 
forms. Material semiotics in Science and Technology Studies (STS), 
nonrepresentational geography, cyborg feminism: all of these might have sympathy 
with an assertion of the openness of the organisation of violence. But these can be 
explored later. Firstly, and not least because it helps us to clarify what openness is, we 
must return to this deceptively simple question: ‘What kind of real?
John Law fires the opening salvo in the possibilising of different ‘kinds’ of real 
when he points to a number o f ‘things’ (he calls them “textures”) that (academic) 
accounts following conventional understandings of the real are not good at 
explaining:
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Pains and pleasures, hopes and horrors, intuitions and apprehensions, losses and redemptions, 
mundanities and visions, angels and demons, things that slip and slide, or appear and disappear, 
change shape or don’t have much form at all, unpredictabilities, these are just a few of the 
phenomena that are hardly caught by social science m ethods.... If much of the world is vague, 
diffuse or unspecific, slippery, emotional, ephemeral, elusive or indistinct, changes like a 
kaleidoscope, or doesn’t really have much pattern at all, then where does this leave social 
science?259
It is not hard to see how violence might flit among this list: as a pain, as a horror -  
but also as a mundanity, for example. How might we account for these ‘textures’ of 
violence? Must we disregard them altogether? Or is there some way of exploring the 
organisation of violence that can attempt to tell these stories as w ell?
In fact, the composition of this list (open as it is) leads one to wonder whether 
phrases like the ‘organisation of violence’ and the ‘spatial ordering of violence’ are 
entirely appropriate in a context that seeks to explore violence’s openness. If the 
openness of the world includes its slipperiness, its lack of specificity, its 
unpredictability, then perhaps this is too coherent. In fact, this is one of the primary 
arguments of this chapter. Analytical tools like ‘organisation’ still make a certain 
sense in the context of the accounts of the previous chapter (although at times these 
logics alter and distort), from here on in, following a more sustained exploration of 
different kinds of real, it will perhaps make more sense to think, at the very least, of 
‘organisations,’ if not in terms of entirely different metaphors altogether. But again, 
this is a discussion for a later time. For, whatever the inadequacies, the 
inconsistencies, the incoherency (or, to be more accurate, the over-coherency) of the 
previous chapter’s accounts of violence, the previous chapter outlines — possibilises — 
a different kind of real.
259 Law, A fter Method, 2.
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Spatial orderings, rhythmanalysis, machinic assemblages, differing though these 
accounts of a spatial logic’ of violence are, share the same basic subversions of the 
‘real’ as it is usually understood. This chapter outlines three themes of this alternate 
real and the methodological steps these authors take to attune themselves to this 
‘kind’ of reality. It then explores the ways in which some contemporary social sciences 
(such as material semiotics and nonrepresentational geography) have elaborated 
more fully the methods that might assist in accessing alternative kinds of real.
A real that emerges through praxis: unglunking reality
It is Marcus Doel who turns our attention to the Glunk.260 The Glunk is a creature 
that cannot be unthunk in Dr. Seuss’s classic tale, ‘The Glunk That Got Thunk,’ and 
serves as a useful thought experiment for challenging conventional understandings of 
‘thing-ness.’ The Glunk is the ultimate ‘thing’: like the ‘real’ that is assumed to exist 
‘out there,’ it is immune to the variegating influences of the Cat in the Hat (who once, 
it must be remembered, turned pink things blue). It may have been thunk, but the 
Glunk’s immutability once created defeats even the antics of the Cat in the Hat. Yet, 
on the brink of disaster, the Glunk is unthunk, thanks, as Doel notes, to the 
contingent alliance and joint action of the Cat in the Hat and his sister.261
In their own ways, Foucault, Lefebvre, and Deleuze all participate in unthinking 
the Glunk. In technical academic terms, they do this by decentring the subject, and 
decentring agency. In practical terms, they do this by examining how the world and 
everything in it (including subjectivity, including agency) emerges through practice.
260 Marcus A. Doel, "Unglunking Geography: Spatial Science After Dr Seuss and Gilles Deleuze," in 
Thinking Space, ed. Mike Crang and Nigel Thrift, 117-35 (London: Routledge, 2000); Dr. Seuss, I Can 
Lick 30 Tigers Today! And Other Stories (New York, NY: Random House Books for Young Readers, 
1969).
261 Doel, "Unglunking Geography," 118.
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In particular, this is the fundamental insight of Foucault’s 
power/knowledge/space: subjectivity, the seemingly intractable rules which order 
matter, and ‘things’ themselves, are what power/knowledge/space (practice) make of 
them .262 There is no external, independent ‘real.’263 It is only through  the historically 
specific, highly contingent interactions of power (itself a relation), knowledge 
(another relation), and space (a materiality, but certainly not a ‘thing’ -  rather an 
altering and alterable condition of possibility), that man emerges as a political subject 
capable of action and being acted upon. The peculiarly modern formulation of this 
power/knowledge/space configuration that Foucault termed biopolitics, for example, 
rests precisely, on the one hand, on the capacity to invest in modern man a soul which 
makes it possible to address power to the body as an individual (as discussed in the 
previous chapter), and, on the other hand, on the new power/knowledge/spaces of 
the ‘m ass’ population:
Western man was gradually learning what it meant to be a living species in a living world, to have a 
body, conditions of existence, probabilities of life, an individual and collective welfare, forces that 
could be modified, and a space in which they could be distributed in an optimal manner. For the 
first time in history, no doubt, biological existence was reflected in political existence... .264
This is what is meant by decentring the subject: no longer does the political subject sit 
at the centre of accounts, explaining action through its agency; rather, it is the 
political subject and agency itself that are taken to need explanation. In Foucault s 
account, then, the ‘real’ emerges through the practice of power/knowledge/space.
262 There is, of course, an excess of being over named existence in Foucault’s account, as is explored in 
the following section.
263 At least, not one that turns its “legible face” to us. See, Michel Foucault, "The Order of Discourse, in 
Language and Politics, ed. Michael Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 127.
264 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History o f Sexuality, Volume 1 (London: Penguin 
Books, 1998), 142.
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Foucault expresses this insight further (albeit in rather abstract terms) when he 
describes the varying historical construction of what he terms the modes of being of 
order (termed here the real) as emerging out of the “pure experience of order” 
(practice):
Thus, between the already ‘encoded’ eye and reflexive knowledge there is a middle region which 
liberates order itself: it is here that [order] appears, according to the culture and the age in 
question, continuous and graduated or discontinuous and piecemeal, linked to space or constituted 
anew at each instant by the driving force of time, related to a series of variables or defined by 
separate systems of coherences, composed of resemblances which are successive or corresponding, 
organized around increasing differences, etc. This middle region, then, in so far as it makes 
manifest the modes of being of order, can be posited as the most fundamental of a l l .... Thus, in 
every culture, between the use o f what one might call the ordering codes and reflections upon 
order itself, there is the pure experience o f order and o f its modes o f b e in g .^
Admittedly, Foucault’s account of the emergence of the real through practice has been 
criticised for being overly ‘big.’ John Law, for example, argues that, “I am more 
optim istic [than Foucault] because I take it that the conditions of possibility do not 
necessarily come in large blocks.”266 Despite this (apt) criticism, Foucault’s account of 
the real subverts traditional conceptions by accounting for the creation of subjectivity 
and agency, order (spatial and otherwise), and things themselves, through the social 
practice  of the time.
In fact, if the work of Foucault is taken to its logical conclusion, then this ‘real’ 
multiplies: unlike in Foucault’s ‘big picture’ accounts, small-scale examination 
illustrates that practices of power/knowledge/space are not singular, nor are they 
universal.267 As Annemarie Mol has shown so effectively, using Foucault as a starting
265 Michel Foucault, The Order o f Things (London: Routledge Classics, 2002), xx-xxi (emphasis added).
266 Law, Aircraft Stories, 53.
267 Annemarie Mol, The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2002), 6 6 .
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point, even in a supposedly singular context (a particular hospital) the emergence of a 
real body, a real disease, is in fact the emergence of multiple reals out of the 
multiplicity of practices.268 This is not a simple statement that there are many 
perspectives on a singular real body, or a singular real disease, but an argument that 
there are many reals that are lived and experienced. To use Mol’s subject of inquiry, 
atherosclerosis in the patient at home is pain in the leg, while in the laboratory it is 
plaque coating the walls of the arteries. The two realities are overlapping but distinct. 
Decentring the subject and decentring agency through examining practice can 
therefore lead to an acknowledgement of the multiple nature of the real if careful 
attention is paid to the specificities of practice -  a point made later in this chapter 
with respect to establishing an appropriate methodology.
In contrast to Foucault, Lefebvre’s emphasis on the emergence of the real 
through practice is less concerned with the production of subjectivity and focuses 
more explicitly on the way in which other aspects of the real are usually assumed to 
exist unproblematically, such as space, time, and everyday life. However, as we are 
reminded in the following sections, Lefebvre’s account is not a simple Marxist 
account, in which the real emerges through abstract and over-determined, processes 
of production that are structured by the dictates of (teleological) ‘history.’ Rather, 
Lefebvre offers an account that allows for the contingency and openness of practice, 
particularly as a result of the complicated and recursive nature of his understanding 
of the dialectique de trip licite . As a result of this perspective, Lefebvre’s method, 
particularly his rhythmanalysis, emphasises exploring practice to access the real. He 
does this in a specific way: where Foucault largely emphasises historical analysis of 
institutions and how they work, Lefebvre conducts a micro-scale analysis of the
268 Mol, The Body Multiple.
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bodily practices of everyday life. In fact, both are commonly used ways of exploring 
the emergence of reality through practice.
Similarly, the influence of Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of the assemblage 
on academics seeking to explore the emergence of the real through practice has been 
enorm ous.269 Assemblage as a concept denies any form of essentialism, arguing that 
all things (people, things, animals) gain meaning, purpose, and form through their 
enrolment in material assemblages. Its use highlights an important step in critical 
social scientific inquiry when the real is seen as emerging through practice: 
assemblages force a move from the prevailing social scientific emphasis on studying 
representations  or m eanings of the real (often through structural or agent-centred 
accounts). This emphasis has implied that meaning is somehow ontologically 
superior to other aspects of the real (such as spatiality, temporality, and material 
form). Assemblage undermines this by showing that meaning (and its correlates, 
agency and structure) emerges through practice alongside spatiality, temporality, and 
materiality, thus nothing is ceded ontological precedence. Assemblage as a method, 
then, is a way of keeping such structuralism at bay. As Marcus and Saka put it:
Indeed, the term [assemblage] itself in its material reference invests easily in the image of 
structure, but is nonetheless elusive. The time-space in which assemblage is imagined is inherently 
unstable and infused with movement and change. Assemblage thus seems structural, an object with 
the materiality and stability of the classic metaphors of structure, but the intent in its aesthetic uses 
is precisely to undermine such ideas of structure. It generates enduring puzzles about ‘process’ and 
‘relationship’ rather than leading to systematic understandings of these tropes of classical social 
theory. 27°
The puzzles raised by the radical anti-essentialism of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
conception of assemblage are further explored in the following section, which
269 See, George E. Marcus, and Erkan Saka, "Assemblage," Theory, Culture & Society 23, no. 2-3 (2006).
27° Marcus et al., "Assemblage," 102 (emphasis added).
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addresses in more detail the complicated relationship between matter and meaning 
found in alternative accounts of the real.
The com mingling o f matter and meaning: the necessary existence o f mess, 
multip lic ity, and resistance
If the ‘real’ emerges through practice in these accounts, then practice is 
understood both more generously and more stringently than might be expected. On 
the one hand, the understanding is more stringent in the sense that (despite a 
common criticism of this perspective) such accounts are saying neither that any  real 
can be constructed through practice nor that it is ‘easy’ to create the real.2?1 It takes 
constant work for practice to create the real, and practice is still constrained, still 
limited in what it can produce (think of Foucault’s aphasiac, limited by the spatiality 
of the table). On the other hand, the understanding is more generous because practice 
is not lim ited to the practice of humans, as is often the case in social scientific study, 
but rather incorporates the inhuman, and even the inorganic.
Practice is a nuanced concept, one that does not place materiality outside the 
scope of the social production of the meaning of material forms, but at the same time 
allows for the independent operation of materiality in ways that are undetermined by 
meaning. This, then, is the second theme that ties together the authors’ subversion of 
traditional notions of the ‘real.’ These authors, to appropriate Lorraine Daston’s 
formulation, “take it for granted that things are simultaneously material and 
meaningful. [They] assume that matter constrains meaning and vice versa.”2?2
2?1 Law, After Method, 7-8.
272 Lorraine Daston, "Speechless," in Things That Talk: Object Lessons From A rt and Science, ed. 
Lorraine Daston, 9-24 (New York, NY: Zone Books, 2004), 17’
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Daston usefully situates this matter versus meaning debate in the context of 
competing approaches to the history of science. These tend to side with one or the 
other of matter and meaning, but fail to comprehend the importance of both. For 
example, traditional historians of science “have long assumed [things] to be as 
inexorable and universal as nature itse lf ,... the history of science has traditionally 
been narrated as just as inexorable and universal.” This is an account of the triumph 
of matter over meaning. On the other hand, new studies “emphasize the local 
character and cultural specificity of natural knowledge,” promoting the supremacy of 
meaning (however it is formulated -  discourse, representations of matter, 
power/knowledge) over matter.273 The position proposed by Daston, and endorsed by 
Foucault, Lefebvre, and Deleuze, as well as by this thesis, is that the truth lies 
somewhere in the middle.
For Foucault and Lefebvre, this is most apparent in their discussions of the body. 
The body is a site of both meaning (discursive construction through 
power/knowledge/space) and (material) resistance (remember Lefebvre’s description 
of the female body “which occasionally fainted, in order subsequently to rebeb”) 274 
The excessive (material) qualities of the body have been well-explored in cultural and 
fem inist studies.275 While Foucault and (to a lesser extent) Lefebvre have been 
criticised for not fully exploring these excessive qualities, implicit, and occasionally 
explicit, in their accounts is the body’s capacity to disrupt the orderings (the 
m eanings) imposed on it from ‘outside.’ Kirsten Simonsen offers a compelling 
reading of Lefebvre in this context. After firstly noting the generosity of Lefebvre’s
273 Daston, "Speechless", 17,15.
274 Henri Lefebvre, Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life (London: Continuum, 1992), 42 
(emphasis original).
275 See, in particular, Gail Weiss, Body Images: Embodiment as Intercorporeality (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 1999); Jackie Stacey, Teratologies: A Cultural Study o f Cancer (London: Routledge, 1 9 9 7 ); 
Mark B. N. Hansen, Embodying Technesis: Technology Beyond Writing (Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press, 2000).
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conception of the practice that leads to our experience of the body, she argues that in 
Lefebvre the attempts of meaning to deprive materiality of all forms of independent 
expression are consistently denied by the body.2?6
Theoretically, then, the body serves both as point of departure and as destination. It is an intrinsic 
part of the ‘lived experience’ -  an experience that in modernity, from Lefebvre’s point of view, is 
exposed to a tendency to be drained of all content by mechanisms of language, signs and 
abstractions, but which cannot be totally erased. As part of the lived experience, the body 
constitutes a practico-sensory realm in which space is perceived through smells, tastes, touch and 
hearing as well as through sight. It produces a space which is both biomorphic and 
anthropological.2??
Matter and meaning intertwined -  resistance, mess, multiplicity, all afforded a place 
in this alternative real when matter refuses to be determined by meaning. Lefebvre, 
Foucault, and scholars inspired by them explore these complications (which are 
fissures in the conditions of possibility) through attending to the body.
Deleuze and Guattari’s account of assemblages looks beyond the body but 
nonetheless locates an excess o f  being that operates alongside structure or meaning 
in forming the real. This occurs in two ways. Firstly, the very nature of the assemblage 
does not leave room for the supremacy of structure (meaning) over materiality. This 
is because materiality gives rise to (and emerges from) the assemblage that gives rise 
to (and emerges from) structures and agency. For example, the recursive interaction 
of the materiality of the desert with the social structure of the nomad is not the 
interaction of two separate systems but a single entity: there is simply no conceptual
2?6 On Lefebvre’s conception of practice, Simonsen notes that:
Lefebvre’s interest in the body is founded on a conception of practice that is complex, open-ended and holding 
many dimensions. It relates to nature, to the past and to human possibilities, and it ranges in scale from 
gestures and corporeal attitudes, over everyday activities, to overall social practice in the economic and social 
spheres.
Kirsten Simonsen, "Bodies, Sensations, Space and Time: The Contribution By Henri Lefebvre,"
Geografiska Annaler: Series B Human Geography 87, no. 1 (2005): 2.
277 Simonsen, "Bodies, Sensations, Space and Time," 4 -
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space for an accounting of the real that prioritises meaning over materiality (or vice 
versa).2?8
This makes possible entirely new ways of thinking the recursive and complicated 
relationships between what we might (at least partially artificially) designate as 
‘matter’ or ‘m eaning.’ These ways move beyond the matter-as-resistance model with 
which we are familiar, rather matter and meaning are bound together in ways that 
exceed accounts of the stubborn resistance or total subordination of matter to 
meaning. For example, in their “Treatise on Nomadology,” Deleuze and Guattari 
describe the operation of the nomadic (or ambulant) sciences, particularly as 
exemplified in metallurgy. These sciences, as opposed to royal science, are not simply 
resisted (m essed up) by materiality, but are in fact driven  by material singularities. As 
Deleuze and Guattari argue:
Due to all their procedures, the ambulant sciences quickly overstep the possibility of calculation: 
they inhabit the ‘more’ that exceeds the space of reproduction and soon run into problems that are 
insurmountable from that point of view; they eventually resolve those problems by means of a real- 
life operation. 279
Nomadic sciences are incapable of codification, or of being made autonomous of 
the materialities in which they are exercised. Unlike royal science, they do not 
attempt to subordinate the operation of materiality to abstract, homogenous laws of 
nature. They exist in the ‘more’ beyond meaning, and:
... they subordinate all their operations to the sensible conditions of intuition and construction — 
following  the flow of matter, drawing and linking up smooth space.280
278 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia Vol. 2 
(London: Continuum, 2004), 421,460.
279 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 412.
280 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 412.
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Materiality in this example creates meaning, but not in the universalising, singular 
way assumed by many of the modern physical sciences and conventionalised in 
traditional conceptions of the real. It is a localising, specifying materiality that 
generates ‘at the coalface’ meanings -  understandings in response to particular 
problems, rather than an impulse of general inquiry. Indeed, these understandings 
cannot be generalised, and as such, cannot be made safe in general -  as the collapse 
of two churches at Orleans and Beauvais built at the end of the 12th century attest.281 
This gives insight into the nuance of the alternative conception of the real presented 
here. Som etim es  matter acts to resist, disrupt the orderings imposed on the real by 
m eaning  (by power/knowledge, by structure, by agency). Sometimes, however, 
matter and meaning intertwine in an entirely different way, with matter giving fo rm  
to meaning, but only under local and specific conditions.282
This example also emphasises the second and related way in which Deleuze and 
Guattari conceptualise the excess of being as interacting with meaning. This is 
through the impersonal role of affect in enrolling ‘things’ in machinic assemblages. 
Affect, in their account, is thoroughly material (in that it is removed from attachment 
to an individual person or any distinctive social logic as traditionally understood). 
However, it must also be thought of as meaningful, in the sense that it is an 
organising  force (but one that does not respond to any universal natural laws).283
281 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 412.
282 This metaphor draws on Daston’s evocative formulation of “things that talk. Lorraine Daston, ed., 
Things That Talk: Object Lessons From A rt and Science (New York, NY: Zone Books, 2004).
283 This draws on Massumi’s reading of affect as:
asocial, but not presocial -  it includes social elements but mixes them with elements belonging to other levels of 
functioning and combines them according to a different logic.
Brian Massumi, Parables fo r  the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2002), 30 (emphasis original).
This is not the only possible reading of Deleuze and Guattari. In particular, Manuel de Landa argues for a 
reading of their conception of assemblage that subordinates the excessive materiality of the assemblage 
to a natural law of complexity. His mathematically and scientifically infused account of Deleuze’s work
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Here again is Ansell Pearson’s description of Deleuze and Guattari’s approach to the 
body:
The ethological approach seeks to define a body not in terms of organs and functions, and as 
characteristics of species and genus, but rather in terms of ‘affects’ (which are not mere feelings or 
affections, but harmonies of tone, colour, etc.).284
Deleuze and Guattari do not emphasise the role of ‘sim ple’ materiality (organs and 
functions) in shaping meaning. Rather they express a concern with the complicated 
ways in which materialities are  affective, are enrolled in assemblages through affect, 
and gain m eaning through affect:
Assemblages are passional, they are compositions of desire. Desire has nothing to do with a natural 
or spontaneous determination; there is no desire but assembling, assembled, desire. The 
rationality, the efficiency, of an assemblage does not exist without the passions the assemblage 
brings into play, without the desires that constitute it as much as it constitutes them.28s
For example, Deleuze and Guattari’s account of the weapons-assemblage vis-a- 
vis the tool-assem blage emphasises their differences along a number of different 
trajectories including  different desiring tonalities, and further itself relies on an 
overall affective ‘pull’ that ties these trajectories together. These affective relations are 
not over-determined, teleological, or even rational. They are inhuman and multi­
directional, possibly even schizophrenic:
argues that the operation of affect and desire is precisely within an (admittedly expanded and highly 
recursive) mathematical framework: desiring-machines, for example, thus become “quasi-causal 
operators.” No matter the openness of the science of this account, it is apparent that by appealing to a 
singular scientific voice, and in particular, by excluding ‘desire,’ de Landa excludes the textures John 
Law argues we should possibilise in our accounts of the real. See, Manuel de Landa, Intensive Science 
and Virtual Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2002), 205.
284 Keith Ansell Pearson, Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition o f  Deleuze (London: Routledge, 
1 9 9 9 ), 1 7 9 -
28s Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 440-41.
110
A worker-soldier, weapon-tool, sentiment-affect affinity marks the right time, however fleeting, for 
revolutions and popular wars. There is a schizophrenic taste for the tools that moves it away from 
work and toward free action, a schizophrenic taste for the weapon that turns it into a means for 
peace, for obtaining peace.286
Affect, the desiring machine, and the passional nature of assemblages are all concepts 
used by Deleuze and Guattari that indicate a fundamental alterity in their conception 
of the real. Rather than traditional accounts of physical science in which brute 
materiality or universal laws of nature control the ordering of our world, or newer 
social scientific accounts which emphasise the ways in which the meaning gives form 
to materiality (be it through power/knowledge narratives, human agency, or 
structure), Deleuze and Guattari propose a materiality which is meaningful, in which 
there is no purpose in thinking them separately.
Yet it is this desiring composition of assemblage that leads to Mark H ansen’s 
engaging critique of Deleuze and Guattari. Hansen otherwise applauds Deleuze and 
Guattari for liberating materiality from the dictates of meaning and vice versa, 
arguing that they “develop a general machinic ontology capable of displacing the 
binary opposition (vitalism vs. mechanism) underlying the machine m etaphor... .”287 
For Hansen, however, subordinating the functioning of the machinic assemblage to 
affect leads to an inability to explain the material autonomy of technology, or:
‘technology creep’ or ‘technology drift,’ [which is] the liability for technology to deploy itself and 
thus to impact experience along pathways that cannot be predicted from or limited to the 
synchronic standpoint of governing social forces.288
286 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 444.
287 Hansen, Em bodying Technesis, 186.
288 Hansen, Em bodying Technesis, 193. ‘Social’ here refers not to narrow, structuralist accounts of the 
social, but to the much more nuanced, materially inflected account of the social-as-assemblage presented 
in Deleuze and Guattari.
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In particular, Hansen argues that the real-as-emerging from the practice of 
technology should not be subordinated to the affective real of the desiring-machine or 
machinic assemblage. This is because in this concept technology acts as cipher for the 
real rather than an autonomous agent in its own right. For example, in relation to 
nomadic science Hansen argues that:
Within nomadology, technology remains an operation to be performed on the real -  a mere vehicle 
fo r  translating the real into a form  (e.g. writing) -  and not an operation o f  the real itself  
Accordingly, the material autonomy D+G [Deleuze and Guattari] attribute to metallurgy remains a 
merely relative autonomy, one generated only through a socially rooted correlation of an act with a 
context. The configuration of an assemblage by the metallurgist (not technology itself) comprises 
what D+G call the Veritable invention.’ The assemblage remains primary in relation to the material 
phylum.28?
For Deleuze and Guattari the technologies by which nomadic sciences attempt to 
track the singularities of materiality are always/already enrolled in the affective 
assemblage that creates them. For Hansen, however, this overlooks the autonomous 
agency of the materiality of technology, ignoring one of the most profound influences 
on human experience in human history. By contrast, Hansen sees technology as 
emanating its own rhythms, enacting its own distributions that disrupt and counter 
existing organisations and tendencies (assemblages):
Becoming, as D+G develop it, cannot encompass the transformational connections where the 
human terms cannot but remain passive, where the human agent must let itself be invaded by the 
inhuman rhythm of material exteriority.... With this limit on the scope of affirmative becoming, 
we encounter the theoretical imperative that underlies my critical study: the im perative to lend our 
em bodied experience a distinct autonomy by divorcing our processing o f  the alien material
28? Hansen, Em bodying Technesis, 200 (emphasis added).
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rhythm s from  any m oment o f  (cognitive) recognition that would precondition or actually cause 
the m ovem ent o f  becoming
Hansen s assertion of the distinctive autonomy of the materiality of technology finds 
echoes in som e of the efforts of nonrepresentational geography to understand the 
inhuman impacts of technology on the way in which we move through space. These 
analyses have referred to this phenomenon through such terms as the “automatic 
production of space,” “m ovem ent-space,” “the technological unconscious,” and 
“software-sorted geographies.”291 Thrift, for example, refers to the technological 
unconscious as being ‘outside’ of meaning because its experience is entirely 
backgrounded, without meaningful content.292
For the m oment, however, while perhaps not endorsing the precise thrust of 
H ansen’s argument, this thesis draws from his work the insight that there are 
m ultiple ways in which materiality interacts with meaning, including: interrupting, 
resisting and making a ‘m ess’ of meaning through the resistance of the body, as in 
Foucault and Lefebvre; through the affective operation of machinic assemblages, 
where matter might direct meaning, in partial and locally specific ways; and through 
the autonom ous operation of technology. No doubt there are other ways, but these 
are just a few. Significant for the purposes of specifying (possibilising) the alternative
290 Hansen, Embodying Technesis, 210 (emphasis added).
291 Nigel Thrift, and Shaun French, "The Automatic Production of Space," Transactions o f the Institute 
o f  British Geographers 27, no. 3 (2002); Nigel Thrift, "Movement-Space: The Changing Domain of 
Thinking Resulting from the Development of New Kinds of Spatial Awareness," Economy and Society 
33, no. 4 (2004); Nigel Thrift, "Remembering the Technological Unconscious by Foregrounding 
Knowledges of Position," Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 22, no. 1 (2004); Stephen 
Graham, "Software-Sorted Geographies," Progress in Human Geography 29, no. 5 (2005). It should be 
noted, however, that many of these accounts from non-representational geography still refer to notions 
of ‘writing’ space which Hansen would reject, given his attempt to move beyond immaterial, discursive 
metaphors for understanding the impact of the autonomous materiality of technology. The book s title, 
Em bodying Technesis: Technology Beyond Writing, for example, refers precisely to an attempt to move 
beyond the metaphor of ‘writing’ for evaluating the impact of technology on human experience.
292 Thrift, "Movement-Space," 585.
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account of the real that emerges from the work of Foucault, Lefebvre, and Deleuze, is 
the acknowledgement of the complexity of the relationship between meaning and 
matter. This includes the multiple ways in which materiality interacts with meaning 
and the subsequent m ultiplicity o f  w a ys  in which the real em erges fro m  practice.
This has a specifically methodological consequence: accounts which gain 
coherence through focussing on one method of allowing materiality to ‘speak’ (for 
example, the body) while excluding the possibility of others risk losing depth. Rather, 
accounts looking to speak to the nuanced interaction of matter and meaning should 
look to the excessive nature of reality as a guide, in particular the real’s complexity, 
multiplicity, and mess. As John Law argues:
Events and processes are not simply complex in the sense that they are technically difficult to grasp 
(though this is certainly often the case). Rather, they are also complex because they necessarily 
exceed our capacity to know them. No doubt local structures can be identified, but, or so I want to 
argue, the world in general defies any attempt at overall orderly accounting.... Regularities and 
standardisations are incredibly powerful tools but they set limits. Indeed, that is part of their 
(double-edged) power. 293
This, then, is one of the first lessons in committing to an alternative real: if the 
alternative real is constructed through practice, if it is a real in which matter and 
m eaning commingle, restructure, and are brought together in logics that include 
those which are other  to our traditional understandings of order (through affect, for 
example), then listening to m ateria lity  speak m ay require us to listen in m ore than 
one w ay .
a93 Law, A fter Method, 6 (emphasis original).
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The significance o f temporalities: the times that unfold difference
This questioning can be understood as part of the shift in contemporary social thought from 
conceiving of society as a thing, to thinking about the social as a process. This in turn involves a 
move away from the idea of a static and monolithic social order to the idea of social ordering  as a 
fluid, open and many-stranded activity. Following on from this interest in ordering, in my account 
questions of agency gain prominence beside, if not over, ones of representation, and a concern 
with what things mean (representation) cedes some precedence to how they work. At various times 
I am concerned with the sorts of agency that need to be brought into play in order for things to 
work in the way they do. Parallel to this I am interested in seeing the social world in terms of action 
or doing, in terms of practice, of what I later call the performance of people, but also of things.2^ 4
Patrick Joyce’s statement of methodological intent usefully illustrates a number 
of points regarding the possibilising of accounts of an alternative kind of real. In 
particular, his concerns with accounting for practice (performance) and the ability to 
act over, or at least alongside, representation and meaning are familiar from the 
preceding sections. However, he highlights another significant aspect of the 
alternative account of the real being provided by Foucault, Lefebvre, and Deleuze: its 
tem pora lity . Joyce, as with the authors discussed in the previous chapter, emphasises 
process, ordering, action  (all verbs, all doing words), illustrating his concern with an 
account of the real that unfolds in tim e .295
Of course, traditional accounts of the real also unfold in time. It has, in fact, been 
critical theory that has been accused of emphasising space (materiality) at the
2 9 4  Patrick Joyce, The Rule o f  Freedom: Liberalism and the Modern City (London: Verso, 2003), 6 
(emphasis original).
2 9 5  Note here the resonance with this thesis, whose use of the word ‘space’ has slowly been replaced 
and/or infiltrated with the term ‘spatialising practices.’
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expense of tim e.296 However, the temporality of most conventional understandings of 
the real is linear (most often, teleological), singular, and universal. We have already 
seen in detail how the authors discussed, in particular Lefebvre, reject these  
assumptions about time. Whereas time in conventional accounts fails to unfold 
radical difference, hitching change to a certain destination (for example, 
thermodynamic equilibrium in some forms of physics, the ‘fittest’ species in 
Darwinian evolution), in each of the three accounts given above, time is an active 
participant in the structuring and restructuring of the real. While for Foucault 
temporality is a component of the spatial structuring of the disciplinary relation 
(although an often over-determined one), for Lefebvre and Deleuze the creative 
possibilities of open-ended duration (as opposed to metricised time) are integral to 
understanding the emergence of difference. In particular, the openness of time is 
apparent in Lefebvre’s formulation of the dialectique de triplicite  as a complicated 
recursive interplay over time. This interplay interrupts Marxist (and Hegelian) 
notions of linear history. For Deleuze and Guattari’s account, the ephemerality and 
contingency of assemblage emphasises tim e’s unfolding and variability.
While these conceptions of temporality are opposed to traditional views of linear 
time, they are also opposed to the singularity and universality of traditional 
conceptions of tim e (the view of time as an arrow that impersonally draws all things 
in its wake). If duration unfolds creative difference in Deleuze and Lefebvre, it is 
precisely because duration is not impersonal or unconnected to that which is 
evolving. Rather, as Grosz points out, the duration of something emerges through 
“the very movement of differin g fro m  its e lf”** Tying temporality to what are usually 
supposed to be its ‘subjects’ multiplies the possibilities of time. There is no longer a
296 However, for a compelling rebuttal to this criticism, see, Doreen Massey, For Space (London: SAGE 
Publications, 2005).
297 Elizabeth Grosz, The Nick o f  Time: Politics, Evolution, and the Untimely (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2004), 159 (emphasis added). This is Lefebvre’s notion of involution. See, previous, 56.
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single, impersonal time, but many times, tied to concrete but multiple expressions of 
practice (multiple reals, as identified above).
Let us return for a moment to Deleuze and Guattari’s description of the patience 
of the nomad: “Immobility and speed, catatonia and rush, a ‘stationary process,’ 
station as process -  these traits ... are eminently those of the nom ad.”2?8 Such a 
temporality is at odds with the measured time of the State form marching to the drum 
of logistics. These two assemblages perform two entirely different reals -  with 
different spatialities, different desiring tonalities, and different temporalities. Yet the 
openness of Deleuze and Guattari’s account allows for the alteration, collapse or 
reworking of these temporalities, for example, in the emergence of the fleet-in-being  
through the previously striated space of the sea.
Such a view of tim e(s) not only creates the openness necessary for “a politics 
which can make a difference,” as M assey argues, but it also multiplies the possibilities 
for exploring the emergence of the real.2"  For, as Lefebvre begins to do with his 
rhythmanalysis, we can now begin to consider another way in which things impact on 
one another. To the ever-growing list of power, knowledge, force, spatial 
distributions, bodies, and affect, we can add rhythm as a way of understanding how  
the real emerges from practice.
The openness asserted to exist in violence requires, at least in the accounts of 
Foucault, Lefebvre, and Deleuze, an openness of temporality that allows for the 
production of difference. However, traditional accounts of violence have assumed a 
number of things that have limited violence and the temporality in which it operates. 
They have assumed, for example, that violence is either fully commanded by agents,
298 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 420. See n. 255, above.
299 Massey, For Space, 11.
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or  that it emerges through structures (such as geopolitical arrangements, the 
competition for resources, the clash of cultures). In either case, however, violence is 
purposive — it has maintained its Clausewitzean sense of being politics pursued by 
other means. The temporality of such an account is linear and closed: violence follows 
the path dictated by the logic of the agent/structure. Violence is constrained, and if it 
exceeds the boundaries set by agents and structures, then there is no accounting for 
this excessiveness, except to say that this excessiveness is anarchical, destructive, and 
otherwise ‘bad.’ Yet, as Julian Reid notes in relation to Deleuze’s reading of 
Clausewitz, even Clausewitz actually conceived of war as subject to the contending 
forces of violence, reason, and chance, citing Clausewitz’s reference to “the play of 
chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam.”300 That is, 
theorists of war have often recognised in violence a creative, productive potential, one 
that plays out through time (“the play of chance and probability” is precisely a 
reference to the nonlinear temporality of battle).301
This thesis contends that we should view this creative potential of violence not 
simply through the lens of its tendency to escape and destroy  (as in the Cossack 
warriors), but also through its tendency to produce and create. This tendency is 
shown through both the creative possibilities opened by destruction, and the creative 
action of the forces that accompany violence into being (forces that cannot be
3°° Carl von Clausewitz, On War (London: Everman’s Library, 1 9 9 3 ), io i, cited Julian Reid, "Deleuze’s 
War Machine: Nomadism Against the State," Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies 32, no. 1 
(2002): 67.
3°i This is not to enter into the popular debate that has emerged in light of the RMA about whether what 
Clausewitz termed the “friction of war” can ever be managed or overcome. For a summary of this debate, 
see, John F. Schmitt and Gary A. Klein, "Fighting in the Fog: Dealing with Battlefield Uncertainty," 
M arine Corps Gazette 80, no. 8 (199b)- Further, it is not to seek to engage with RMA proponents who 
have attempted to read into Clausewitz a scientifically nonlinear (i.e. complex or chaotic ) 
understanding of battle. Such accounts have rightly been decried as both anachronistic and scientifically 
determinist. For an example of this literature, see, Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future 
War: McNair Paper 52 (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense 
University, 1996).
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separated from violence, as in the nomadic war machine, which produces both 
violence and the desert, both metallurgy and the speed of the warrior).
It is this tendency that creates a need to make possible accounts of a different 
kind of real, ones that incorporate a different kind of temporality. Following 
W hitehall’s description of music, we might think that Foucault, Lefebvre, and Deleuze 
enable “the paper to treat [violence], not as a thing, but as an active force imbued 
with transformative political potential.”3 °2 The spatial vocabulary of violence 
provided in the previous chapter -  Foucault’s distribution of bodies, Lefebvre’s 
rhythmanalysis, the smooth and striated spaces of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
assemblages -  all open up avenues for exploring the ways in which violence contends 
with (incorporates/is affected by/creates from) materiality, affect, multiple 
temporalities, the agency of the inhuman, and more. Traditional accounts of violence 
simply do not contend with such ‘textures,’ reliant as they are on traditional versions 
of the real, where ‘things’ stay constant no matter the stuff of their relations, where 
destruction is creative only in the sense of creating absence, and where agency and 
structure reign supreme -  or are subordinated entirely to a kind of naive but brute 
materiality.
By pushing the commonalities underlying the accounts of Foucault, Lefebvre, 
and Deleuze as far as they will go, this chapter makes possible a strongly plausible 
account of an alternative kind  of real. This real is not singular, universal, or anterior
3°2 Geoffrey Whitehall, "Musical Modulations of Political Thought," Theory & Event 9, no. 3 (2006): 1. It 
is worth drawing attention to music as a point of comparison for violence, because, in an analogous way 
to the manner in which violence is conceived, Whitehall notes that music has also been viewed as either 
thoroughly autonomous from society or thoroughly socially determined. Whitehall suggests instead that 
music has the capacity to subvert these either/or accounts, by “breaking for the virtual — that is, by 
moving beyond the over determination of state music, harmony, and rhythm into a plane of excess, 
difference and repetition. In this, Whitehall is strongly influenced by Deleuze and Guattari s account of 
music. See, Whitehall, "Musical Modulations of Political Thought," 46, 4 4 -
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to us. Instead, this real and, in particular, agency and subjectivity emerge through  
p rac tice  in a way that denies the singularity of the real, or its supposed ahistorical 
qualities, and implies instead the existence o f  m ultiple reals responding to m ultiple 
tem poralities. This alternative real emerges from a com plicated and non- 
determ in istic  interaction o f  m atter and m eaning  (practice as interpreted most 
generously and most stringently), which, it has been argued, leads to reals that 
respond to a number of orderings (som e of which are not orderings at all, but affects).
All of these insights into an alternative account of the real demand a method that 
can address the multiplicity, the mess, and the slipperiness of reality without either 
losing critical insight in a jumble of detail, or gaining critical insight through the 
violent suppression of multiplicity via the imposition of a grand narrative. As Donna 
Haraway argues:
So, I think my problem and ‘our’ problem is how to have simultaneously an account of radical 
historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects, a critical practice for 
recognizing our own ‘semiotic technologies’ for making meanings, and  a no-nonsense commitment 
to faithful accounts of a ‘real’ world, one that can be partially shared and friendly to earth-wide 
projects of finite freedom, adequate material abundance, modest meaning in suffering, and limited 
happiness.3°3
This chapter now turns to the work undertaken by material semiotics in STS and 
nonrepresentational geography to address precisely these concerns.
A Methodology for an Uncertain Real
The view of reality as composed of matter and meaning held together in tension, 
without the resolution of one into the other, reflects a growing political project under
3°3 Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women (London: Free Association Books, 1991), 187 
(emphasis original).
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way in the social sciences. This project draws on a so-called “minor tradition” in 
philosophy (from Spinoza and Leibniz through to Nietzsche and Foucault) that takes 
seriously questions about the ‘nature of nature’ (materiality, historicity) and its 
political import.304 Taking up the challenge of this minor tradition have been two 
‘disciplines-within-a-discipline,’ material semiotics and nonrepresentational 
geography.303 This section will explore how these disciplines have grappled with the 
slipperiness of the alternative real presented above. As urged above, the emphasis is 
on maintaining an awareness of the need to listen to the real in more than one way.
What becom es clear through this exploration is that method is something that 
cannot be placed at the beginning of a paper only to be ‘backgrounded’ in following 
chapters. The kind of method proposed here is not a ‘framework’ in any traditional 
sense. If anything, it is an orientation, with some accompanying tools and hints and 
openings which can be used to grapple with the story that emerges through research. 
These tools have to be picked up as the story emerges, and cannot be decided in 
advance in case unexpected textures are excluded from consideration. As Annemarie 
Mol says in reference to this kind of mode of enquiry:
... in the philosophical mode I engage in here, knowledge is not understood as a matter of reference,
but as one of manipulation^06
3°4 See, William E. Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), 2-3.
3°5 For an account of material semiotics in STS, see, Law, After Method. For an account of 
nonrepresentational geography, see, Nigel Thrift, Spatial Formations (London: Sage Publications,
1996), Chapter One. However, the phrase ‘non-representational theory,’ while useful, does not begin to 
cover the range of interesting geographic work exploring the alternative real outlined in the previous 
section. The work of Doreen Massey, for example, draws on but goes beyond nonrepresentational theory 
in both its theoretical scope and its politics. See, Massey, For Space, 7 5 - Similarly, material semiotics in 
STS works alongside branches of feminist (techno-)cultural studies, including cyborg feminism, which 
challenge conventional accountings of the matter/meaning relationship. See, for example, Sarah 
Kember, Cyberfeminism and Artificial Life (London: Routledge, 2003).
306 Mol, The Body Multiple, 5.
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The manipulation of objects to produce knowledge is not only performed by those 
that we, as academics, observe, but also by us, as academics ourselves. We must 
therefore be very cautious about what we make absent, other, or as John Law terms 
it, what we put in “the hinterlands.”307 Overly rigorous method which holds fixed 
what is being studied from the beginning, which assumes the kind  of answer it should 
return (a structure, an agent, or even a specific desiring machine), which fixes a 
specific subject (a political project, a technology, even a battle), might veiy well 
continue to m iss the complexity, the multiplicity, the mess of the real -  the openness 
of violence. Hence, this section acts as nothing more than a brief listing (and the 
m ethod of the list is important here) of some ways of approaching this alternative 
kind of real. Methodological tools, as with all theoretical tools, will be made to earn 
their passage inside the accounts of the real of the US military battlespace that 
follow.308
An attitude o f openness and doubt: sketchbooks, lists, and pinboards
Annemarie M ol’s book The B ody M ultiple  is a beautifully-written exploration of 
the enaction of a single disease, atherosclerosis, in a single hospital somewhere in the 
Netherlands. Despite the singularity of her object of study, Mol demonstrates 
effectively the ways in which the disease, the patient’s body, and the hospital itself are 
enacted as multiple realities, responding to multiple concerns and organising 
principles. While multiplicity is addressed below, what is significant for the moment 
is the way in which Mol formulates her study. Her book is not primarily an exercise in 
medical anthropology, despite its subject matter, but rather an exercise in what she 
terms “empirical philosophy.”309 Empirical philosophy attempts to articulate a
3°7 Law, After Method, 42.
3°8 This expands on Patrick Joyce’s demand that “theoretical approaches work their passage.” Joyce, The 
Rule o f  Freedom, 2.
3°9 Mol, The Body Multiple, 1.
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philosophical (ontological) account of the nature of the alternative real (hence the 
philosophy), while maintaining an emphasis on its material, praxiographic origins 
(hence the empirical).
One of the m ost significant results of Mol’s empirical philosophy is her advocacy 
of what she terms an “ontological politics.” An ontological politics has a number of 
elem ents, but it is marked by an orientation of doubt toward asserted ontological 
coherence and totality, and an openness toward the existence and possibilities of 
alternative (material, ontological) ontologies. It is about promoting alternative 
processes of enacting reality, but importantly it is also about acknowledging the 
partial nature of such promotions, the contingent nature of their enaction, and their 
own ongoing and open nature.310 As Mol notes:
... the world we live in is not one: there are a lot of ways to live. They come with different ontologies 
and different ways of grading the good. They are political in that the differences between them are 
of an irreducible kind. But they are not exclusive. And there is no w e  to stand outside or above 
them able to master them or choose between them: we are implied. Action, like everything else, is 
enacted too.311
Ontological politics, then, is a political way of thinking multiplicity, a way of 
embracing the political possibilities presented by the multiplicity that emerges if we 
attend to this alternative real.
A primary feature of this ontological politics is doubt, which promotes the 
multiplication of reality. For example, medical sociology has long argued that 
conventional medicine (detrimentally) ignores the experience of the patient s disease 
by prioritising pathological understandings of disease. As a result, it is argued, 
patients are made the subject of power/knowledge relations that ignore their own
310 Mol, The Body M ultiple, 184.
311 Mol, The Body Multiple, 181 (emphasis original).
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capacity for agency within the disease. Yet, as Mol notes, such an argument can be 
self-defeating:
When critics ... say over and over again that medicine silences the objects of its knowledge, the 
irrelevance of what patients have to say is restated as many times as a fact. Thus, the fact is 
strengthened. There might be better ways of escaping.... It might then be a good way to escape 
from a medicine founded on pathology to wonder whether, in practice, medicine is indeed founded 
on pathology. This implies that instead of criticizing pathology’s foundational role, we raise 
questions about it, we doubt i t . ... Is pathology indeed foundational if we no longer investigate 
medicine as if there are knowing subjects on the one hand and objects to be known on the other?312
Mol is not saying that we can doubt pathology’s damaging relations with the 
patient out of existence: it cannot be denied that doctors can and do ignore what 
patients say about their bodies in favour of the knowledge they have gained from  
textbooks. But they also ignore textbooks in favour of ‘experience’ or ‘intuition’ -  or 
maybe even as a result of the patient’s own actions. Further, sometimes (most times), 
it is not the doctor who ‘acts’ at all, but the laboratory, or the hospital process, or the 
government health benefit scheme. What Mol is saying is that the real of disease 
operates in complex ways that are not covered completely by any single account.
M ol’s doubt is that there is any single ontology (a world in which knowledge cleanly 
determines practice, for example) which explains things entirely. Doubt is not a form 
of the denial of reality, but a means of its m ultiplication. Similarly, we might doubt 
the often asserted relation between Orientalism and Western violence, and in so 
doing, multiply the realities across which violence is deployed.313
This is where the second aspect of an ontological politics comes into play. 
Openness is about embracing the possibilities of multiplication. Multiplication and
312 Mol, The Body Multiple, 47-48 (emphasis original).
3^ See, Derek Gregory, The Colonial Present (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), Chapter 2.
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the acknowledgement of complexity have the paradoxical effect that the possibilities 
for ethical action seem  both worse (no single revolutionary impulse can overturn a 
tyrannical order) and better (possibilities and locations for interference multiply, the 
coherence of power has fractured, other realities exist that might be less 
damaging).314 As Mol argues: “An analysis like this opens up and keeps opened up the 
possibility that things might be done differently.”315 Doreen Massey makes a similar 
point rather differently, when she argues against utilising traditional spatial terms of 
analysis -  the local, the global, the openness and closure of boundaries -  to guide 
one’s analysis. Massey argues for an emphasis on understanding (and attempting to 
impact) how our “throwntogetherness” in spaces makes necessary the constant 
negotiation  of the open-ended real.316
All of this makes for what Marcus and Saka term, in a different context, a 
“nervous condition for analytic reason.”317 If one sets out to doubt coherence, to be 
open to multiplicity and change, then one must be not only ‘generous’ in method, as 
John Law espouses, but capable of holding the various ‘reals’ that emerge in tension  
with one another, so that they do not collapse into another singular account. One of 
the ways in which Law and Mol suggest that we might begin to do this is through 
using different methods of telling stories.
In particular, when reality is thought of as enacted multiply and complexly the 
singularity of narrative prized by (social) science over the centuries becomes 
impossible. This much has been argued above, but is also apparent in Chapter One, 
which highlighted different ways of telling the same story (think of Lefebvre and 
Foucault’s quite different accounts of dressage). The tone of that chapter was
3M See, Law, After Method, 155-56-
3!5 Mol, The Body Multiple, 164.
316 Massey, For Space, Chapter Fifteen.
317 Marcus et al., "Assemblage," 102.
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permissive, and stories were held together not by their internal coherence but 
through their ‘addition’ to each other’s insights. However, addition is not quite the 
right word:
Imagine, then, not a grid drawn in ever more detail, with ever more subdivisions; imagine, instead, 
turning the pages of a sketchbook. Imagine looking at different pictures, one after the other. Each 
orders and simplifies some p a r t o f  the world, in one w ay or another, but w hat is drawn is alw ays  
provisional and w aits fo r  the next picture, which draw s things differently.^18
Here, Law and Mol are describing the way in which a list can hold things together 
without striving for the coherence of an overall ‘order,’ that is, without losing an 
orientation of doubt and openness. Not only are lists works-in-progress -  never 
completed (perhaps not even seeking completion) but their elements do not always 
refer to the same order of logic. This is particularly useful if one considers the 
alternative real, which contains elem ents that operate according to entirely different 
logics (power/knowledge, affect, force, and so on).
In another context, Law refers to possibilities opened up by a “pinboard” 
approach. In contrast to narrative, Law argues that a pinboard performs our 
knowledge in a way that allows us to hold different accounts of the real “in tension” in 
order to “secure other knowing effects.”319 Similarly, Mol and Law refer to the 
possibilities of performing our knowledge in a non-narrative form, by discussing the 
possibilities opened by ‘walking through’ rather than making a ‘mapping o f  a 
particular real.320 This thesis uses such an approach -  a discussion of the 
coordination of multiplicity here, a description of absence and presence there.
318 Annemarie Mol and John Law, "Complexities: An Introduction," in Complexities: Social Studies o f  
Knowledge Practices, ed. Annemarie Mol and John Law, 1-22 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 7 
(emphasis added).
319 LaW> Aircraft Stories, 191 (emphasis original).
32° Mol et al., "Complexities," 16-17.
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However, there are problems posed by the permissive nature of such 
m ethodological tools. As Law asks in A ircraft Stories , “what would count as rigor  in 
the m ode of the pinboard?”321 This is an important question, because there are 
unfamiliar dangers in speaking so permissively of the provisional nature of academic 
work. In addition to the dangers of conclusion and of attaining to coherence, outlined 
above, there are dangers of becoming lost in the wilderness of ever-expanding detail. 
As Mol argues: “Blow up a few details of any site and immediately it turns into 
m any.”322 The modes of assembling stories outlined in this chapter m aybe  
permissive, allowing sites to be explored from any number of angles (as in a 
sketchbook), but ultimately there has to be a purpose  to this permissiveness. For Mol, 
for example, her first purpose is simply to illustrate the ontological fact of the 
existence  of multiplicity.323 Her second purpose is to illustrate some of the ways in 
which multiple realities are coordinated to enact a ‘singular’ object (the body, the 
disease). So her account included much that would usually be bracketed in the 
sociological or otherwise study of disease, but still excluded much more (there was 
little discussion of epidemiology, or public health policy, for example). What guided 
M ol’s exploration, then, was the formulation of an ontological politics. This politics 
was both specific (locating junctures in the enaction of disease to allow an 
interference on behalf of certain realities), as well as general (presenting a persuasive 
argument for maintaining an open academic attitude toward the multiplicity of 
reality).
Rigour, then, is being able to hold in tension the impetus to illustrate multiplicity 
and resist coherence, and the need to say  something. Academic rigour, so apolitical in 
traditional methodologies, becomes a political act. What is othered, excluded, made
321 Law, Aircraft Stories, 191 (emphasis original).
322 Mol, The Body Multiple, 51.
323 “So what I am trying to relate is not that there are two, five, or seventy variants of atherosclerosis, but 
that there is multiplicity.” Mol, The Body Multiple, 51 (emphasis added).
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absent in the account must be acknowledged as such. Methods of bringing stories 
together must be acknowledged as being partial and contingent, and not least as a 
way of enacting (in the academic’s own small way) a new kind of real.
Praxiography: the study o f practice
Studying something through the lens of this alternative kind of real is a difficult, 
doubt-ridden exercise. It is also a playful process in which we turn an object around 
and around to describe the different reals we find. This opens out possibilities for 
critical action through thought. Lists, pinboards, and sketchbooks all play a role in 
allowing for the study of this alternative kind of real.
Yet there is more substance to the method proposed by material semiotics and 
nonrepresentational geography than an orientation of openness and doubt. One of 
the ways in which rigour is introduced is through the study of things through p ra x is . 
As argued above, practice is what makes reality multiply, and by emphasising practice 
(rather than ‘knowledge’ or ‘power’ or even ‘spaces,’ as things that exist on their own) 
we illustrate the contemporaneous existence of competing realities (objects, systems, 
things) of greater-or-less coherence.324 As anyone who has worked in a large 
bureaucratic environment will attest, the study of practice undermines what narrative 
makes coherent.
However, the study of practice -  praxiography -  is not a singular process. In 
Mol’s book The Body M ultiple  praxiography is performed through ethnography, a
324 For an extended exploration of theories of practice in the context of nonrepresentational geography, 
see, Thrift, Spatial Formations, 6-30. This section clearly identifies at least four modes of thought that 
emphasise practice as a mode of study: phenomenological and associated approaches; Bourdieu s 
historical sociology of habitus and de Certeau’s associated work on the (spatial) practice of everyday life; 
actor-network theory (a cousin of material semiotics); and non-representational post-structuralism 
(such as that found in Foucault and Deleuze).
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close study of the practice of people (what people do) in a given context. However, she 
notes that there are ways of studying praxiography. For example, there is the study of 
the “m ateria ls and m ethods  section of scientific articles,”325 and Nigel Thrift explores 
practice through the body  (the “sensuousness of practice”), asking questions such as, 
‘How do people perform their bodies?’, and ‘How do they experience their bodies?’326 
This is what Foucault does with his study of dressage; it is partly what Lefebvre is 
doing in his rhythmanalysis; and it is even part of Deleuze and Guattari’s exploration 
of desiring machines. Lefebvre also studies the practice of everyday life, a topic he 
shares with Michel de Certeau, whose study The Practice o f  E veryday Life famously 
explores the possibilities for resisting capitalism through the ‘tactics’ of walking in the 
city against the grain of capitalist rhythms and patterns.327 As Amin and Thrift note, 
however, “we do not have to take on the romanticism of de Certeau’s notion of tactics 
to validate everyday life because large parts of what goes on in the city are still 
uncontrolled, a part of the city’s processual excess.”328 The practice of everyday life 
can be unintentional and unconsidered, and the study of practice should allow for 
that to speak.
What these studies of practice (ethnography, materials and methods, bodily 
practices, the practice of everyday life) share is their emphasis on the complex ways in 
which reality is enacted through material practices that are uncontrolled by grand 
narratives. Note the use of the word enacted: it hints at the multiple, ongoing, 
processual creation of reality, and leaves “open who  or w h at the actor is. 329 By 
emphasising praxis and enaction, authors like Mol hope to undermine the universal,
325 Mol, The Body Multiple, 158 (emphasis original).
326 Thrift, Spatial Formations, 1 (emphasis removed).
327 Michel de Certeau, The Practice o f  E veryday Life (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of 
California Press, 1984), Chapter Seven.
328 Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift, Cities: Reimagining the Urban (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), 46.
329 Mol, The Body Multiple, 143 (emphasis original).
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immaterial claims of traditional ontology. As Mol suggests at one point: “The 
praxiographic ‘is ’ is not universal, it is local. It requires a spatial specification. ”330 The 
specifically spatial consequences of this insight are explored in the following section. 
What is apparent here is that praxiography can but be limited in scope: not all bodies, 
but these  bodies; not all disease, but this disease, here. In the case of this thesis, this 
means that the (spatial) practice of violence becomes time and place specific. No 
longer the spatiality of US military violence, then, but the practice of violence by a 
particular group of people in a particular battlespace.
This thesis draws on an ethnography of the use of the Command Post of the 
Future (CPOF) by the 1st Cavalry Division in 2004-2005. Further, this study is a 
specific ethnographic study of spatia l praxis. This means that what is examined is the 
practice (of violence) in relation to space. While certainly not the only way of 
approaching the study of the praxis of violence (the possibility of studying the bodily 
practices of violence springs to mind), considering the spatial practices of violence 
allows consideration of the open and experimental qualities of violence in a non- 
subjective, multi-spatial and temporal, but still recognisably ordered context.
Further, as Patrick Joyce notes, spatial practice offers the opportunity to sit between  
‘micro’ narratives such as those of the body and the family and ‘macro’ narratives 
such as those of society and the e c o n o m y .331
Interrogating the alternate real
This section outlines briefly three kinds of question one might ask in order to 
approach the study of a spatial praxis of violence with a doubtful and open mind. It 
does not offer a comprehensive analysis of the questions because these are questions
330 Mol, The Body Multiple, 54.
331 Joyce, The Rule o f Freedom, 8
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that do not, cannot, exist in the abstract. The answers to these questions must instead  
be thought alongside/next to/inside of that which is being studied. What this account 
em phasises instead is how asking these questions allows a critical perspective on the 
kind of real that is being studied. There will be other questions, and further answers, 
but they are for another time.
Firstly, one of the consequences of thinking of the world as made up of objects 
and subjects that are multiple (multiple bodies, multiple diseases, multiple US 
Armies) is a consequent need to explain how things ‘hang together.’ Or at least there 
is a need to explain how multiplicity does not overwhelm us with a cacophony of 
overlapping realities. As Annemarie Mol notes, one of the most amazing things about 
atherosclerosis is not that it is multiple, but rather that multiplicity underlies a world 
nominally predicated on singularity.
Atherosclerosis enacted is more than one -  but less than many. The body multiple is not 
fragmented. Even if it is multiple, it also hangs together. The question to be asked, then, is how this 
is achieved. How are the different atheroscleroses enacted in the hospital related? How do they add 
up, fuse, come together?332
Mol examines a number of different mechanisms that enable multiplicity to 
coexist in its som etim es contradictory state. From the use of ‘gold standards’ to rank 
the worth of different realities, to the spatial and temporal distribution of alternate 
enactions of the disease, to the use of ‘covering’ mechanisms that unify realities by 
bracketing out their contradictions (written reports, for example): all of these are 
implicated in helping multiplicity hang together.
3 3 2  Moi^  The Body Multiple, 55 (emphasis original).
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In the following, it is argued that multiplicity is enacted in forms that are not 
simply unrelated or simply related, but rather fall somewhere in between. It may not 
be possible to gain an overall picture of the way in which multiple reals assemble 
them selves, but that is not to say that there is no point in exploring this process. At 
the very least, identifying the processes that enable the seeming coherence of 
multiplicity helps explain the orderings we see when we look at the world as a whole, 
and gives us tools for undermining the coherence and power of the seemingly 
singular orders we identify. Further, Law suggests that strategies for the coordination 
of the noncoherent also them selves enact difference and m ultiplicity. That is, 
coordination actually multiplies noncoherence. For example, in the following chapter, 
one coordinating strategy is the use by the 1st Cavalry Division of a m ode o f  
encountering  to coordinate (navigate) the complex spaces (reals) of Baghdad.333 Such 
a strategy itself then becomes enm eshed in the production of multiple reals. The 
creativity -  the openness -  of violence might lie in the altering strategies of 
coordination utilised by the US military as it attempts to reconnect itself to an 
increasingly complex and varying real.
Secondly, the emergence of the real from practice raises questions about the 
relation between absence and presence implied in any given arrangement of ‘things.’ 
Spatial practices imply the material configurations of things that are by definition 
present, yet it is possible (indeed, increasingly common) to think beyond the strict 
dimensionality of Euclidean space when thinking about the nature of this presence. 
Deleuze and Guattari, for example, discuss the absolute movement of a ‘thing’ in 
terms that do no relate to that thing’s discrete location at any given moment but to its 
occupation of a non-striated, non-demarcated space. What does it mean to be present 
in such a space? Exploring absence and presence opens up a series of related
3 3 3  For more on encountering, see, Michel Callon and John Law, "Absence-Presence, Circulation, and 
Encountering in Complex Space," Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 22, no. 1 (2004).
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questions. What is here? What is not here? What is not anywhere much? H ow  are 
things here and there? What, indeed, is the meaning of here?
Mol and Law suggest that we might consider a number of kinds of spatialities in 
which and through which things are enacted. These include Euclidean space, network 
space, and fluid spaces. These spatialities by no means form an exclusive list and are 
joined by others.334 Further, they engage in complex interactions with one another. As 
Amin and Thrift put it:
We need to be careful about space. There are many different kinds of space, not just one, and the 
smallest spatialities can also have the largest social consequences. The different kinds of spaces are 
legion: there are, to name but a few, continuous, planar regions that emphasize exclusiveness and 
borders; there-and-back again networks; fluid spaces that emphasize interaction and proliferate; 
more than one place at once spaces that mix up proximity and distance, and so o n .335
One of the m ost interesting things is to see how different configurations of absence 
and presence -  different spatialities -  interact.
Finally, attending to an alternate real raises questions about the emergence of 
agency. The fourth chapter identifies how the altering relations of absence and 
presence brought about by the CPOF’s enrolment in the US military war machine are 
implicated in enacting US military units as agents with a particular kind of agency, 
one that is neither necessarily intended by the US command structure, nor 
necessarily easily controlled.
334 indeed, Mol and Law themselves suggest alternative ‘social topologies,’ including distinguishing 
between regions, networks, and fluids, and expressing a concern with different kinds of boundaries 
(permeable, blurred, mobile, folded, and so on). See, Annemarie Mol and John Law, Regions, Networks 
and Fluids: Anaemia and Social Topology," Social Studies o f Science 24, no. 4 ( i9 9 4 )> John Law and 
Annemarie Mol, "Situating Technoscience: An Inquiry into Spatialities," Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space 19 (2001). See, also, Tiago Moreira, "Surgical Monads: A Social Topology of the 
Operating Room," Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 22, no. 1 (2004).
335 Amin et al., Cities, 40.
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How is agency produced? (Remember Foucault’s description of the soldier as a 
fragment of mobile space, before he is courage or honour.”)336 How is it distributed 
among both human and non-human actors? What kind  of agency is produced? Law 
and Callon, for example, distinguish between a ‘qualculative’ mode of agency and the 
strangely actively-passive mode of agency of a Quaker at a meeting.33? Exploring these 
questions helps explain ways in which violence emerges as a novel and differentiating 
force.
Conclusions
The previous chapter explored the ways in which spatiality and violence might be 
linked through spatial orderings, through rhythms, and through the composition of 
desiring-machines, opening up a vocabulary and an avenue for thinking of violence 
“not as a thing, but as an active force imbued with transformative potential.”338
However, as this chapter has argued, in linking spatiality and violence, Foucault, 
Lefebvre, and Deleuze also begin to make it possible to think of an alternative kind o f  
real. This real, and the things, subjects, and agency that people it, are marked by their 
emergence through practice, in a way that denies the singularity of the real and its 
supposedly ahistorical qualities. This has the effect of undermining traditional 
academic accounts of violence: when the real emerges through practice, violence 
becom es a part of the set of practices that demand examination in the specific. As a 
result of this, these accounts possibilise (though, it must be acknowledged, have not 
definitively argued for) a way of thinking of the existence of m ultiple  reals responding
336 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f the Prison (London: Vintage Books, 1 9 9 5 ). 164.
337 See, Michel Callon and John Law, "On Qualculation, Agency, and Otherness," Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 23, no. 5 (2005).
3 3 8  Whitehall, "Musical Modulations of Political Thought," 1.
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to m ultiple  temporalities.339 This alternative real emerges from a complicated and 
non-determ inistic interaction of matter and meaning in practice, responding to a 
number of different ordering principles (including affect, the resistance of bodies, and 
the materially autonomous operation of technology).
This chapter opens out the question of how to explore the spatial logic of violence 
if this alternative account of the real is to be taken seriously. As Haraway puts it, the 
problem is, on the one hand, how to provide an account of the emergent and 
contingent nature of the real, avoid narrative coherence and acknowledge the role our 
accounts as academics play in shaping the real, while at the same time still saying 
something p o sitive  and concrete about the w o r l d . 3 4 0  This thesis has argued that this 
complicated and difficult task can be attempted (though never completed) if the 
author maintains an orientation of doubt toward ontological coherence, and openness 
toward the possibilities opened out by the existence of ontological noncoherence, 
complexity, and multiplicity. This orientation makes possible an ontological politics, 
which looks to promote the already-existing, but potentially marginalised, alternative 
processes of enacting reality, while acknowledging the partial, contingent, and 
ongoing nature of such interventions. It is this ontological politics which guides the 
selection of material and methodological tools.
This thesis explores the spatial practices of violence in the context of the study of 
a particular kind of practice (the ethnography of a command technology). In so doing, 
it maintains an awareness of the kinds of problems raised at the end of this chapter 
that are unique, perhaps, to the praxiographic mode of study. How does the 
multiplicity of objects, subjects, reals, hang together? In what ‘way’ (In what kind of
339 jn particular, Lefebvre’s Marxist humanism shies from the decentring of agency implicit in this 
account.
3 4 0  Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women, 187.
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space? Through which time?) are things made absent and present in this set of 
practices? How (Through what entities? In what relations?) is agency distributed? 
What kind  of agency results? These are just a few of the questions that open out if the 
real is viewed as emergent, responding to complicated and recursive relations 
between matter and meaning, and dependent on time to unfold difference. There will 
be others.
As the real emerges in multiple ways, so too does violence, undermining 
ambitions to locate a singular spatial practice of violence. As Mol would argue, 
however, this is not a problem but an opportunity, for the enaction of war in the 
streets of Baghdad, particularly during the time period covered by this thesis, was the 
enaction of a real in which the US forces played a central role in perpetrating and 
continuing cycles of destruction. This is the nature of war, of course. What the 
analysis above suggests is that there is a possibility that one might look for ‘edges’ of 
the orderings of such violence (and its associated productive forces) where these 
orderings overlap and interfere with others, and where it is possible to interfere on 
behalf of one’s own sense of the good — not a universal sense of the good, however (a 
trap much commentary on the war in Iraq falls too easily into), but one that 
understands that the good, as with all else, emerges out of practice.
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INTERLUDE 
The (not-so-)distant roar of battle
On the contraiy, [this mode of study] is interested in defining and discovering, beneath the forms 
of justice that have been instituted, the order that has been imposed, the forgotten past of real 
struggles, actual victories, and defeats which may have been disguised but which remain 
profoundly inscribed. It is interested in rediscovering the blood that has dried in the codes, and not, 
therefore, the absolute right that lies beneath the transience of history; it is interested not in 
referring the relativity of history to the absolute of the law, but in discovering, beneath the stability 
of the law or the truth, the indefiniteness of histoiy. It is interested in the battle cries that can be 
heard beneath the formulas of right, in the dissymmetry of forces that lies beneath the equilibrium 
of ju stice^
As Foucault so evocatively termed it, beneath the polite discussion of ontological 
realities, there is a distant roar of battle. Beneath discussion of the relation between 
spatial orderings and violence, there is the dried blood on the streets of Baghdad. This 
interlude, then, begins with the ‘stability of the law or the truth’ -  the doctrines and 
concepts of war-making that attempt to contain and describe the spatial organisation
341 Michel Foucault, Society M ust Be Defended (London: Allen Lane, Penguin Books, 2003), 56.
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of violence before listening to the battle cries that can (still) be heard coming from  
Baghdad today.
By sketching some of the US military’s spatialising practices in Baghdad in this 
way, this interlude illustrates something about the practice of violence in Iraq that 
can be lost in critical reflection on the war, and on the contemporary security 
problematic in general. That is, it notes how spatialising practices of violence in 
Baghdad are a result of both  the hybridisation and  the separate operation of different 
military concepts and behaviours, particularly the concepts of Network-Centric 
Warfare and urban warfare. This point is significant as it establishes both the 
multiplicity of the battlespace and undermines the supposed singularity of the 
operation of violence (and of security discourse) in Iraq, a point often assumed by 
critical security theorists and traditional military analysts alike.
Netw ork-C entric Warfare, urban operations, and spatialising the 
battlespace
The US military is undergoing a complicated process of transformation, one 
strongly contested both from within and outside the military. Further, it has recently 
been declared dead on arrival by some critics, due in part to difficulties in matching 
the force transformation agenda to the situation in Iraq, and in part to the precipitous 
departure of one its most zealous advocates, Secretary R u m s f e l d s
One Network-Centric Warfare critic argues that:
Terrorists ... do not fear ‘network-centric warfare’ because they have already mastered it for a tiny
fraction of one cent on the dollar, achieving greater relative effects with the Internet, cell phones,
342 See, David S. Cloud, "Pentagon Review Calls for No Big Changes," New York Times, February 2,
2006; Fred Kaplan, "Rumsfeld Surrenders: The QDR Dashes His Dreams of Military Transformation," 
Slate (2006), http://www.slate.com /id/2135343/.
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and cheap airline tickets than all of our military technologies have delivered. Our prime weapon in 
our struggles with terrorists, insurgents, and warriors of every patchwork sort remains the soldier 
or Marine; yet confronted with reality’s bloody evidence, we simply pretend that other, future, 
hypothetical wars will justify systems we adore -  purchased at the expense of the assets we n e e d . 3 4 3
However, despite the attempts of sceptics of network-centrism to write off the impact 
of transformation on US military behaviour, or the converse attempts of network- 
centric advocates to ignore the ongoing influence of competing approaches (in 
particular, urban warfare and counterinsurgency), US military behaviour in Iraq has 
been inflected by both . 344
This section explores the spatialising practices envisioned by the two central 
concepts of warfare informing US military behaviour in Iraq, Network-Centric 
Warfare and urban warfare, before exploring the ways in which US military behaviour 
in Baghdad has been implicated in multiple as well as hybridised spatialising 
practices.
343 Ralph Peters, "The Counterrevolution in Military Affairs," The Weekly Standard  11, no. 20 (2006), 
http://www.weeklystandard.com /Content/Public/Articles/ooo/000/006/649qrsob.asp. For a 
discussion of the institutional factors influencing the failure of cross-pollination between NCW, urban 
warfare, and counterinsurgency doctrines, see, Caroline Croser, "Organising Complexity: Modes of 
Behaviour in a Networked Battlespace," Australian A rm y Journal (2007), (forthcoming).
344 There is a complicated relationship here between concepts and doctrine. NCW is a general concept for 
the future operation of armed forces (a suggestive description), integrated into the Capstone Concept fo r  
Joint Operations. Urban operations has both its own concept (which according to the US military 
hierarchy of concepts should respond to the Capstone Concept) and specific doctrine within each of the 
Services (a prescriptive range of activities to be undertaken in specific circumstances). For a description 
of the relationship between concepts and doctrine, see, Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force 
Development, Capstone Concept fo r  Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2003),
3-4-
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The battlespace o f Network-Centric Warfare
Warfare is about human behaviour in a context of organized violence directed toward political
ends. So, network-centric warfare (NCW) is about human behaviour within a networked
e n v ir o n m e n t .  345
As promulgated by its adherents, Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) -  subsumed now  
within US doctrinal-speak under the broader theme of Force Transformation -  is 
about taking the information-driven changes of our time and making them central to 
the changing of the US military. No mere advocacy for the adoption of new  
technologies (although these play their role), NCW and Force Transformation are 
nothing less than an attempt to shift the entire footing of the US militaiy: all facets of 
operation -  logistical, doctrinal, strategic, training, technological, and organisational 
-  are to be altered to reflect their involvement in a networked environment (or, to use 
the words of Cebrowski and Gartska, to reflect their role in a “continuously adapting 
ecosystem ”).346
Network-centric warfare brings together the description (and prescription) of a 
number of behaviours and outcomes that are possibilised in a networked 
environment. These include:
• gaining and maintaining information supremacy;
• increasing the speed of command;
• increasing shared situational awareness;
• enabling the coordination of physically dispersed forces through the 
battlespace;
• developing self-synchronisation during battle;
345 Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski (ret.), in, Office of Force Transformation (OFT), The Implementation  
o f Network-Centric Warfare (Washington, DC: Office of Secretary of Defense, 2005), i.
346 Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Gartska, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," 
Proceedings o f  the U.S. N aval Institute January ( 1 9 9 8 ) ,
h t t p : / /w w w .u s n i .o r g /P r o c e e d in g s /A r t i c l e s 9 8 /P R O C e b r o w s k i .h t m .
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• developing high rates of change within one’s own forces and in the broader 
environment;
• enhancing jointness of operations (that is, the removal of structural barriers 
between the Services); and
• compressing previously separate levels of warfare (the strategic, tactical, and 
operational), such that actions in one may directly impact on others.3*?
Or, to cite the description of NCW provided by one of its greatest proponents,
(retired) Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski:
NCW is characterized by the ability of geographically dispersed forces to attain a high level of 
shared battlespace awareness that is exploited to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical 
objectives in accordance with the commander’s intent. This linking of people, platforms, weapons, 
sensors, and decision aids into a single network creates a whole that is clearly greater than the sum 
of its parts. The results are networked forces that operate with increased speed and synchronization 
and are capable of achieving massed effects, in many situations, without the physical massing of 
forces required in the past. This increased speed and synchronization directly impacts operations 
across the battlespace, from support areas through combat z o n e s . 3 4 8
NCW deals in explicitly spatial terms: it is the distribution of forces through  the 
battlespace, using modes of coordination and movement that were previously 
impossible, and the ability to generate a speed of action that defies the usual spatial 
lim its o f ‘rem oteness,’ distance, and separation that sets NCW apart from its 
unnetworked counterpart.
34? See, Office of Force Transformation (OFT), Elements o f  Defense Transformation (Washington, DC: 
Office of Secretary of Defense, 2004); Office of Force Transformation (OFT), The Implementation o f  
NCW, 7-10.
348 vice Admiral Cebrowski, in, Office of Force Transformation (OFT), The Implementation o f  NCW, i-ii.
141
PLATFORM -CENTRIC WAR
S  j [DM I IW
i S 1 [PM J [W
S I [dm | I w
V: DM • W
B a ttlesp a ce
NETW ORK-CENTRIC W AR
r s |  |dm [ J w:k
y
S  § ^ 0 —x
/
S DM w “7^✓
I
J
s] |dm F jw
B a ttlesp a ce
F i g u r e  i .  S en sor—D ecision-m aker—W eapon chains in  traditional and Network-Centric 
W arfare. (Adapted from W. Perry, “Network-Centric Warfare: Measuring the Effectiveness of 
Networked Forces,” paper presented at RAND New Securities Forum, Washington DC, September 
2004.)
This is apparent even in the more technical rendering of NCW as the networking 
of the sensor-to-shooter chain (this is the chain whereby the sensor identifies enemy; 
a decision-maker allocates a weapon to target the enemy; a weapon attacks the 
enemy). In this rendering networking technologies enable decision-makers to pass off 
sensor information to more proximate weapons out of their chain of command. This 
results in NCW acting to ‘de-linearise’ and de-compartmentalise the battlespace. This 
phenom enon is illustrated in Figure 1.
All of this implies a profoundly new ordering of the designated space of military 
violence. In particular, critical theorists use the network’s role in ordering space in 
this military concept to highlight the possible penetration of the ‘pipelines’ and ‘flows’ 
that constitute our increasingly networked society by US military violence — that is, 
the space of networked warfare is seen as coterminous with the space of networked 
society. In one of the earliest articulations of this perspective, Michael Dillon argues 
that:
The many theatres of this network-centric warfare will be as virtual as they will be geographic, 
coursing through the capillaries and conduits that comprise network society itself. Conflict will
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newly configure and exploit these virtual spaces of encounter: re-routing, re-regulating and re­
engineering global flows through them.
The duration of hostilities threatens to be just as indeterminate as the newbattlespaces. The tempi 
of operations will also be diverse with speed, lethality, range and duration modulated. Or so it is 
idealized in the new strategic literature.349
This expanded battlespace is distinct from the 19th century “battle-field,” or the 
m id-20th century “theater of operations” or “combat zone.”350 The battlefield, for 
example, is a site which sees civilian geographies disappear under the brute 
materiality of violence. It is not like the battlespace, which is a (securitised, often 
semi-civilian) space through  which military practices flow. Think for a moment of 
Erich Maria Remarque’s descriptions of soldiers lolling in empty French villages, 
whose existence in the middle of the battlefield is without consequence, except in 
terms of the dubious comforts and safety the buildings left behind might provide.
The village gradually vanishes under the shells and we lead a charmed life. So long as any part of 
the supply dump still stands we don’t worry, we desire nothing better than to stay here till the end 
of the war. 351
349 Michael Dillon, "Network Society, Network-Centric Warfare and the State of Emergency," Theory, 
Culture and Society 19, no. 4 (2002): 74.
350 See, Francis Lieber, "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field 
(Lieber Code)" (Avalon Project, Yale Law School, 1863),
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lieber.htm; United States War Department, Field Service 
Regulations: Operations" (ibiblio, 1941), http://www.ibibli0.0rg/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM-100-5/FM-100- 
5-1.html.
351 Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front (London: Pan Books, 1987), 156. The 
complete disregard for civilian geographies is surely given up by the use of the word ‘and: The village 
gradually vanishes under the shells and  we lead a charmed life.” Nicholas Saunders explores the close 
links between the destruction of human (civilian) landscapes and the exercise of violence in World War I 
further, arguing, for example, that:
The chaos and desolation of the battlefields after battle is often described by such words as ‘skeleton’, ‘gaunt’ 
and ‘broken’, in such a way that imagery phases in and out between landscape, village and human corpse. The 
result was ‘a close connection, an osmosis between the death of men, of objects, of places (Audoin-Rouzeau 
1992: 81).
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On the other hand, the shift in the focus of military spatiality from the battlefield to 
the “theater of war,” “theater of operations,” or the “combat zone” by World War II 
indicates that violence is now understood as being deliberately productive of a series 
of (spatial) relations that penetrate beyond the specific site of armed combat. The 
most obvious of these is the interpenetration between the civilian and military 
econom ies as a result of the vastly increased use and rationalisation of logistics.352 For 
example, the opening provisions of the US Army’s Field Service Regulations from  
World War II define the relevant geographic areas of activity:
1. The theater of war comprises those areas of land, sea, and air which are, or may become, directly 
involved in the conduct of war.
2. A theater of operations is an area of the theater of war necessary for military operations and the 
administration and supply incident to military operations. The War Department designates one or 
more theaters of operations.
3. A combat zone comprises that part of a theater of operations required for the active operations of 
the combatant f o r c e s . 3 5 3
The battlespace, by contrast, makes more complex both civilian and  military 
geographies. In fact, it is so inclusive as to disregard them as categories of distinction 
at all, replacing them both with the broader ordering principles of the networks. 
According to the definition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the battlespace is:
The environment, factors and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat 
power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space, and the 
included enemy and friendly forces; facilities; weather; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and
Nicholas J. Saunders, Trench Art: M aterialities and Memories o f War (New York, NY: Berg, 2003), 128 
(emphasis added).
352 For a description of the gradual penetration of logistics into civilian economies, see, Martin van 
Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from  Wallenstein to Patton (2nd Edition) (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004).
353 United States War Department, "FM 100-5 ( i9 4 i)>" i.t-i.3 -
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the information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest. See also 
electrom agnetic spectrum ; inform ation environm ent; jo in t in telligence preparation
o f  th e battlespace. 354
This Borges-esque definition puts the permissive qualities of the list to good use: the 
battlespace is not simply a space in and through which brute force is exercised (air, 
land, sea), but rather is ‘itse lf an active participant in the battle -  or, more accurately, 
comprises such elements. These elements include enemy and friendly forces, 
“facilities” (also defined through a highly inclusive definition of civilian and m ilitaiy  
infrastructure), and the weather. These elements also include things that are not 
traditionally considered ‘spatial’ at all (the electromagnetic spectrum, and, even 
further removed, the information environment). As Figure 2 indicates, the 
battlespace is a hybrid entity of the material and immaterial, the civilian and the 
military. These are pulled together in a manner that is totally foreign to the 
distinction drawn above between the “theater of war” and the “theater of operations,” 
which are viewed as geographically distinct (though contiguous) entities.
This extension of the scope and complexity of the understanding of the 
designated location of military violence responds in part to the concerns of a (part of 
the) military attempting to deal with a networked world, a world composed of objects 
held in place (in space) only through their contingent relationships with other objects. 
The contingency of these relations is emphasised by their biological-like emergence, 
as though they were components of “ecosystem s.”355
354 Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Department o f  Defense Dictionary o f  
M ilitary and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2002), 53 (emphasis 
original).
355 Cebrowski et al., "NCW: Its Origin and Future".
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F i g u r e  2. B attlespace com ponents. [Reprinted from Department of the Army, Operations: Field 
M anual 3-0  (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2001), 4-21.]
As Michael Dillon and Julian Reid note, such an understanding of the world as 
being formed of complex and evolving networks (systems) draws in turn on 
discourses that relate biological life with the digitisation of information implicit in the 
computing revolution of the 20th century.356 This conflation is noted by scholars as 
existing in diverse contexts, from the pursuit of artificial life through to the attempt to 
read the ‘book of life’ in the human DNA sequence.357 It leads to the phenomenon of 
‘informationalisation,’ whereby things are understood as essentially comprising and 
being responsive to the ordering principles of information. ‘Life-as-information’ is 
often expressed through the lexicon of complexity science (think of the nonlinear 
expansion of mould, not to mention the swarming of bees and the growth of crystals 
-  life that responds to the mathematics and topography of complexity), such that 
organisations like the US military have come to view themselves as part of a complex, 
constantly mobile, and evolving (biological-style) system. As a result, the ordering of
356 See, Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, "Global Liberal Governance: Biopolitics, Security and War," 
Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies 30, no. 1 (2001).
357 Sarah Kember, Cyberfeminism and Artificial Life (London: Routledge, 2003); Lily E. Kay, Who 
Wrote the Book o f  Life? A H istory o f  the Genetic Code (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000); 
N. Katherine Hayles, H ow We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and 
Informatics (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1 9 9 9 )-
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violence results from the novel configuration of networked space in Western society  
(and an accompanying mode of informationalised subjectivity).358
The m ult i-d im ens iona l urban battlespace
Proponents of NCW present a confident and all-encompassing understanding of 
the battlespace, where systems (no matter how complex, seemingly) can be 
engineered and understood. By contrast, US military concepts and doctrine relating 
to urban combat illustrate a surprising degree of uncertainty and doubt.359 Much of 
this uncertainty stems from the lack of easy routes of penetration (for both forces and 
intelligence) into densely built urban environments, rendering ineffective the factors 
on which mid-to-late 20th century US military supremacy is built: superior stand-off 
firepower, and advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). This 
lesson was graphically demonstrated during the US militaiy intervention-cum- 
peacekeeping operation in Mogadishu during 1993. Authors such as Stephen Graham 
have been instrumental in revealing the ways in which US military discourse is 
saturated with a fear of the ‘dirt,’ poverty, and chaos of the city (especially the 
underdeveloped city).360 This is true to such an extent that the recently revised US
358 Informationalisation is explored in the following, see, 180-83.
359 For an account of the ad hoc manner in which the US Army has formulated its urban combat 
doctrine, see, Roger Spi Her, "Sharp Corners: Combat Operations in Urban Areas,” in Future Armies, 
Future Challenges: Land Warfare in the Information Age, ed. Michael Evans, Russell Parkin and Alan 
Ryan, 82-95 (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2004).
3<>o See, for example, Stephen Graham, "Cities as Strategic Sites: Place Annihilation and Urban 
Geopolitics," in Cities, War, and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics, ed. Stephen Graham, 31-53 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004). For a discussion of these discourses in the context of the 
Western city’s vulnerability to terrorism, see, Jon Coaffee, Terrorism, Risk and the City: The Making o f  
a Contemporary Urban Landscape (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2003). For an exploration of these 
urban discourses in a non-military context, see, Nigel Thrift, "But Malice Aforethought: Cities and the 
Natural History of Hatred," Transactions o f  the Institute o f British Geographers 30, no. 20 (2005).
147
Army Field Manual on Urban Operations conceptually distinguishes between the 
negative effects of urbanisation and the threats posed by the enemy.361
The anxiety of urban conflict is apparent in the Army’s ongoing discussion of the 
three-dim ensional nature  of the city (the “multi-dimensional battlefield”), a 
topography that is full of places to hide, that blocks some of the more sophisticated 
electronic intelligence-gathering devices, and that disguises and places civilians 
between the enem y and the Army.362 This final factor also emphasises one of the US 
Army’s strongest concerns in the urban environment: its usefulness for enemies 
prosecuting an asymmetric war.363
There is, then, a concrete US military concern with the geographic complexity of 
the urban environment. For example, US Army Field Manual 3-06, a complete 
statement of Army doctrine relating to urban warfare, emphasises the complexity of 
urban environments as sites of military operation:
The urban environm ent includes the physical aspects of the urban area as well as the complex and 
dynamic interaction and relationships between its key components -  the terrain (natural and man- 
made), the population, and the supporting infrastructure -  as an overlapping and interdependent 
system  o f system s.364
Note here that urban warfare doctrine overlaps with Network-Centric Warfare in 
viewing the environment as a network, but this time, implicitly at least, one into 
which it is difficult for the US Army to ‘plug’ itself in order to form key nodes of force 
and security.
361 Specifically, the Field Manual raises concerns under the categories of “general instability,” “food and 
water shortages,” “disease and pollution,” and “competing power structures,” including urban 
insurgencies, merchant classes, criminal organisations, and warlords. Department of the Army, Field 
Manual 3-06: Urban Operations (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2003), 3-34"3-56.
362 See, Department of the Army, FM 3-06, 2.8.
363 See, Department of the Army, FM 3-06, Chapter Three.
364 Department of the Army, FM 3 -0 6 ,1.3 (former emphasis original, latter emphasis added).
148
This ‘network emphasis’ emerged in the recently revised FM 3-06, regarding the 
need as a response to the perceived need to refurbish ‘traditional’ US Army 
approaches to urban war. Conventional approaches, dating back to before World War 
II favoured a “systematic linear approach” using stand-off weapons and firepower in 
order to achieve territorial dominance.363 FM 3-06 instead emphasises close combat 
(accepting the likelihood of casualties as a result), arguing for the effectiveness of 
inserting forces into the battlespace at “essential” points (ranging from holding key 
strategic terrain through to the provision of infrastructure rebuilding).366 The US 
Marine Corp’s “Three Block War” concept is, in many respects, the equivalent of the 
Army urban warfare concept. James Szepesy argues that three-block warfare and 
NCW intersect in the figure of the “strategic corporal,” a reference to highly 
decentralised command and control and the importance of small-scale human 
networks in successful operations.367 As with US Army doctrine, the emphasis is on 
inserting (potentially small) groups of networked forces into key sites of the urban 
battlefield in order to achieve maximum effect.
Urban warfare doctrine emphasises an overlapping but different kind of space to 
that of NCW. NCW, with its emphasis on a spatiality comprising contingently 
arranged, highly mobile and mutating systems (both civilian and military) contrasts 
with the more concretely observed doctrine of urban warfare, whose emphasis is on 
the difficult, impenetrable, and multi-dimensional nature of the city as a site of war.
365 Department of the Army, FM 3-06, 5.13.
366 Department of the Army, FM 3-06, 5 -i3 _5 -i4 -
367 The phrase “Three Block War” refers to the possibility of having to fight dramatically different kinds 
of war (from high-intensity combat through to peacekeeping operations and the provision of aid to 
civilian populations) within the space of three city blocks. See, James E. Szepesy, The Strategic Corporal 
and the Emerging Battlefield: The Nexus Between the USMC’s Three Block War Concept and Network 
Centric Warfare" (Tufts University, 2005), http://fletcher.tufts.edu/research/2005/Szepesy.pdf.
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Urban battlespaces: the spatial logic(s) o f  US military doctrine meet the 
experimental space(s) o f the city o f Baghdad
Baghdad, a city about the size of Chicago in population density, and Austin, Texas, in landmass, 
divided through the center by the Tigris River, is, like many overpopulated yet underdeveloped 
cities, subdivided into neighborhoods with distinct demographic divergences, reliant on a social 
system of governance based on tribal and religious affiliations, and interconnected by modern lines 
of communication and technology. The neglect by Saddam Hussein and the gray period following 
initial coalition combat operations created those ‘ripe’ conditions in Baghdad.368
1st Cavalry Division, with which the fieldwork which comprises the core of this 
thesis was undertaken, is one of the US Army’s premier Divisions (one of two ‘Digital’ 
Divisions). It has been an early recipient of transformational technology, as well as an 
early implementer of network-centric doctrine. For this reason, it offers a good 
vantage point from which to explore the spatialising practices of the US Army in 
Baghdad as related to concepts both of network-centric and urban warfare.
The epigraph to this section is drawn from an article co-authored by 1st Cavalry’s 
Commanding General following the Cavalry’s deployment in Baghdad from April 
2004  to April 2005. General Chiarelli’s writings provide insights into the multiple 
nature of the battlespace confronted by 1st Cavalry during their time in Baghdad. In 
particular, Chiarelli’s writings emphasise that the space of the city is multiple. On the 
one hand, it is three-dimensional, block-like, and creative of vertical and horizontal 
surfaces with which the Army must contend. As such it is a divided, demarcated 
space, a space divided by neighbourhood, by demography, by designated Areas of
368 Maj. Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli and Maj. Patrick R. Michaelis, "Winning the Peace: The Requirement for 
Full Spectrum Operations," M ilitary Review  July-August (2005): 5.
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Operations — a space divided by a mobilising friend/enemy distinction.369 Yet 
Baghdad is also  “interconnected by modern lines of communication and 
technology.”37° It is a space where streets and highways are always flowing: a site of 
the excessive intersection of different systems (economic, political, social, religious, 
and military); a moving background of civilian and enemy activity that disguises what 
the Army might want to see -  and sometimes (reverting to a non-networked mode of 
operation) actively denies access entirely. In this, the city also operates as a 
networked space of flows, one that might form the subject of the controls and 
regulations that Deleuze suggests accompany the ‘control society.’371 In Chiarelli and 
M ichaelis’s analysis, Baghdad responds to different ordering principles, and therefore 
different m odes of power/knowledge/space. Diken and Laustsen make a similar point 
more generally regarding the multiple logics at play in the contemporary city when 
they argue that:
Today, disciplinary enclosure seems to be only one among three organizing principles of urbanism.
The contemporary city is also organized according to the principles of control, based on the
regulation/coding of flows and naked violence, t e r r o r . 3 7 2
Interestingly, at an operational level 1st Cavalry in Baghdad was strongly 
influenced by the NCW paradigm, approaching the city as a set of regulated flows and 
complex systems. In particular, General Chiarelli addressed Baghdad as a ‘system of 
system s,’ simultaneously pursuing five “lines of operation” essential for the successful
369 For a discussion of the importance of the friend/enemy distinction in the spatial ordering of 
contemporary international relations, see, Mitchell Dean, "A Political Mythology of World Order: Carl 
Schmitt's Nomos," Theory, Culture & Society 23, no. 5 (2006): 2-4; Dillon, NCW and the State of 
Emergency", 74-75-
370 Chiarelli et al., "Winning the Peace," 5.
371 See, Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, 1972-1990 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1 9 9 5 ), 177- 
82. See also, above, 67-68.
372 Biilent Diken, and Carsten Bagge Laustsen, "Zones of Indistinction: Security, Terror, and Bare Life, 
Space and Culture 5, no. 3 (2002): 291.
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functioning of the city. These lines of operation were: running combat operations 
(search and destroy operations); training Iraqi security forces; providing essential 
services; promoting indigenous governance; and promoting economic pluralism.373
However, at a tactical level Chiarelli exposed his ambivalence toward a highly 
technological version of networked spatiality. In particular, in an article on the use of 
heavy armour in urban combat (Bradley Fighting Vehicles and M1A2 Abrams tanks), 
Chiarelli opens with these foreboding words:
The new fight brings to light a cautionary message to the force -  be wary of eliminating or reducing 
the option of heavy armor; it has proven decisive and has been the critical enabler that allowed 
T[ask] F[orce] Baghdad to win every fight, everyday. The enemy we fight in streets and crypts is not 
connected by a vast suite of electronics packages; instead, they use proven kinetic techniques, such 
as the rocket-propelled grenade (RPG), the command-detonated improvised explosive device 
(IED), the mortar, and the AK47 in an asymmetric fashion, using the concrete valleys of the 
cityscape to their advantage.
This evolution in warfare is not a side note in history; it is a foreshadowing of operations to come. 
The mass migration of humanity to cities and the inability of third-world nations to keep abreast of 
basic city services relative to growth, breeds discontent. It is a harvesting ground for 
fundamentalist i d e o l o g u e s . 3 74
Chiarelli’s article emphasises that while networking technologies are important 
in urban combat, it is combinations of old and new technologies and tactics that 
enable the successful navigation of the urban battlespace -  for example, through the 
innovative joining of old-style, thick-skinned tanks capable of withstanding
373 Chiarelli et al., "Winning the Peace," 7.
374 Maj. Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli, Maj. Patrick R. Michaelis, and Maj. Geoffrey A. Norman, "Armor in 
Urban Terrain: The Critical Enabler," Arm or 114, no. 2 (2005),
http://www.angelf1re.com/art2/narod/armour_urban_terrain_iraq/.
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improvised explosive device (IED) blasts with high-tech vision and communication 
capabilities.375
In the context of Baghdad, 1st Cavalry rejected the wholesale use of conventional 
urban warfare doctrine in favour of an approach that drew on some aspects of the 
NCW concept, while innovating beyond the bounds of both. For example, traditional 
urban doctrine argues that tanks should move through urban terrain in fixed column 
formation, with hatches open to draw fire in order to allow for target identification 
and easy escape in the event of a catastrophic anti-armour attack. These tactics 
compensate for the perceived vulnerability of tanks in urban environments, where 
catastrophic attacks might be launched from hidden locations. Yet the relatively light 
kinetic impacts of the attacks launched by insurgents in Baghdad (particularly in the 
early years of the occupation) made it possible for tanks to survive the initial impact 
of IEDs, while it was open hatches that presented a danger to soldiers inside, due to 
the sniper firing-angles presented by the verticality of the urban environment. As a 
result, 1st Cavalry reversed its tactics.
In particular for 1st Cavalry successful movement of tanks in urban terrain 
became summarised according to three concepts:
• creating security, by travelling ‘buttoned up’ (with hatches closed) and using 
the vision technologies of the tanks to enable target identification, and by 
moving to and occupying points of domination where US weapons worked to 
their best advantage;
375 For a discussion of tank/infantry cooperation in the second battle of Fallujah that emphasises similar 
points, see, Capt. Michael D. Skaggs, "Tank-Infantry Integration," Marine Corps Gazette 89, no. 6 
(2005).
153
creating stan do ff  (the capability to create “reaction time to allow servicing of 
targets ), either through strategic stops or through continuous movement; 
and
• creating interior lines (minimising surfaces presented to the ‘external’
battlespace, for example, by travelling in a box-like formation), a tactic which 
“further offsets the enem y’s propensity to execute simultaneous attacks from 
multiple surface and elevated avenues of approach.”376 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate in some detail the kind of battlespace that is conceived 
in these urban warfare tactics.
D irection  of Travel 
12 O 'c lock
Direct Fire Plan 
12
• P om ls of D om ination /  A dvan tage : 
Intersection
• N ote how  e a c h  ve rsion  of em p loym ent 
of Armor in UO is a  ba ttle  to  c re a te  
standoff, secu rity  a n d  in terior tines
?
In fa n try  ■ IWttWfc ?
F i g u r e s  3  a n d  4. Effective tank formations in urban warfare, as utilised by 1st Cavalry 
Division in Sadr City (Baghdad) and An Najaf. [Reprinted from Maj. Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli, Maj. 
Patrick R. Michaelis, and Maj. Geoffrey A. Norman, "Armor in Urban Terrain: The Critical Enabler," 
Arm or 114, no. 2  ( 2 0 0 5 ) ,  http://www.angelfire.com/art2/narod/armour_urban_terrain_iraq/.]
The space presented in these tactics is subtly different to that indicated in NCW. 
Where NCW allows for the coordinated distribution of forces through  the battlespace, 
allowing commanders to avoid massing force, and utilising overwhelming speed of
376 Chiarelli et al., "Armor in Urban Terrain."
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action that defies limits of remoteness, this space relies on a deliberate massing of 
physical objects (tanks in box formation, for example) and the deliberate creation of 
internal ‘safe’ spaces through spatial configuration. In Baghdad convoys were the 
name of the game. These are hardly the infinitely mobile units depicted in some of the 
more imaginative accounts of NCW .377 Yet this is not a linear form of movement with 
the sequential domination of demarcated space. Rather, the “standoff” discussed is a 
form of movement that is perhaps reminiscent of the Israeli Defence Forces discussed 
in Chapter One, which attempted to gain absolute movement (to sm ooth space) 
through a seem ingly paradoxical waiting game.
F i g u r e  5 . US tanks moving in ‘traditional’ formation through Sadr City (Baghdad). [Courtesy 
of Google Earth (2006)].
377 in fact, at some points NCW proponents have been actively hostile to increased use of heavy armour 
in combat. Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, the late head of the Office of Force Transformation, has said 
that, even in the context of OIF, he tends to “come down more on the speed and information side” over 
the value of armour:
I look a t th ese  m arvellous navy a n d  a ir force m un itions an d  w hat they  do to  arm our. I look a t w hat o ne o f our 
ow n tan k  ro u n d s  does to  everyone e lse ’s a rm o u r in  th e  w orld. The no tion  th a t steel p ro tec ts  ju s t  does no t seem  
to  be th e re  because  it does n o t p ro tec t in the  absolu te .
Cebrowski, cited, Frederick W. Kagan, "War and Aftermath," Policy Review  120 (2003): 3 -
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Looking at the history of the US Army’s engagement in Baghdad, there are 
behaviours which both smooth and  striate space, and, in particular, which respond to 
the dynamics of either urban warfare or Network-Centric Warfare -  or both. For 
example, the 3 rd Infantry Division’s Thunder Runs on the 5th and 8th of April, 2003  
were classic examples of NCW in operation. Charging through the streets of Baghdad, 
with no territorial objective in mind other than to see whether it could be done, 3 lD ’s 
tanks shifted the centre of gravity of the fight for Baghdad through speed of action 
alone.378 Never mind that, in reality, the American troops were terrified of the way in 
which they were cut off from their support base, bloodied from fierce fighting, and 
only able to stay in Baghdad for only a single night, the image of tanks moving 
through the city seemingly at will was sufficient to make the Hussein regime’s 
pronouncem ents of the successful defence of Iraq seem far-fetched, even hysterical.
We see here that “networked forces that operate with increased speed and 
synchronization are capable of achieving massed effects, in many situations, without 
the physical massing of forces required in the past.”379 Yet this “absolute state of a 
moving body occupying  a smooth space” is only one of the spatialising practices of 
the US military.380 One might alternatively point to the extensive use of roadblocks to 
check and control the circulation of the city as indicative of a certain striating 
tendency -  one that has sadly been adopted with enthusiasm by neighbourhood 
militias and death squads. Further, the use of night-time curfews, now common in 
Baghdad, illustrates the US m ilitaiy’s implication in the domination and
378 For a detailed account of the Thunder Runs, 3lD’s luck in navigating them so successfully, and the 
haphazard way in which they turned into symbols of the fall of Baghdad, see, Michael Gordon and 
Bernard Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story o f  the Invasion and Occupation o f  Iraq (London: Atlantic 
Books, 2006), Chapters 19 and 20.
379 vice Admiral Cebrowski (ret.), in, Office of Force Transformation (OFT), The Implementation o f  
NCW, ii.
380 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia Vol. 2 
(London: Continuum, 2004), 426 (emphasis added).
156
subordination of rhythms of the city, altering the very fabric of lived time in the city 
through counting and measuring it.381
These brief examples indicate the multiplicity of spatialising practices in place in 
Baghdad. Despite attempts by critical theorists and military analysts alike to seek one 
governing discourse, one ‘style’ of American war, on which to pin disapproval of (or 
disappointm ent in) the Iraqi venture, there is no singularity of battlespace. Rather, 
many different kinds of battlespace are implicated in many different kinds of US 
military enactions of violence. Sometimes these respond in simple ways to the 
spatialities constructed through military concepts, although more often they do not. 
The following chapter addresses the multiplicity of the battlespace, not in terms of the 
multiple kinds of battlespaces enacted in Baghdad, but rather in terms of how  the US 
military addresses that multiplicity. As one of the most significant features of the US 
military enterprise in Iraq has been the US military’s acknowledgement of the 
multiplicity, mess, and complexity of the situation, it is possible to see its attempt to 
organise multiplicity as an attempt to operationalise the alternative real outlined 
previously.
381 For a discussion of the impact of the curfew on everyday life in Baghdad, see, Sahira Rasheed, 
"Midwives Risk Baghdad Curfew" (Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 2005), 
http://www.iwpr.net/?p_icr&s=f&o=2 5 4 0 i7 &apc_state=heniicr2 0 0 5 .
CHAPTER THREE 
CPOF: commanding the future
Locating spatial practices o f violence in Baghdad
This thesis began by asserting that it is possible to explore violence as an 
experimental and productive force. The first chapter argued that, to explore violence 
in this way, it is necessary to get ‘below’ the over-determined level of strategy, where 
violence is apparently instrumentalised by (political) agency or structural 
configuration, and ‘above’ the level of the supposed anarchy of the moment of 
combat. Rather, the chapter suggested that it is possible to witness in the spatialising  
practices  of violence (particularly in the everyday practices of violence) the 
emergence of novel and competing modes of ordering violence. The nexus between 
(open formations of) violence and space was explored through the work of Foucault, 
in which spatial orderings of violence are historically contingent arrangements of 
decentred subjects and objects (although, in practice, Foucault’s assessment tends to 
affix practices of violence to rigid configurations of power/knowledge/space); 
through the work of Lefebvre, in which the relationality of Foucault’s understanding 
of space is given real flexibility by including the openness of everyday rhythms to
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repetition and  change; and through the work of Deleuze and Guattari, in which the 
differentiating (vitalist) operation of spatialising assemblages is shown to be 
intimately related to shifting ‘kinds’ of violence.
Taking these insights as a starting point, the rest of this thesis looks to the city of 
Baghdad to illustrate how the US military engaged in hybridised and experimental 
behaviour. Specifically, this thesis argues that the spatial practices of violence in 
Baghdad are a figure of a truly ‘new’ security problematic that is not easily confined 
within the “geo-mythography” of contemporary security debates, but which instead is 
related to the US military’s self-reflexive response to a multiple, slippery, and 
uncertain real.382
This chapter outlines the qualitative study on which this thesis is based, 
exploring 1st Cavalry Division’s use of a new command and control technology, 
Command Post of the Future (CPOF, pronounced ‘c-pof). The study consists of 
interviews carried out with returned soldiers from 1st Cavalry who had been operating 
in Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom Phase II (OIF-II, the phase immediately 
after the invasion, that lasted roughly from April 2004 to April 2005). These 
interviews, undertaken at the Cavaliy’s hom e base of Fort Hood, Texas during June 
2005 (about two months after the Division’s return from deployment), took place at 
nearly every level throughout the Division, from senior members of the Commanding 
General’s staff in the Divisional Headquarters, through to enlisted men who worked 
in Battalion-level Tactical Operations Centres (TOCs). All of the interviewees worked 
in som e way with CPOF.383 The interviews also encompassed the civilian contractors 
supporting CPOF who deployed with 1st Cavalry to Baghdad to troubleshoot the new
3 8 2  por a discussion of the role of “geo-mythography” in shaping contemporary security discourse, see, 
Mitchell Dean, "A Political Mythology of World Order: Carl Schmitt’s Nomos," Theory, Culture & Society 
23, no. 5 (2006): 3.
3 8 3  For a summary of the structure of US Army Divisions, see Figure 10.
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system. These contractors had the advantage of having seen CPOF as used by the 
Cavalry s replacement force, 3 rd Infantry Division, after 1st Cavalry5s return home in 
2005, providing them with insight into alternative modes of using the technology. 
These interviews were supplemented by observation of 4th Infantry Division (with 
whom  1st Cavalry share Fort Hood) using CPOF in a simulated Iraq-style 
environment, as well as observation of classes of new soldiers from both 1st Cavalry 
and 4th Infantry Division learning to use the technology.
1st Cavalry Division is one the US Army's premier Divisions (one of two so-called 
Digital Divisions), and as such, offers an excellent location from which to study the 
novelty of the ways in which the US Army has engaged the complex situation in 
Baghdad. Its situation, however, should not be over-generalised. 1st Cavalry entered 
the war at a precarious stage, and its experience in Baghdad is far from a ‘universal5 
experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Briefly put, when the Cavalry arrived in 
April 2004  the US military had effectively destroyed the Baathist regime, and was 
facing only the early stages of an insurgency which was undefined in its scope and 
ambitions. Parts of the insurgency derived from the (ethnically Sunni but secularly 
motivated) irregular forces, or Fedayeen, established by Saddam Hussein’s regime as 
a form of civil defence; parts were inspired by a Sunni religious jihad, including those 
mujahadeen led by al-Qaeda. In Sadr City, meanwhile, an explicitly religious, but at 
this stage still ostensibly ‘patriotic5 and ‘nationalistic5 Shi’ite militia, the Mahdi Army, 
began resisting the American occupation just as 1st Cavalry assumed command.384 
While it was a very dangerous time to be a Westerner on the streets of Baghdad (at 
least outside of the Green Zone), there were some signs of a ‘normal5 Iraqi life 
resuming in the city proper. Politically, during this period, the Coalition Provisional
384 For more details of the early composition of the insurgency in Iraq, see, Michael Gordon and Bernard
Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story o f the Invasion and Occupation o f Iraq (London: Atlantic Books,
2006), Chapters 13-24. For an intimate study of 1st Cavalry’s first engagement in Sadr City, see, Martha
Raddatz, The Long Road Home: A Story o f  War and Family (New York, NY: GP Putnam’s Sons, 2007).
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Authority transitioned sovereignty to an unelected Iraqi government on 29th June, 
2004 , and elections to determine the country’s constitution (and subsequent 
democratic future) were held in November of that year. There were high hopes that a 
democratically elected, publicly legitimate government would be able to stem the 
insurgency. Funds for reconstruction, however, continued to be disbursed largely 
through US military as well as international civilian agencies.
Importantly, none of the concerns that dominate discussion of Iraq (and 
particularly Baghdad) today -  the likelihood of civil war; the formation of rival Shi’ite 
and Sunni militias (death squads); the dramatically escalating nature and number of 
deliberately targeted attacks against civilians; the Parliament’s inability to form a 
stable (and united) government; interference by Iran and Syria; mass refugee flows; 
and the possibility of Iraq becoming a failed state -  were dominant in discussion of 
Iraq at the time. In other words, while it was certainly bloody, the situation did not 
yet seem  as intractably insoluble as it does today (see, in particular, Figure y).385 1st 
Cavalry’s form of engagement with Baghdad during this period took a very different 
form to that taken on its return to Iraq in August 2006.
Further, CPOF is a small technology and does not contain the entire of 1st 
Cavalry’s experience of Baghdad. It does not, for example, address important issues 
such as patrol tactics, taking and dealing with prisoners, and the training of the Iraqi 
National Guard. It is a technology that is confined to command posts, and does not 
(explicitly) travel to and with the soldiers on the street. However, CPOF’s form as a 
command and control technology opens it onto a world of spatial practice that is 
largely ignored by doctrine or concepts of war. Doctrine dictates spatial orderings by
3®5 Raddatz, for example, notes that when 1st Cavalry soldiers deployed they believed that in Baghdad 
they would be engaged in no worse than robust peacekeeping. See, Raddatz, The Long Road Home, 32-
3 5 -
l6l
producing knowledge about the battlespace in the abstract (knowledge about a 
generic battlespace, a generic enemy), which is then routinised through tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (TTPs). In this, Foucault’s discussion of dressage 
explored in Chapter One of this thesis is a discussion of doctrine, emphasising as it 
does the routine and pre-determined activities of the 18th-century military. 
Command, on the other hand, is implicated in spatial orderings through its 
involvement in the production and organisation of a flow of knowledge about the 
battlespace in specific. To study command practices, then, is to produce an everyday 
praxiography of power/knowledge/space regarding the battlespace, and one that does 
not overly circumscribe the similitude of the repetition of the everyday.
F ig u r e  6 . Average daily 
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This chapter and the following address how CPOF not only is a part of the US 
military s attempt to operationalise an uncertain and slippery real, but also is implicated 
in creating the conditions by which that real escapes the US military’s grasp. In 
particular, this chapter and the following explore the consequences of operationalising 
multiplicity. How does an institution such as the Army produce multiplicity? How does it 
organise it once it is produced? What happens to the way the Army operates if 
multiplicity is allowed to exist -  or is even encouraged? Answering these questions 
indicates that in Baghdad the US military is configuring spaces of violence in new and 
creative ways.
Using CPOF (1): the hardware and software architecture
Command Post of the Future (CPOF) is a command and control tool used at 
Divisional headquarters and Tactical Operations Centers (TOCs) throughout a 
division.386 It is designed to provide a Common Operating Picture (COP) of the 
battlespace to users and commanders, and to enable collaborative planning between 
physically remote locations. In some ways its predecessors are the maps pinned to walls 
and covered in acetate overlays that have been a common feature of pre-digital 
headquarters for the last century. In other ways (and particularly because of its 
communication and collaboration capabilities) it is an entirely new technology.
The CPOF command and control (C2) software and hardware suite was developed by 
the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and deployed brand-new and 
untested with 1st Cavalry on their rotation into Baghdad in 2004. The CPOF system
386 a  Tactical Operations Center is a Command Post at the lower levels of the military hierarchy, or, as 
defined by Joint Doctrine:
A physical groupment of those elements of a general and special staff concerned with the current tactical operations
and the tactical support thereof. Also called TOC. See also command post.
Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Department o f  Defense Dictionary o f M ilitary 
and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2002), 434 (emphasis original).
consists of a series of workstations deployed throughout the Division in Divisional 
headquarters and Brigade TOCs and also deployed down to som e Battalion TOCs (see 
Figure 10 for details of US Army structure).387 1st Cavalry operated around 75 CPOF units 
in OIF II, although these were often deployed two or more to a command post. Each 
workstation comprises three flat-screen computer displays arrayed on a desktop with an 
ordinary computer hard drive attached. These are connected to a network server, often 
kept in an adjacent room, that comprises a series of large, washing machine-sized, 
unfriendly-looking boxes.
The network server’s job is to maintain the data within CPOF in a ‘liquid format’ in a 
database, and to share this liquid data with other CPOF stations. According to DARPA:
Liquid Information allows the data itself to be separate from the viewing space. This enables the 
commander to put that data into a number of different displays. In this way, the data becomes modular 
in that it can be moved and viewed in a number of different ways, depending on the display chosen.388
This ‘liquefaction’ of information resonated with the phenomenon of 
informationalisation, noted briefly in the Interlude, where information is treated as an 
ontological category -  and an ordering force -  in its own right that operates in ways that 
are entirely independent of its representative or material context.38^  A direct consequence 
of this information architecture is that data presented on CPOF is “live” -  when it is
387 The US Army is currently transitioning to a “modular” structure, whereby the traditional Brigade is being 
replaced by the BCT (Brigade Combat Team). BCTs will no longer be as firmly attached to the Divisional 
structure, through the placement of key auxiliary functions within their structure, increasing their self- 
sufficiency and thereby enhancing their rapid deployability. While 1st Cavalry is technically participating in 
this process, the terminology used by interviewees, not to mention the building names and signposts to find 
interviewees, remains Brigade (Bde). As a result, this is the terminology adopted by this thesis. For more on 
modularity, see, http://www.army.mil/modularforces/.
388 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), "Command Post of the Future" (2005), 
http://dtsn.darpa.mil/ixo/programs.asp?id=n.
3 8 9  For a discussion of how this definition of information came to have priority in the field of computer 
science, as well as an exploration of the different ontological implications of competing definitions, see, N. 
Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1 9 9 9 )> Chapter Two.
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changed on the screen in one context it is simultaneously changed e v e r y w h e r e . 39°  The 
CPOF system also included a large projection screen which sat at the front of the Tactical 
Operations Center, onto which the CPOF display was projected.
Sourcing in formation for CPOF
Data for CPOF is received in two ways: via direct inputs by the CPOF user, and via 
the continuous passive reception of information from the Army’s latest generation 
command and control technology suite, Army Battle Command System (ABCS).39* ABCS 
is itself an amalgamation of a number of C2 systems, discussed in Figure 8.
As these C2 technologies are deployed to different levels within the Division, the 
granularity of information differs from source to source. CPOF does not replace ABCS as 
the primary interface for these C2 systems: indeed, at the time at which CPOF was being 
used by 1st Cavaliy, information placed on CPOF did not feed back into the ABCS system. 
This highlights the intended use of CPOF: CPOF enables a broad (generally operational 
level) visualisation of, and general communication through, the battlespace, and was not 
intended to be a tool to enable tactical level management. Despite CPOF’s centrality in 
terms of the placement of the system within the TOC, within that headquarters there 
would be users working on any number of the component systems of ABCS in a stand­
alone format.
3 9 0  MAYA Viz, "Command Post of the Future Project" (2003),
http://www.mayaviz.com/web/industries/military/industry_mil_darpa_cpof.mtml, 9.
391 On this first deployment, CPOF was using ABCS 6.3.6 (on the following deployment it was upgraded to 
ABCS 6.4).
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SYSTEM NAME  
BFT/FBCB2
(Blue Force T racke r /  
Force XXI Battle 




AS AS (All Source 
Analysis Systems)
AFATDS (Advanced 
Field Artillery Tactical 
Data System)
AMDWS (Air and  
Missile D efense  Work 
Stations)
CSSCS (Com bat 
Service S upport  
C o m p u te r  System)
SYSTEM FUNCTION
Autom atic  location of  friendly units (blue 
forces) on a geograph ic  information system 
(CIS, or a digital map) via GPS (Global 
Positioning System) em itte r  and receiver.
BFT is the unclassified version (because of 
the  satellite used to t ransm it  the 
information), while FBCB2 is the  classified 
version.
This system  includes a capability for anyone 
with an em itte r  to place enem y locations on 
the  map.
A general C2 tool,  allowing C2 overlays on 
a digital m ap  (useful for planning), and 
incorporating  general situational aw areness  
(including enemy, or red force, locations).
A general intelligence collation and 
in terpre ta t ion  system  for intelligence, 
ta rge t  deve lopm ent and ta rge t  
identification.
A tool for o rganising fire support ,  including 
visualising artillery d a ta  (such as locations
of hostile fire). ______




(*This m eans  th a t  units 
from the  Bn down have 
both em itte rs  and  
receivers. At the  tim e of 
interview this was true  
only of the  Digitised 
Divisions, 1st Cav and 4 th 
ID)
Corps (down to) 
Battalion
Division (down to) 
Brigade
Corps (down to) Platoon
Air Defense Artillery 
Battalion (down)
Division (down to) 
Brigade
F ig u r e  8 . C om ponents o f  th e  Arm y Battle Com m and System , including th e levels at w hich  each  
system  is  deployed. [Adapted from US Army PEO STRI, “Army Tactical Command & Control Systems,” 
(2004) http://www.peostri.army.mil/PRODUCTS/ABCS/atccs.jsp.]
The CPOF screens: using CPOF
The three screens of each CPOF workstation, what people usually call the CPOF, 
materialised Liquid Information from ABCS and user inputs for the commander’s 
benefit.393 The software design of CPOF largely determines the presentation of this data, 
but users have the ability to tweak their display further.
392 This refers to the deployed levels of the original ABCS component systems, which gives a sense of the 
granularity of the information provided in any given system. A system deployed to platoon level, for example, 
has much greater granularity than one deployed to Brigade level.
393 it is technically inaccurate to refer to the workstations themselves as CPOF, as it is only when the 
workstations form an integrated network that they gain functionality.
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Each of the three screens has a specific function, as well as allowing access to usual 
functions associated with the Windows platform (internet access, email, word processing, 
PowerPoint). For a sense of the layout of the central and right-hand screens, see Figure 9.
The far left screen
This screen is ostensibly dedicated to Oculus, a three-dimensional topographic 
visualisation tool that allows a user to fully tilt and rotate an image of a specified area 
(often at quite high levels of resolution). This is useful for determining whether, for 
example, tanks will be able to navigate berms, such as those that are common along the 
edge of the canals that run through Baghdad, or angles of potential sniper fire. However, 
Oculus is veiy  processor-intensive and slows other programmes when running, such that 
1st Cavaliy users (with the exception of the Aviation Brigade -  4th Brigade) were reluctant 
to use it, leaving the left-hand screen free for usual work functions (email, PowerPoint, 
and so on). (Oculus is not shown in Figure 9.)
The central screen
This is where the visualisation enabling the immediate command and control of a 
TOC’s area of operations takes place. The screen consists of a two-dimensional map (with 
clickable zoom down to a detailed level of satellite imagery of the area, rather like Google 
Earth), which is usually focused on the user’s Area of Operations (AO). The satellite 
imagery forming the basis of this map is updated three to four times a month. Located on 
this map are icons known as PLIs (Position Location Identifiers), which mark the known 
location of blue forces and known/suspected red force locations, either from a direct feed 
from BFT/FBCB2 through ABCS, or as inputted manually by the user. The legend for 
these icons is given in a side window that shows the PLI count, as well as information 
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Also on the map are ‘event’ icons, chosen and dropped on the screen by the user 
from a narrow toolbar to the right-hand side of the map itself. Icons are designed to 
easily convey their distinct category of meaning (enemy fire, friendly dead, hijacking, 
and so on). Further, as they are placed there is an opportunity to attach extra 
information that is accessible through clicking on the icon. Finally, there are two 
small toolbars containing drawing tools -  basic shapes, lines, colours, an area 
highlighter and so on -  that allow the user to configure areas for display, either for 
short periods of time or permanently. These are particularly used when planning, or 
when in conference with other users watching your map on their screens.
In addition to strictly topographic depictions of the AO, users can choose from  
overlays that indicate social and cultural aspects of the city, such as ethnic population 
densities, mosque locations, or even density of incidents (some of these overlays may 
be available through the ABCS, while others have to be created by a user -  often a 
tim e-consum ing and laborious process).
It is usual to create more than one map, emphasising different scales, features, or 
areas, and to flick between them using tabs akin to those available on some internet 
browsing software. These are visible in green on the screen displayed above.
Finally, on the middle screen, there is a separate, non-geographic piece of 
software that is bundled together with the Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to 
enhance CPOF’s effectiveness (this is not shown in Figure 9). This is the Ventrilo 
VO/IP (voice over internet protocol) software, that operates as a hybrid between a 
radio and an instant message chat room. Here, each user is attached to the computer 
via a headset akin to hands-free devices used by mobile phone users, and using 
Ventrilo they can speak to other CPOF users. Depending on your rank and the 
location from which you are working, you have access to particular chat rooms (which
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look just like instant message chat rooms — a list of names under a heading, each of 
whom  can hear everything you say). The small Ventrilo window lists chat rooms 
available, shows who is present in a chat room at any given time, and provides a 
couple of spare chat rooms for private or extraneous conversation. Users with 
sufficient privileges can also exclude other users from chat rooms. In some cases, the 
clarity of the VO/IP format meant that Ventrilo replaced other forms of audio 
communication between TOCs altogether.
The right-hand screen
This is the shared view area, where collaborative planning and the dissemination
of commander’s intent take place (see the right-hand side of Figure 9). This area has 
tabs for each of the maps being utilised by other CPOF users. CPOF was distributed to 
enable communication between Division and Brigade level, with some Brigades also 
having access to sufficient CPOFs to be able to distribute them down to Battalion level 
(a luxury that would become standard when 3rd ID replaced 1st Cavalry in Baghdad). 
Hence for 1st Cavalry there were, at any given time, at the very least six to nine shared 
‘pasteboards’ from which a viewer might choose, and usually more.
Users of pasteboards, depending on their privileges, can alter and update other 
people’s screens with their own information. For example, this happens if a TOC 
wishes to resolve conflicting information regarding their Area of Operations (AO). 
Privileges are granted by the creator of the pasteboard, often after a request from the 
other party via Ventrilo. Alternatively, a user (with or without privileges) can clone a 
window into their central screen and alter it for their own use, creating a new  
pasteboard.
It is this ability to share information that is coordinated in both content and 
(re)presentation that allows a key feature of CPOF: the vastly increased ease of
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(digital) communication between the command levels of the Division. For example, 
each day for 1st Cavalry in Baghdad began with a briefing by the Commanding 
General, the Commander’s Update Briefing, in which the commanders of each of the 
Brigades would conference with General Chiarelli. Such briefings were hosted by the 
Division HQ on a CPOF screen, with Brigade level commanders monitoring the 
Division’s presentation via CPOF. Previously, such meetings would have required 
physical travel across hostile territory, wasting commanders’ valuable time and/or 
scarce airlift resources.
At a lower level, the ability to act as a central repository of information 
(information about events reported on the radio, via email, even information gleaned 
from the ubiquitous CNN) saw CPOF act as an interface for much of the flow of 
information up the chain of command. It also acted as a valuable tool for horizontal 
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F ig u r e  i o . US Arm y organisation chart. [Adapted from US Army, “Operational Unit Diagram,” (no
date) http://www.army.mil/organization/unitdiagram.html.]
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Introducing m ultiplicity (in theory, in the TOC)
The previous chapter argued that there is multiplicity where the real is 
understood as emerging from practice. As Annemarie Mol notes, if subjects and 
objects are viewed as contingent assemblages, or enactions, then what it means to 
exist, (to be) alters.
Somewhere along the way the meaning of the word ‘is’ has changed. Dramatically. This is what the 
change implies: the new ‘is’ is one that is situated. It doesn’t say what atherosclerosis is by nature, 
everywhere. It doesn’t say what it is in and of itself, for nothing ever ‘is’ alone. To be is to be related. 
The new talk about what is does not bracket the practicalities involved in enacting reality....
The praxiographic ‘is’ is not universal, it is local. It requires a spatial specification. In this 
ontological genre, a sentence that tells what atherosclerosis is, is to be supplemented with another 
one that reveals where this is the c a s e .394
This chapter discusses the praxiographic ‘is’ of the battlespace. As in Mol’s analysis, 
this praxiographic ‘is’ is multiple: the battlespace is enacted at different sites, 
according to different organising principles, responding to different textures of the 
world. This opens many fronts for analysis, and this chapter explores just one. 
Specifically, this chapter discusses how it is possible for CPOF to enact multiple 
battlespaces at all.
There are some initial problems associated with viewing the battlespace as 
multiple. As in Mol’s analysis of atherosclerosis, the battlespace is a hidden 
phenom enon that can only be accessed indirectly. Only here, this hidden thing is not 
accessed through blood pressure readings or patients’ complaints about walking, but 
through pictures of the battlespace garnered through intelligence, surveillance, and
394 Annemarie Mol, The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2002), 54 (emphasis original).
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reconnaissance (ISR), or through situation reports (SITREPs) from troops on the 
ground. W hen the subject of analysis is hidden, there is a temptation to analyse the 
various enactions of the battlespace as though they were simply different 
representations of a single ‘real’ battlespace, as though there were an underlying 
reality to which alternative representations do a lesser or greater degree of justice. In 
the case of atherosclerosis, this underlying reality is often argued to be thickened 
walls of arteries, which cause pain on walking. Yet, as Mol shows so effectively, 
thickened arteries are not what organises the clinical structure of the treatment of 
atherosclerosis -  such arteries are not screened for in the manner of mass screenings 
for cervical cancer; rather, it is pain-on-walking that forms a condition of possibility 
for the enaction of atherosclerosis in the clinical setting.395 To think of thickened 
arteries as the underlying reality of atherosclerosis is to ignore the way in which 
multiple enactions of atherosclerosis (including, but not limited to thickened arteries 
as enacted in the pa th o logy lab  -  but nowhere else, except textbooks) play roles in 
disrupting and re-casting the ordering of the ‘real’ of atherosclerosis.
Similarly, the battlespace is not the underlying reality of friendly soldiers making 
contact with enem y soldiers. Such a battlespace exists, certainly, but it is 
distinguishable from other enactions that have discrete, and often contradictory, 
impacts on the ‘real’ of the battlespace. For example, 1st Cavalry’s focus on pursuing 
multiple “lines of operation” (LOOs) enacts a variety of battlespaces relating to 
different organising principles (economic, institutional, infrastructural).396 These 
battlespaces have varying scales of operation, different targets of intervention, and 
even different criteria for their successful navigation. Acknowledging the multiple 
nature of battlespaces is particularly relevant given the expanded definition of
395 Mol, The Body Multiple, 46-48.
396 Maj. Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli and Maj. Patrick R. Michaelis, "Winning the Peace: The Requirement for 
Full Spectrum Operations," M ilitary Review  July-August (2005): 7 *
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‘battlespace’ discussed above, which can be seen as part of the US m ilitaiy’s attempt 
to articulate and therefore control a real operating in more registers than previously 
imagined. This thesis, then, does not view ‘boots on the ground’ as the authentic 
perspective of war. Although it is true that soldiers at the lowest levels often have a 
more highly textured understanding of the battlespace in terms of ‘civilian’ 
geographies (for example, they are more likely to be aware of the impact of US patrol 
tactics on the everyday driving practices of people living in Baghdad), it is also true 
that they ‘m iss’ a lot of the textures that inflect the battlespace. These textures are (to 
paraphrase Mol) the battlespace multiple.
As Mol points out, however, “blow up a few details of any site and immediately it 
turns into m any.”397 To treat each enaction of the battlespace as singular is itself a 
simplification.
The atherosclerosis enacted in the outpatient clinic contrasts with the thick vessel wall that can be 
observed through a microscope. But the outpatient clinic is no natural unity. It forms a unity in 
contrast to pathology. When it is approached a little more closely, the clinic appears to be full of 
contrasts that, in their turn, may be singled out for further investigation. The clinic is not a single
s ite .398
The rest of this thesis explores the enaction of the battlespace through CPOF, treating 
CPOF as both  a unified site for the enaction of the battlespace in contrast to 
alternative enactions of the battlespace at different sites and  as a site in which 
multiple enactions of the battlespace are brought into messy correlation. Both of 
these aspects help illustrate the ways in which the US military has become implicated 
in the production of, and coordination of, an uncertain real.
397 Mol, The Body Multiple, 51.
398 Mol, The Body Multiple, 50-51 (emphasis original).
174
It is, however, the role of CPOF in correlating multiple battlespaces that forms 
the emphasis of this chapter and the next. Specifically, the rest of this chapter 
explores the complicated relation of multiplicity and singularity in CPOF. In so doing, 
it illustrates the way in which 1st Cavalry operationalised the idea of a messy real in its 
engagement in Baghdad, and, as a result, possibilised new and creative spatial 
practices of violence.
Using CPOF (2): the human dimension
CPOF was deployed to Baghdad almost brand new with 1st Cavaliy, which had 
veiy  little tim e to establish routine protocols regarding its use. The use of the system  
evolved instead through the practical constraints of what could be achieved with 
lim ited personnel, along with imitation and adaptation of the ‘best practices’ of other 
users. Thus, by the end of the Cavalry’s deployment there was a certain regularity 
involved in its use, albeit of an ad hoc and malleable kind. The following is a 
description of the generic set-up of CPOF’s use, although it is important to remember 
that this generic operation was neither homogenous through the Division nor carried 
over to 3rd Infantiy Division, which followed 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad.3"
On arrival in Baghdad, commanders were faced with a decision regarding who 
would use the system. This decision was significant in establishing not only how  the 
system would be used but also the priority its enaction of the battlespace would be 
given within the Tactical Operations Centre (TOC). For example, a number of 
interviewees mentioned that the 5th Brigade did not have an officer working the 
system, an indication that the system was a low priority in the operation of the TOC. 
That was, however, unusual as the Commanding General had made it clear that he
399 it is for this reason that almost all descriptions of CPOF, following, are phrased in the past tense. It 
acts as a reminder of the specificity (historicity) of their application.
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expected the system to be used to its fullest extent. In the words of one interviewee, 
“If it wasn’t on CPOF then General Chiarelli wasn’t interested.”
As a computer interface with fully functional Windows facilities, CPOF tended to 
end up as a workstation in its own right, ‘owned’ by particular users in the TOC.
There were usually two users of the CPOF: a ‘battle captain’ (usually a captain, but 
som etim es a first lieutenant) and a supporting non-commissioned officer (NCO). The 
battle captain is a specialised position in command staffs that is held by a junior 
captain (usually with no experience of direct command of a company) who is 
responsible for tracking and monitoring all information coming into and emerging 
from the TOC.400 This includes monitoring compliance with orders, paying attention 
to the progress of action toward plans, and making sure that all units under the TOC’s 
direction are given consistent information. The battle captain is not an active 
decision-maker, but acts as a centralised information point for the commanding 
officer and his chief of staff.401 Information is reported to the battle captain vertically 
from units below and command levels above via radio, telephone, and sometimes 
email, and horizontally from specialised areas within the TOC such as intelligence or 
fire support, as well as from remote sensing apparatuses and TV news images. As a 
result of the significance of this position in coordinating information (the bread and 
butter of the TOC), the battle captain, the supporting NCO, and the CPOF were 
usually situated centrally within the TOC, often directly behind the commanding 
officer (see Figure 11).
400 For a detailed description of the role of the battle captain, and the problems with its contemporary 
use in the US Army, see, Capt. Marcus Oliviera, "What Now, Battle Captain? The Who, What and How of 
the Job on Nobody’s Books, But Found in Every Unit’s TOC," Combat Training Center Quarterly 
Bulletin 2nd Qtr (1995),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_2qfy95_ctcchap1.htm.
401 All interviewees at 1st Cavalry were men (as were all relevant commanders in the Division), and thus 
the male pronoun will be used throughout this thesis.
176
Usually, CPOF ended up being the primary focus of the battle captain’s day-to- 
day existence. This is not to say that CPOF usage replaced the previous functions of 
his position in the TOC, rather that CPOF dovetailed easily into his existing workload. 
Users generally were physically situated at or next to the CPOF, and utilised CPOF’s 
tools in addition to or to carry out their usual workload. Sometimes CPOF 
functionality reduced other types of work -  for example, it was commonly noted that 
radio traffic between the Brigade and Divisional level was reduced as a result of the 
Ventrilo software (it being a clearer audio signal and a more intuitive format). This 
doubling up of functionality (email was also accessed through the CPOF screen) 
ensured that CPOF was generally well attended in the TOC.
Screen of CNN Screen of MAP 
OF CPOF
Screen of UAV 
or BFT/FBCB2
(O (0z z
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F i g u r e  11. Diagram o f positioning o f CPOF and battle captain within TOC of 1st Bde, 1st CD, 
showing communication lines into and som e functions of battle captain and assisting  
NCO. (Diagram by author).
177
Additionally, the main screen of CPOF acted as a focal point for the TOC more 
generally. Generally, large screens at the front of the TOC displayed three things: 
CNN on the first; the CPOF screen being used by the battle captain on a second; and 
possibly a direct feed from either an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or from  
BFT/FBCB2 (see Figure 8) on the third.
The battle captain’s stated purpose is to compile a picture of the battlespace to 
present to the commanding officer while excluding matters that are too insignificant 
to dem and high-level command attention. However, the picture presented on CPOF 
was far from the unified picture implied by this description. It was, in fact, a nuanced 
and complex series of different versions of the battlespace. The multiple versions of 
the battlespace presented in the CPOF came from two sources: the incorporation of 
other users’ constantly changing CPOF maps, and the multiple maps from which a 
single user operated at any given time. In fact, the only time when the CPOF came 
close to presenting a unified picture was twice a day at Commander’s Update 
Briefings, when all users were focused on a single map at a time (although even 
during this, users confessed to flicking through other maps to keep track of force 
m ovem ents and the like, while simultaneously watching the posting on the 
collaborative screen).
These multiple maps enabled a diverse range of spatialising practices to be 
presented to the TOC. For example, a user might have a map devoted to charting the 
sewerage system reconstruction of a particular area, while another might detail the 
information collection facilities being used to monitor the battlespace (locations of 
hidden and visible cameras, for example), while still another might chart IED
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placem ents along major routes over a period of time.4°2 Given General Chiarelli’s 
campaign plan that called for the simultaneous pursuit of the five lines of operation 
m entioned previously (combat operations, training security forces, providing 
essential services, promoting indigenous governance, encouraging economic 
pluralism), multiple use was not only possible but necessary.4°3 The battle captain, 
then, had a function that was not really to compile a single picture of the battlespace 
on CPOF, but to compile many such pictures, and present them as appropriate to the 
commanding officer. (See Figures 12 and 13, below, for a sense of the kind of multiple 
trackings made possible by the system.)
The rest of this chapter explores whether this multiplicity is, in fact, ontological 
multiplicity and, if so, the implications that flow from this. Multiplicity, to recap, is
1
not to be confused with a multiplicity of ‘perspectives on’ an external reality. Rather, 
as suggested by John Law, instead of thinking about how multiple perspectives 
emerge from a single ‘real,’ it might be useful to think of how these different versions 
} are implicated in the enaction of a supposedly singular object. Thus in relation to
divergent accounts of a single defence procurement decision, Law argues:
There is also the alternative multiple possibility, the proposal made by Mol. This is that the 
different participants were making different decisions, and that they simply thought they were 
making a single decision. Then, somehow or other, they co-ordinated themselves. Imagined
4°2 The author has seen screen shots from CPOF for each of these examples from 1st Cavalry’s 
deployment in Baghdad.
4°3 jn describing his campaign plan, Chiarelli notes:
What became clear to the task force during mission analysis and mission preparation was that to achieve the 
operational goal the task force had to simultaneously work along all five equally balanced, interconnected lines 
of operations. What also became clear was that the traditional phased approach, grounded in U.S. doctrine, 
might not be the answer; rather, an event-driven “transitional” approach might be more appropriate based on a 
robust set of metrics and analysis.
Chiarelli et al., "Winning the Peace," 7.
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themselves to be making the same decision. Displaced the possible difference, kept them apart. 
Perhaps we might call this ‘virtual singularity.’4°4
Ontological singularity and m ultiplicity in CPOF
This section contrasts the seemingly singular informational basis of the system  
with its m essy and multiple enaction in practice.405 It establishes that 1st Cavaliy’s 
intervention in Baghdad was premised on an engagement of its many faces.
Liquid Information and ontological singularity
CPOF’s functioning is premised on the notion of Liquid Information. To repeat 
from above:
Liquid Information allows the data itself to be separate from the viewing space. This enables the 
commander to put that data into a number of different displays. In this way, the data becomes 
modular in that it can be moved and viewed in a number of different ways, depending on the 
display chosen.^06
This assumption of the essential fungibility of informational inputs and informational 
displays is related to the phenomenon of informationalisation.40? In particular, the 
CPOF system relies on ‘liquefied’ information -  information unmoored from its point 
of origin and insertion in the data stream which flows rapidly and easily, avoiding the 
friction attendant to alternative knowledge systems that require the context of 
information to accompany its content.408 This liquefaction is achieved through the
4°4 John Law, A fter Method: Mess in Social Science Research (London: Routledge, 2004), 58 (emphasis 
original).
4 0 5  Here, multiplicity refers to the possibility of enacting different (not necessarily compatible or 
coherent) textures of the battlespace.
4°6 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), "Command Post of the Future."
4 0 7  ‘Fungible’ is defined as: “of such a nature that one unit or portion may be replaced by another in 
respect of function, office, or use.” The Macquarie Dictionary, 3rd ed., s.v. “fungible.”
4°s see, Hayles, H ow We Became Posthuman, Chapter Two.
ability of digitised information to form seemingly endless combinatory organisations 
for different effects. In the context of CPOF, some of these recombinations even result 
from the operation of the system itself rather than the conscious intervention of its 
human operators (the shifting location of PLIs tracking BFT/FBCB2, for example).
The ideal operation of CPOF vis-a-vis Liquid Information echoes some of the 
trends critical security theorists identify in the evolution of the contemporary security 
problematic. Dillon and Reid argue, for example, that the conflation of the two great 
information revolutions of the past few decades -  the digitisation of information 
technologies, and the molecularisation of the life sciences -  has led to the 
incorporation of a discourse of complexity into the contemporary Western security 
problematic. In particular they identify global liberal governance’s mobilisation of a:
... biophilosophical discourse of complexity [and] ‘recombinant biopolitics’. Here, the power of 
recombination is said to be the means by which life, conceived to be comprised of open complex 
adaptive systems, exploits connectivity to evolve recombinant forms of organisation capable of 
meeting the changing demands of rugged fitness l a n d s c a p e s . 4 °9
Security, in this discourse, becomes about the re-engineering and recombination of 
complex system s to increase their resilience to crisis.410 Informationalisation — the 
treating of all things as discrete bytes of (digital, molecular) information -  is essential 
to such a perspective because, by removing qualitative, theological, or other aspects of 
som ething’s existence, life can be understood solely as a complex adaptive system  
capable of (re)engineering itself (and being re-engineered) as it moves through the 
capillaries of global liberal governance, rather than something that requires moral or 
other forms of intervention. Without taking a firm position in relation to this
4°9 Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, "Global Liberal Governance: Biopolitics, Security and War," 
Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies 30, no. 1 (2001): 44.
410 See, also, Michael Dillon, "Global Security in the 21st Century: Circulation, Complexity and 
Contingency," in International Security Program m e/N ew Security Challenges Programme Briefing 
Paper 05 /02 , 2-3 (London: Chatham House, 2005).
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argument, which has since been elaborated and adapted by both Dillon and Reid, it is 
possible to see how CPOF, and NCW more generally, attempt at least discursively to 
draw on such an ontology of life (think of Cebrowski and Gartska’s description of “the 
shift from viewing actors as independent to viewing them as part of a continuously 
adapting ecosystem ”).411 Liquid Information operates with ontological singularity by 
enacting a world in which all things are made of essentially the same ‘stu ff -  (digital) 
information. An atomism for the 21st century, Liquid Information relies on the 
assumption that things-as-information are fungible and recombinatory -  capable of 
re-engineering according to predictable (if enormously complex) scientific laws.
At a more concrete level, even if Liquid Information is not the dominant ontology 
throughout the US military (or the 1st Cavalry), it could be argued that within CPOF 
the Liquid Information model leaves no room for enactions of the battlespace (no 
room for configurations of power/knowledge/space) outside of this version of reality. 
For things to be displayed on the system they must be capable of being inputted as 
information, and in particular, they must be capable of representation via the tools 
available in the system -  mostly icons, lines, shading, and photos. According to this 
argument, the essential fungibility of information in the system is enhanced by the 
common base of representation (the underlying maps onto which information is 
projected). Together, these factors arguably ensure that multiple maps on CPOF do 
not represent multiple reals, multiple ‘textures’ of the real, or any kind of ontological 
multiplicity. Rather, different maps on CPOF are simple permutations of the same 
underlying reality, an underlying reality of bits and bytes flowing deeply and quickly 
within the server network.
4“ Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Gartska, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," 
Proceedings o f  the U.S. N aval Institute January (1998),
http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles98/PROCebrowski.htm.
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This chapter argues however that, in practice, this was far from how CPOF 
operated. Addressing both the supposedly singular geographic base ‘underlying’ the 
system and the essential fungibility of information, this chapter argues that multiple 
maps of CPOF are (at least capable of) enacting multiple battlespaces. In fact, this 
chapter goes further and argues that one of CPOF’s greatest strengths for 1st Cavalry 
was precisely that it did not collapse multiplicity into singularity, enabling the city to 
be engaged on an increasing number o f ‘levels.’ However, the system operated in 
constant tension between the pull to singularity and the dispersion of multiplicity. 
This theme recurs throughout this thesis, and reflects a point of difficulty for US 
military engagement with an alternative real.
The geographic base o f CPOF
CPOF receives information from both the ABCS and from users layering different 
kinds of information (often PLIs, but also event icons and ‘drawings’ that indicate 
lines of operation, points of effort, and more) over a base that serves as a common 
reference point for all users. Here some limits of multiplicity in CPOF are clear: for 
battlespaces to be included they must be capable of being represented as icons, lines, 
shading, or pictures on or attached to this base. The base is the geographic 
representation (satellite imagery and topographic renderings) of the Area of 
Operations, which can be as small as just a few streets wide, or as large as the entire 
CENTCOM region (which at the time encompassed 25 states from the Horn of Africa, 
through the Arabian Gulf region, and into Central Asia). The ability to alter the scale 
at which it is used renders this base mobile. However, CPOF users tended to assume a 
continuity between the base picture they used and the base picture underlying other 
CPOF maps, in the same way, perhaps, that doctors assume that there is a common 
(underlying) thickening of artery walls when enacting the multiple faces of 
atherosclerosis. This narrative singularity founded the possibility for an ‘actual’ 
multiplicity that did not then threaten the fundamentally singular approach to the
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world within which the US Army operated. For example, while commanders are 
uncomfortable operating from a different set of maps to their subordinates (this 
increases the possibility of conflicting information and misunderstood 
communications, not to mention ‘fratricide’), in CPOF the assumed singularity of the 
map at the base erased concerns regarding the multiple maps used.
While this base theoretically establishes a form of singularity through which 
multiplicity can be erased, in practice this base was not reliably singular. CPOF users 
might have assumed they were working from the same backdrop as other users, but in 
reality this was not necessarily true. To take a simple example, this base depends on 
the scale at which it is viewed. Further, it contains in itself layers of features 
(topographic detail, planning features, satellite imagery) which can be clicked on or 
off at will, in a manner reminiscent of the commercial technology Google Earth. Then 
there are the more complicated ways in which the base was not singular. For example, 
interviewees often commented that the satellite imagery underlying CPOF was 
updated once every three or four months, a standard length of time adopted by data 
collection agencies because it is usually sufficient to capture the changing geographies 
of a city in detail. However, the continual destruction and creation of Baghdad’s 
landscape during OIF II meant that, in this case, users could not (and did not) 
necessarily trust the satellite imagery presented at the base of the CPOF. Instead they  
supplemented their use of CPOF with localised knowledge of the existence or 
otherwise of buildings, infrastructure, and so on -  knowledge that could be present in 
one TOC but not another. It was as much the belief in the singularity of the 
underlying base as the singular performance of the base itself that made possible the 
distribution of a (circumscribed) multiplicity of battlespaces within CPOF. In fact, in 
the practice of CPOF, rather than layers founding ontological unity  (an underlying 
base layered with multiple superstructures), layering actually correlated (and thus 
allowed the exploitation of) ontological m ultiplicity.
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The viscosity o f  Liquid Information
Nevertheless, even if the geographic base of the system is acknowledged to be 
multiple, it might be argued that the essentially liquid nature of the information 
feeding the CPOF (its essential fungibility) ensures that the system responds to 
singular ordering principles. In this argument singularity is created by the strict 
limits im posed on the conditions of existence of things (that is, as information) within 
the system. This section argues, however, that there are a number of ways in which 
multiplicity was enabled within  these boundaries of the CPOF system.
The tools o f CPOF: fungible or context dependent?
One way of demonstrating that the different maps of CPOF responded to
multiple spatial orderings, multiple rhythms, or were implicated in diverse 
assemblages, is to explore the supposed fungibility of the tools used to input 
information onto the system. In the theory of Liquid Information, these tools are 
assumed to produce essentially fungible inputs (in this ontology information is 
determined by content and not context). In practice different tools represented the 
same information in ways that enacted quite different textures of the battlespace, 
and, in a related way, different tools represented quite different modes of operating 
within the battlespace.
For example, CPOF commonly contained digital photographs emailed through by 
troops on the ground, who were either issued with a digital camera by their unit or 
(just as commonly) carried their own. These photos were then attached to SITREPs 
on a CPOF map to illustrate a particular incident or battlespace feature. When 
questioned about the phenomenal rate of use of this feature by 1st Cavalry, 
interviewees expressed the view that pictures provided ‘intangibles’ to the map which 
could not be incorporated within the simpler (and more user-determined)
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information inputs of icon, texts, and drawing tools. As a reflection of the regard with 
which this function was held, by far the most common complaint about the system  
was the inability to attach digital video in a similar fashion.*12
Sometimes the choice of tool profoundly impacted a map’s use, even if the 
information content carried was technically identical to information represented on 
another tool. For example, 1st Cavalry users derided 3rd Infantry Division’s use of 
PowerPoint. Third Infantiy Division were reputed to attach PowerPoint slides to 
maps to represent information that might have been directly inputted onto the 
system, albeit with more difficulty. For example, a user might directly create a 
demographic overlay on CPOF using drawing tools, or they might do one in the more 
familiar PowerPoint programme and then attach it to a map of the same AO. To the 
extent that this happened in 1st Cavalry (this practice was minimised by General 
Chiarelli’s renowned dislike of PowerPoint), other users would treat these maps as a 
low priority, failing to look at and engage with them in a timely manner. This reduced 
the offending map’s ‘reach’ beyond the TOC in which it was created. Whereas photos 
gave rather more to the system in terms of additional textures of the battlespace, 
PowerPoint gave rather less. Multiple maps demonstrated the high viscosity of Liquid 
Information, despite claims to the contrary. In CPOF, information would ‘stick’ to its 
representative tool.
The m ode o f information display: alternate grids o f power/knowledge/space
Further, different tools, or using tools in different ways, could be strongly
associated with different modes of behaviour in the battlespace. To put it more 
precisely, different tools were implicated in different arrangements of
412 The widespread use of digital video by US troops in Iraq has attracted much attention in the academic 
and general community. Such videos, often produced for tactical purposes within a unit, can be re-cut 
and re-cast over soundtracks of rock or metal music to form ‘trophy videos,’ or ‘war porn.’ See, for 
example, http://www.militaryvideos.net.
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power/knowledge/space. For example, the use of drawing tools to represent 
statistical patterns (such as the placement of IEDs over a period of time, see Figure 
12) represents a different configuration of power/knowledge/space to a map 
illustrating incident reports in real time.
Recall for a moment Foucault’s description of order as “the grid created by the 
glance, an examination, a language.”4^  This grid varies from war to war, and, 
according to the argument presented in this chapter, within the practice of each war 
as well. In CPOF, the tools used to make sense of the diverse range of information 
create their own ‘grid’ -  their own relations between subjects and objects -  and hence 
their own power/knowledge/space.
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F ig u r e  12. Diagram illustrating Improvised Explosive Device placements along major 
routes in Baghdad, 4th April -  24th August 2004. (Compiled by 1st Cavalry Division. Figure in 
author’s possession.)
4!3 Michel Foucault, The Order o f Things (London: Routledge Classics, 2002), xxi.
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Van Creveld examines the use of statistics by the US during the Vietnam War, 
arguing that statistical orderings of the battlespace were a factor in distorting US 
military behaviour in that conflict. US reliance on statistics during that war was taken 
to the rather bizarre extent that, in the face of the torrent of information produced by 
all levels of the military, the upper echelons of command began to count messages 
rather than reading them .414 Here, statistics were not a grid  that classified and 
separated, but a graph  that conglomerated things, reducing qualitative difference to 
quantitative calculation.
In one sense, the US military’s reliance on statistics in Vietnam was a rational 
response to the nature of the conflict. Unlike recent wars in US histoiy, territorial 
control -  or “arrows or colored patches on a map” -  gave little indication of the 
success of the political battle for ‘hearts and m inds.’415 Statistics allowed a view of 
these aspects of the battlespace which did not correlate neatly with direct territorial 
control. However, they also enforced a quantified notion of otherwise qualitative 
(spatial) relations, where a political result was deemed to be achieved through 
meeting numerical targets. It is worth quoting van Creveld at length on this issue:
Progress toward either [garnering the allegiance of a people or the building of a nation] being 
difficult to determine, indirect means had to be substituted: the percentage of the population in 
‘pacified’ areas as measured by the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), the economic activity as 
measured in tons of rice brought to the urban markets. The enemy situation in its turn was 
measured by the number of incidents and the body count, and the performance of friendly troops 
was put in terms of kill ratios. ...
Statistics, even when accurate, can never substitute for in-depth knowledge of an environment, a 
knowledge that the Americans in Vietnam were almost entirely without. The lack of it tends to 
convert genuine political and military problems into bogus technical ones. Though the reams of 
figures in a computer printout may appear impressively comprehensive and accurate, their
Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 254.
4*5 Creveld, Command in War, 253.
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meaning is often ambiguous: for example, a drop in the incident rate may signify (among several 
other things) either that the enemy is being defeated or that friendly forces are less than successful 
in locating him and bringing him to battle.^
Civilian geographies suffered particularly under this kind of quantification. For 
example, the binary distinctions required by statistics led to a strict dichotomy 
between friendly and enemy villages, such that “entire districts were flattened so that 
they could be saved. ”417
Similarly, 1st Cavalry’s use of different command tools in CPOF created different 
‘grids’ (different spatial orderings, different power/knowledge/space) by which the 
battlespace was (re)ordered. For example, Figure 12 (which relies on statistical 
conglomeration and the use of drawing tools) implicated the Divisional Headquarters 
(the site from which this map emerged) in a power/knowledge/space that rendered 
som e routes through the city safe, and others (notably those in Sadr City -  named 
Tharwa on this map) unsafe. In so doing, this kind of map enacted a battlespace that 
was about ‘safe passage through’ rather than ‘safety within.’ The spatial ordering of 
this map can be correlated with the largely unsuccessful IED-countermeasure utilised 
by the US Army at this time, which consisted of driving at high speeds through areas 
known for their IED placements (and associated ambushes), a mode of behaviour 
which tended to create fear and opposition within the civilian population who were 
(som etim es fatally) harassed off their own roads.418
The power/knowledge/space enacted by Figure 12 contrasts the maps that 
predominated in 4th Brigade (Aviation), who rarely engaged in such reflections on the 
nature of the battlespace over time. Rather, and as a result of their specialised
416 Creveld, Command in War, 253.
417 Creveld, Command in War, 257.
418 For a discussion of the tactics and counter-tactics of IED placement in the early days of OIF, see, 
Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American M ilitary Adventure in Iraq  (London: Allen Lane, 2006), 217-21.
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function within the Cavalry, 4th Brigade used the system primarily as a planning tool, 
with maps that tended to emphasise features useful to air support (vertical elevations, 
size of clearances that might be used as landing spots, and so on). This was a rigidly 
‘forward-looking’ use of CPOF, with little space for the past or the immediate 
present.419 Both of these, meanwhile, can be contrasted with maps focused on the 
immediate present and the placement of incident reports in real time.
Despite the common format of things-as-information inside the CPOF system, 
then, there was still room for the emergence of multiple textures of the battlespace 
through the multiple maps of CPOF. This partly resulted from the viscosity of the flow  
of Liquid Information: liquefied information ‘stuck to the context of its 
representation (the CPOF tool) more firmly than implied in the informational model. 
It also resulted from the different kinds of things that are done with different tools. 
Thus, using Foucault’s notion of spatial orderings at the micro as well as macro level, 
this section has argued that a single stream of Liquid Information can be implicated 
in multiple configurations of power/knowledge/space. This is not to say that the 
‘entire’ multiplicity of the battlespace can be encompassed within CPOF and its 
stream of Liquid Information. Far from it: much of CPOF’s function is still to exclude 
those alternate textures of the battlespace presenting themselves to the TOC (itself no 
mean feat -  many such textures, particularly civilian aspects, do not go far through 
the precarious communications infrastructure of the US Army), but which would not 
fit within the instrumentalising agenda of the command process.
419 However, interviewees from 4th Brigade did note that their use of the system adapted throughout the 
year to include a more active ‘monitoring’ role of troops on the ground in order to more flexibly 
anticipate and respond to calls for assistance.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Addressing multiplicity in the event-ful city
One way of addressing CPOF from here would be to look at the different kinds of 
battlespaces enacted by 1st Cavalry while using the system, and then, drawing on 
Mol’s notion of ontological politics, to formulate arguments favouring the enaction of 
particular kinds of battlespace over other, more harmful, enactions of the battlespace. 
This is an important task, and one which opens the possibilities for more nuanced 
interventions in the debate about US m ilitaiy behaviour in Iraq than those that have 
dominated critical studies to date. However, the rest of this chapter adopts a different 
approach, addressing that which is most novel about CPOF -  the greater scope it 
allows for the coexistence of alternative enactions within the TOC. Law suggests that 
“the insistence on singularity is productive,” allowing things to be done generally  
even if there is no general th in g .* 20 Perhaps the 1st Cavalry’s insistence on multiplicity 
was equally productive, allowing things to be done at a level or in a way not 
previously possible. Here we begin to see the ways in which violence in Iraq 
configured itself in altering and novel ways, as a constant and deadly experiment. The
420 j 0hn Law, After M ethod: Mess in Social Science Research (London: Routledge, 2004), 66.
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following section addresses the usual role military command plays in controlling 
multiplicity, alongside the novel demands placed on command in the context of Iraq. 
The rest of the chapter then asks how CPOF enabled 1st Cavalry to utilise the 
multiplicity of the battlespace without diffusing its efforts so much that they no 
longer responded to a recognisable military imperative at all.
The role o f command in addressing multiplicity
Command and control, particularly as exercised in the upper echelons of the 
military, has always played a significant role in dealing with the multiplicity of the 
battlespace. This results from the nature of the function of command. As described by 
military historian Martin van Creveld:
The exercise of command in fact involves a great many things, not all of which can be clearly 
separated from each other. There is, in the first place, the gathering of information on the state of 
one’s own forces -  a problem that should not be underestimated -  as well as on the enemy and on 
such external factors as the weather and the terrain. The information having been gathered, means 
must be found to store, retrieve, filter, classify, distribute, and display it. On the basis of the 
information thus processed, an estimate of the situation must be formed. Objectives must be laid 
down and alternative methods for attaining them worked out. A decision must be made. Detailed 
planning must be got under way. Orders must be drafted and transmitted, their arrival and proper 
understanding by the recipients verified. Execution must be monitored by means of a feedback 
system, at which point the system repeats itself.
This description emphasises command’s role as a system ‘fed’ by information, and, 
indirectly at least, illustrates the way in which command must coordinate (or at least, 
control) the multiplicity of the battlespace. Even though doctrine, training, 
established command processes, widely held preconceptions about the enemy, and 
the nature of information passed by communication devices all act to regularise 
information coming into the TOC, the varying nature of the inputs of information into
421 Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 7.
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the command system is still substantial: from radio links with troops on the ground 
to CNN reports, command and control involves addressing a multiplicity of textures 
of the battlespace. To refer to these textures simply as ‘information/ as van Creveld 
does, is to underestimate the quality, quantity, and diversity of the ways in which the 
TOC is connected to the battlespace. Nevertheless, van Creveld’s description makes it 
clear that one of the functions of command is to take these multiple enactions of the 
battlespace and make them simple enough (singular enough) to be capable of 
purposeful intervention by the military. This simplification (and singularisation) has 
generally been achieved using a number of mechanisms, particularly processes of 
ranking and the use of scale. These are explored in the following section using van 
Creveld’s description of US command in Vietnam as a point of reference.
Gold standards and the distribution o f realities
This section discusses one of the primary ways in which hierarchical military 
structures address multiplicity. That is, this section discusses the exclusion of 
incompatible realities and their subsequent distribution down the chain of command. 
For the US in Vietnam, for example, statistics were the gold standard that was 
capable of effectively subordinating and distributing multiplicity in this way.
Mol describes the use of gold standards in addressing the multiple realities of 
atherosclerosis in terms of the ‘authority’ with which particular kind of reals are 
enacted. For example, in a process with which sociologists of medicine would be 
familiar, subjective (patient) accounts of the disease are routinely subordinated to the 
reals produced through clinical and then laboratory practice. As Mol argues:
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A hierarchy between subjective complaints’ and objectifying ‘laboratory findings’ is 
institutionalized in the very routine that says all patients with clinical disease go to the lab before 
further therapeutic measures are considered.^22
However, in medicine these rankings are not fixed. As Mol goes on to argue:
And yet it isn’t solid. There are other modes of establishing coherence as well. Sometimes the clinic 
is on the top of the hierarchy. Pressure measurements are not necessarily “believed’ in.423
Dealing with multiplicity, then, can also involve the complication of routine rankings. 
Laboratory practice can be distrusted by some doctors -  it does not always ‘win’ in 
acting as a gold standard of ordering the ‘real’ disease.
In command in Vietnam, statistics were a gold standard that allowed the 
continual trumping of concerns expressed down the command chain by the dictates 
laid down further up the command chain. This was particularly significant in a war 
like Vietnam which was noted for its micro-management of operational and even 
tactical level engagements by the very highest levels -  precisely those levels from 
which alternate realities were most firmly excluded. The Vietnamese battlespace (the 
grid according to which the US military operated) was therefore surprisingly singular. 
The tendency of modern society to accord scientific results with a gold standard 
quality combined here with the inherent exclusions established in the military system  
of ranking to compelling, if misguided effect.424
422 Annemarie Mol, The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2002), 63.
423 Mol, The Body Multiple, 63.
4 2 4  in the US military, the Vietnam era is most famous for its Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, 
who attempted to imbue the planning processes of the Pentagon with scientific rigour. See, Michele 
Chwastiak, "Taming the Untameable: Planning, Programming and Budgeting and the Normalization of 
War," Accounting, Organizations and Society 26 (2001).
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Gold standards not only exclude alternate textures, they also have a regulatory 
effect on other enactions of the battlespace. For example, van Creveld notes that, 
particularly toward the end of the war, it was common to see troops fighting to 
increase statistical measures of success (increased body counts, increased firefights, 
and so on), even if these had little to do with achieving the qualitatively framed 
m ission statements that were intended to guide troop behaviour.4^
In case this ruthless exclusion of alternate realities from central command posts 
through the dow n w ards  dismissal through the military’s established hierarchy is 
thought to be a phenomenon restricted to the US military in Vietnam, it is useful to 
remember the British experience at the Battle of the Somme. There, troops were 
expected to (and in many cases, actually did) literally reach and remain at a line 
drawn on a map at headquarters many miles behind the battlefield, with no regard for 
the terrain features, number of casualties, or enemy activity being experienced.426
Scaling and issues of complexity
In addition to specific tools that distribute realities using the military’s 
hierarchical structure, the command structure commonly values ‘bigger picture’ 
enactions of the battlespace over those focused at a smaller scale. Without addressing 
too deeply the complexities of scale discussed in Chapter Five, it is useful to note that 
conventional US military doctrine has unproblematically assumed that the three 
levels of military operation -  tactical, operational, and strategic -  act as concentric 
circles of increasing size (the tactical is smaller than the operational, which is smaller 
again than the strategic). This assumption is accompanied by a correlated 
assumption: that the tactical realities add up to the operational realities, which in
425 Creveld, Command in War, 254-255.
426 Creveld, Command in War, 155-168.
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turn add up to the strategic realities. Thus it is that the US military definition of the 
operational level of warfare is constructed with reference to both the tactical and 
strategic levels:
These [operational] activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they 
ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which 
tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.^
Accompanying these assumptions about the scale of military operations are 
assumptions about the geography in which the military operates. The layout of a 
village, for example, would fall within the Area of Operations (AO) of a small unit 
(perhaps a company), rendering it a tactical geography, whereas the geography of a 
city is more appropriate for the operational context, and, depending on its size (and 
level of enemy activity) is likely to form the Area of Operations for a Brigade, a 
number of Brigades, or perhaps, in the case of Baghdad, an entire Division. In the 
context of these assumptions, the hierarchical exclusion of multiple realities from  
superior command structures through the imposition of a singular strategic logic or 
singular way of viewing the world makes a degree of sense. Alternate textures of the 
battlespace experienced at the tactical scale (the experience of how civilians liv e ’ their 
city, for example) are unimportant at higher echelons of command because they are 
deemed to be adequately addressed by the tactical level of command, and, 
importantly, if they are not, then it should quickly become apparent through tactical 
failures.
Yet the battle in Iraq has rendered issues of scale more complex for the US Army. 
In particular, there has been what NCW adherents refer to as a compression of the
427 Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Department o f Defense Dictionary o f  
M ilitary and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2002), 324.
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levels of w ar.428 In NCW theory, this refers to the ability to utilise the complicated 
scaling properties of systems exhibiting (properly mathematical) complex behaviour 
in order to create strategic effects from tactical a c t i o n s ^  in  practice in Iraq, this 
refers to the difficulty of aligning tactical and strategic goals. In counterinsurgency 
operations, tactical goals are usually still presented in terms of familiar military 
m issions (winning firefights, capturing insurgent cells, going on patrol, search and 
sweep operations, and so on). Strategic goals, on the other hand, are expressed in the 
political terms of winning the hearts and minds of the population. The mismatch 
between the two is a result of military command, training, and doctrinal practices too 
diverse to discuss here (although the practice of general mission statements by 
strategic level commanders being ‘boiled down’ into actionable commands for tactical 
units is important here). What is immediately apparent, however, is that the two do 
not necessarily add up neatly as foreseen in typical Army conceptions of scaling. A 
striking consequence in Iraq of this lack of linear scaling properties has been the US 
military achieving tactical success ( ‘winning the battle ...’) with either no benefit for, 
or explicit cost to, strategic ambitions (‘... but losing the w a r ’) . 4 3 o  For example, success 
in the second Battle of Fallujah was achieved only at enormous cost to both the 
civilian population and the built environment, leading Jonathan Keiler to argue in the 
Proceedings o f  the U.S. N ava l Institute  that: “The Battle of Fallujah was not a defeat
428 See, Office of Force Transformation (OFT), The Implementation o f Network-Centric Warfare 
(Washington, DC: Office of Secretary of Defense, 2005), 10.
429 in particular, this is the basis for the principle of Effects-Based Operations. See, Paul K. Davis, 
Ejfects-Based Operations: A Grand Challenge fo r  the Analytical Community (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2001).
430 See, for example, the scathing assessment of Thomas Ricks on this issue:
It is difficult to overstate what a key misstep this lack of strategic direction was -  probably the single most 
significant miscalculation of the entire effort. In war, the U.S. military would fight hard and well but 
blindly....
Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American M ilitary Adventure in Iraq (London: Allen Lane, 2006), 129 
(emphasis added). See, also, Brig. Nigel R.F. Aylwin-Foster, "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency 
Operations," M ilitary Review  Nov-Dee (2005).
197
... but we cannot afford many more like it.”431 Traditional command approaches that 
exclude alternate enactions of the battlespace that take place on a tactical scale, on 
the assumption that they are adequately captured by simple measures of tactical 
success, do not seem to apply in Iraq.
Indeed, it was in response to the failure of traditional tactical operations to ‘add 
up’ to strategic success that 1st Cavalry adopted a campaign plan of the simultaneous 
pursuit of multiple lines of operation (LOOs).432 Previously, the Army had adopted a 
sequential approach to the urban battlespace, which emphasised establishing security 
f ir s t,  then engaging in reconstruction and development. This traditional approach is a 
twist on the linear scaling assumptions made about the tactical, operational, and 
strategic levels. This approach assumes that establishing tactical success first 
(capturing the streets, patrolling the ground level) lays the ground for operational- 
and then strategic-level interventions in the battlespace. However, General Chiarelli 
notes:
The outcome of a sequential plan allowed insurgent leaders to gain a competitive advantage 
through solidifying the psychological and structural support of the populace.433
Without reconstruction and development to win the all-important hearts and minds 
of the Iraqi people, there was a continuous degradation of the security situation, 
despite the focused tactical efforts of 1st Cavalry. Multiple LOOs subverted the idea
431 Jonathan F. Keiler, "Who Won the Battle of Fallujah?" Proceedings o f  the U.S. N aval Institute 
January (2005), 57, cited in Ricks, Fiasco: The American M ilitary Adventure in Iraq, 405. For 
descriptions of the key tactical aspects of the joint Marine Corps-Army-UK Army assault on Fallujah in 
November 2004 (one of the most ferocious battles of the post-invasion campaign), see, Capt. Michael D. 
Skaggs, "Tank-Infantiy Integration," Marine Corps Gazette 89, no. 6 (2005); Lt. Gen. John F Sattler and 
Lt. Col. Daniel H Wilson, "Operation AL Fajr: The Battle of Fallujah -  Part II," Marine Corps Gazette 89, 
no. 7 (2005); 1st Lt. Carin Calvin, "The Assaultman in an Urban Environment," Marine Corps Gazette 
89, no. 7 (2005).
432 See, Maj. Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli and Maj. Patrick R. Michaelis, "Winning the Peace: The 
Requirement for Full Spectrum Operations," M ilitary Review  July-August (2005).
433 Chiarelli et al., "Winning the Peace," 4.
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that reconstruction and development were things to be added on top of a secure 
battlespace. Rather, the battlespace came to comprise multiple, interlocking systems. 
This had the effect of making each layer of warfare more complicated, as well as of 
making many more enactions of the battlespace at lower levels important to the 
upper echelons of command. For example, civilian geographies were deemed to be 
vitally important by upper echelons of command, as they sought to re-establish 
infrastructure and the general functioning of the city, as well as the lower levels of 
command looking to navigate the city. Figure 13 (below) illustrates one of the ways in 
which Divisional Headquarters tracked multiple kinds of information at a high 
(essentially tactical) level of granularity (the Significant Activities or SIGACTs, 
sewerage, electricity grid operation in a small portion of the city) in order to achieve 
strategic effect (an understanding of trigger points of Shi’ite insurgent activity).
1st Cavalry’s actions suggest that the usual role of command in addressing 
multiplicity through repressing and/or excluding alternative enactions of battlespace 
is insufficient to explain command behaviour in the complex circumstances of Iraq. 
The following sections explore some of the novel ways in which CPOF has gone about 
addressing this newly militarily important multiplicity in ways that do not simply 
exclude alternative textures of the battlespace.
Taming m ultiplicity in CPOF through narrative singularity
While pursuing multiple LOOs made upper echelon commanders receptive to the 
multiple textures of the battlespace, strong narrative  singularity remained in this 
mode of enacting the city. In particular, multiple LOOs were narrated as a 
preliminary ‘untangling’ of the systems that comprise the city, with each LOO 
representing one system essential to the functioning of the well-ordered city. So there 
was a need to: control netw orks  of insurgents (combat operations); establish a
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system  of law and order (train security forces); regulate f lo w s  of garbage, power, and 
other essential city by-products (provide essential services); organise netw orks  of 
power and order (promote indigenous governance); and mobilise and proliferate 
economic system s  (promote economic pluralism). Together these systems comprised 
the city as 1st Cavalry understood it, and there was a strong sense that (maps 
representing) these LOOs added up to a coherent, if highly complex, whole. Figure 13 
illustrates this narrative singularity with startling clarity.
Enem y Activity
S ew ageP o w e r  D is tr ib u tio n
[Sg] R av /S ew agfI I 3 h o u rs  o n  13 h o u rs  off 
[77) 2 h o u rs  on  /  <1 h o u rs  off
F ig u r e  13 . Diagram illustrating the correlation between infrastructure failures and enemy 
activity in Sadr City. [Reprinted from Maj. Gen. Peter Chiarelli and Maj. Patrick Michaelis, “Winning 
the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations,” M ilitary Review  July-August (2005): 9.]
Figure 13 proceeds through the sequential layering of information on a map (it 
should be read left to right, top to bottom). Each new layer adds more ‘depth’ to the 
city and to the commander’s understanding of the city. The narrative causality is 
clear: the usual geography of concern to the commander is enemy activity (SIGACTs, 
represented by circles), which can be explained if the other systems of the city
2 0 0
(sewerage and power distribution) are included in the narrative. In this campaign 
plan the multiple faces of the battlespace exist within a tightly constrained 
conceptualisation of linked causality (failures of sewerage and electricity cause enemy 
activity). The tension between multiplicity and singularity is pulling strongly toward 
the side of singularity.
However, it was unusual for the battlespace to reveal itself in such linear depth. 
Consequently, 1st Cavaliy utilised an alternative and complementary discourse of the 
city as a system too complex for explanation. The discourse of complexity plays many 
functions within this thesis. First Cavalry’s adoption of complexity as a motif for 
understanding Baghdad is just one example of the US Army’s attempts to 
operationalise the implications of complexity.
When confronted with something that escapes linear or simple explanation, with 
things that do not easily add up or that cannot be easily predicted, there are a number 
of things one might mean when saying ‘this thing is complex.’434 One of these might 
be that the thing is complex in a way that aligns with the alternative real presented 
previously, that the thing is messy, noncoherent, and uncertain. Law refers to this as 
baroque complexity, where complexity is endlessly intricate, highly promiscuous, 
inarticulable, and incomplete.435 Such a version of complexity acknowledges that 
there is no overview possible, no guarantee of coherence, no singular logic at work, 
only a continuous impetus to look further ‘down’ into the mess rather than ‘over’ or 
‘across’ it.
434 See, Annemarie Mol and John Law, "Complexities: An Introduction," in Complexities: Social Studies 
o f Knowledge Practices, ed. Annemarie Mol and John Law, 1-22 (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2002), 1-3.
433 See, John Law, "And if the Global Were Small and Noncoherent? Method, Complexity, and the 
Baroque," Environm ent and Planning D: Society and Space 22, no. 1 (2004).
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On the other hand, one might mean that this complex thing is an ‘open system,’ 
displaying properties identified by the branches of mathematics and physics (and 
later, biology) which responds to ordering (mathematical) principles of chaos and 
nonlinearity. Such concepts were popularised in the 1990s, and spread throughout 
the social sciences to establish a firm foundation for understanding the world as 
fundamentally composed of complex systems.435 Such systems may not be linear or 
easily explicable, but they display some regular or predictable qualities, and are 
capable of rendering as a coherent whole, even if details of their working remain 
elusive.
This scientific understanding of complexity has been highly influential in the new  
biopolitical security agenda identified by Dillon and Reid and discussed above. In 
particular, it has been important in both the NCW and force transformation 
discourses. In these, the world is viewed as being composed of complex, nonlinear 
system s that are, given sufficient information, capable of both comprehension and 
manipulation.437 The persuasiveness of this view of the world is such that military 
analysts spent much of the late 1990s arguing about whether Clausewitzean ‘friction’ 
could be removed (the fog of war penetrated) through a sufficiently sophisticated 
understanding of the systems underlying the prosecution of war.438 While enthusiasm  
for the usefulness of complexity as a tool for commanders has since been dampened
436 See, for example, Raymond A. Eve, Sara Horsfall and Mary E. Lee, ed., Chaos, Complexity, and 
Sociology: M yths, Models, and Theories (London: Sage Publications, 1997k
437 See, for example, David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, ed., Complexity, Global Politics, and  
National Security (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1 9 9 7 ); Thomas Czerwinski, Coping 
With the Bounds: Speculations on Nonlinearity in M ilitary Affairs (Washington, DC: Institute for 
National Strategic Studies, 1998); John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, ed., Networks and Netwars: The 
Future o f  Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001).
438 See, Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War: McNair Paper 52  (Washington, DC: 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996); cf. John F. Schmitt and Gary 
A. Klein, "Fighting in the Fog: Dealing With Battlefield Uncertainty," Marine Corps Gazette 80, no. 8 
(1 9 9 6 ).
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by an appreciation of the general difficulty of engaging in such complicated 
calculation and analysis in the time-pressured environment of the battlespace, the 
idea persists that the battlespace is a complex system that could be understood as 
such if there was simply a big enough computer or sufficient time.
Figure 13 was compiled using this second definition of complexity, whereby 
complex behaviours (enemy activity) emerge out of the interaction of complex 
system s. Yet, in practice, CPOF was rarely used to understand Baghdad through the 
addition of multiple battlespaces into a complex whole. More often, in practice (as 
opposed to in the campaign plan) such multiplicity was never expected to add up to a 
coherent, actionable whole. By asserting the putative (but usually unprovable) 
existence of a coherent, complex whole, the discourse of complexity could elide the 
fact of inconsistency and noncoherence in the general narrative of the battle, but did 
little in practice to assist commanders confronted with multiple battlespaces 
(particularly in CPOF).439
Multiplicity in CPOF was instead addressed through a number of different 
m echanisms, two of which are discussed in the following section: the mechanism of 
layering multiplicity; and the creation of “communities of tim e” that operated to 
provide temporal instead of spatial coherence. These had the result of creating a 
particular orientation to the battlespace, one which demonstrates the openness of the 
spatialising practices of violence by 1st Cavalry.
439 As an indication that the addition of systems into a larger complex whole is largely a discursive and 
not a praxiographic enterprise, it is worth noting that Figure 13 was constructed for an article written on 
return from deployment — an article that attempts to make sense of 1st Cavalry’s year in Baghdad.
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Correlating m ultiplicity in CPOF through layering
In practice, the ‘fractions’ of the battlespace on CPOF were enacted in a way that 
had little to do with adding them up to form a coherent, if complex, whole. Yet if 
fractions of the battlespace were not added up, then how were they related? In this, 
CPOF enacted battlespaces in a mode of ‘dimensionless layering’ that is unique to the 
cybernetic world. Layering here refers to the map windows layered on top of each 
other inside the computer screen, while the word ‘dimensionless’ qualifies this 
because maps are not layered on one another to add depth. Layering through depth is 
common in both the real world (where acetate overlays add increasing depth to a base 
map, for example) and in CPOF (where icons are layered onto a digital base to form 
an increasingly rich picture). However, dimensionless layering is less common and 
refers to the ability to distribute different layers in a dimensionless space, such that 
they are kept completely separate, but at the same time, close to each other (the 
distance of a mouse-click). In keeping multiplicity distributed in the same space, 
CPOF performs what is perhaps a unique distribution of multiplicity within military 
command.
This has significant consequences for the behaviour of users of the system. It is 
common when confronted with multiplicity to attempt to resolve incompatibilities in 
some way. We have seen already some of the ways in which this can happen: gold 
standards can be used to determine the ‘real’ real; incompatible realities can be 
excluded and/or suppressed; strands can be brought together in a ‘covering’ 
(difference effacing) singular narrative. When alternate realities are nevertheless 
forced together, as in CPOF, then inconsistency is usually addressed through the 
mechanism of local controversy. As Mol puts it, in the context of atherosclerosis, the 
question is not about which real is ‘generally’ right or wrong; instead, the question 
becom es what to do with this patient, how to address this circumstance:
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Instead of a global controversy or a consensus, this is another distribution of reality over different 
sites. Over different sites, this time, in the reality of a th e r o sc le r o s is .4 4 0
Noncoherence between multiple enactions of atherosclerosis is addressed at 
intersections (the borders between multiple sites) which play an important 
translating role. At these borders controversy is resolved to a greater or lesser degree, 
in a more or less temporary manner.
What happens in CPOF is something quite different. There is no intersection, no 
overlap where multiple battlespaces meet: instead multiple battlespaces are 
correlated explicitly by the user’s direct movement from one site to another. In fact, it 
is the ability of the user to maintain this movement that marks their aptitude at using 
the system. Interviewees consistently indicated that unsuccessful CPOF users were 
those who could not hack the pace of the system. Those who could not navigate 
between pages with sufficient speed to keep track of the constantly mutating 
conditions marked there, those who were insufficiently dextrous to simultaneously 
update multiple maps (while all the time performing their other functions, including 
talking on Ventrilo and communicating with their commander) were the users held in 
contempt by their peers. Interestingly, the spatiality of the CPOF user is akin to the 
spatiality of the nomad as described by Deleuze and Guattari. It is the spatiality of the 
intermezzo:441
A path is always between two points, but the in-between has taken on all the consistency and enjoys 
both an autonomy and a direction of its own. The life of the nomad is the intermezzo. Even the 
elements of his dwelling are conceived in terms of the trajectory that is forever mobilizing th e m .4 4 2
440 Mol, The Body Multiple, 108.
441 ‘Intermezzo’: “a short dramatic, musical, or other entertainment of light character introduced 
between the acts of a drama or opera.” The Macquarie Dictionary, 3rd ed., s.v. intermezzo.
442 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia Vol. 2 
(London: Continuum, 2004), 419.
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The intermezzo enables mutual incompatibility — there was a working assumption 
that things would not necessarily add up between maps, nor even within maps. Maps 
m oved too quickly for users to be concerned with the formulation of singularity. The 
m ovem ent of the intermezzo kept incompatibilities apart, it mobilised (added velocity 
to) the user and allowed them to escape the gravity created by logical inconsistency. 
That is, CPOF correlated multiple battlespaces according to criteria that were 
unrelated to the need to maintain logical consistency in the picture of the battlespace, 
and were instead related to the mobilising impulse of the user.
This meant that CPOF operated quite differently to other means of 
communication between TOCs, which required a substantial degree of time and effort 
being spent to translate outside information onto pre-existing representations. That 
is, traditional methods of communication were ‘borders’ capable of translating and 
resolving local controversy as described by Mol. By contrast, the common interface of 
CPOF meant that the work of translation was not required. Of course, this work was 
replaced with other work, the work of movement -  a creative action subject to novel 
mobilising processes.443
The user’s ability to cope with incompatibility did not flow simply from the 
rapidly changing maps. Information about the battlespace has always changed 
rapidly. Usually a force either collapses multiplicity into a single battlespace or 
distributes it vertically within the TOC (between specialised functions of the 
command structure), and horizontally below the TOC (down the chain of command).
It is the user’s ability to move between maps that enables this unique mode of 
correlating multiple battlespaces. Before CPOF, there were few tools enabling nearly 
simultaneous and purposeful intervention in multiple battlespaces by the
443 One of these mobilising processes was the common temporality that tied the system together and 
helped govern its use, discussed in the following section.
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commander. The ‘nearly’ is significant: it is this delay that is the moment of the 
m ovem ent of the user that adds the pause — the moment of creative possibility. 
Doctrine and established command processes suggest that the user’s movement 
should be m obilised by a series of command priorities. However, at a practical level, 
m ovem ent was more inflected by the ‘m ode’ of behaviour (an affect of encountering) 
engendered by the system than by doctrine, a mode that emerges from the 
temporality that binds the system together.
Mobilising m ultiplicity in CPOF through temporality
The previous section discussed the way in which in CPOF’s maps were spatially 
distributed in a way that allowed multiplicity to be held alongside itself in tension, 
with layers rarely resolving into one another (in this, Figure 13 is the exception rather 
than the rule). This distribution rested on the ability of the battle captain to move 
between layers. This prompts further questions about the movement of the battle 
captain. Why did he move to a particular battlespace? What prompted him to move 
on?
In other spatial distributions of multiplicity, multiplicity is ‘properly’ separated 
by spatial distance and noncoherence is addressed through translation effects at the 
borders of different sites. In these situations, questions of which version of something 
to enact are built into the fixed spatial relationships between different sites. To use 
Mol’s study, go to the clinic first (where atherosclerosis is pain-on-walking), then go 
to the lab (where it is thickened artery walls). In CPOF, the simultaneous presence of 
multiplicity within one spatial location (the screen) makes it difficult to identify a 
pattern in the user’s order of enaction (Which first? Then what?). Difficult, but not 
impossible. This section illustrates one way in which orders of enaction were 
established in CPOF, not through spatial distribution and regulation (enacting this
207
here, followed by that there), but through temporal ‘coordination’ (enacting this now, 
enacting that then).444 According to this argument, the determination of which 
enaction of the battlespace is given priority at any given time is connected to the 
(varying) flow of time inside CPOF. The fluctuating nature of this flow of time 
engenders an experimental orientation within the battlespace, one best described as 
‘event-ful.’
This section discusses how the temporality of CPOF mobilised 1st Cavalry to 
exploit the multiplicity they encountered in a novel way. Firstly, it discusses the two 
(seem ingly opposed) features that inflect the temporality of CPOF: its rhythmic 
enaction and its constant alteration. It then discusses how this temporality 
established a “community of tim e” in 1st Cavalry that was sufficiently invested in the 
system ’s commonality to enable it to be used in the mobile way discussed.4^  Finally, 
the temporal ordering of the user’s enaction of multiple battlespaces will be discussed 
with reference to the ‘structure of feeling’ it engenders, one that is termed an ‘event­
ful’ orientation to the battlespace.
The tempora lity  o f CPOF: rhythm and change
In part, the hypnotically rhythmic temporality of the TOC embedded an 
expectation in CPOF users that things would emerge in similar ways to how they had 
emerged before. Daily life in the command post was often referred to by interviewees 
as ‘Groundhog Day,’ a reference to the movie in which the same day is lived over and 
over with only minor variations. Safely enclosed in either the Green Zone or Forward
4 4 4  Coordination has been avoided in this chapter as a metaphor as it is too structural to describe the use 
of CPOF. CPOF did not coordinate multiple battlespaces (which implies a kind of resultant coherence), 
rather it mobilised 1st Cavalry to exploit the multiplicity of battlespace in a novel and experimental way.
445 See, Karin Knorr-Cetina and Urs Bruegger, "Global Microstructures: The Virtual Societies of 
Financial Markets," American Journal o f  Sociology 107, no. 4 (2002): 928-32.
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Operating Bases, removed from the sights and smells of Baghdad, many of the 
interviewees worked 12-hour days, seven days a week for an entire year, interrupted 
by only two weeks holiday. Interviewees returned day after day to the same crowded 
room to perform a distinctly repetitive daily schedule, starting with the Commander’s 
Update Briefing in the morning, and finishing in the evening with a changeover 
briefing.
But the rhythm of the TOC was not internally determined. Interviewees noted the 
rhythm of ‘hot spots’ and ‘hot tim es’: here, the rhythm of the insurgent’s life 
(in)forms the temporality of CPOF. Lunch, dinner, the call to prayer, all marked lulls 
in violence and incident reports. These lulls, in turn, allowed more routine, non­
combat oriented work to be pursued -  work that was deprioritised when troops were 
engaged in firefights, or when things were exploding. Interestingly, one captain 
qualified this observation by saying that he wasn’t sure you would see this rhythm in 
statistics: we see here the disconnect between quantitative enactions of the 
battlespace (the Vietnam-era statistical approach) and qualitative enactions (the 
intuitive ‘sense’ of the battlespace). They did not always add up; battlespaces do not 
always match.
However, the rhythmic environment in which CPOF operated (the daily rhythm 
of the TOC, the rhythms of Baghdad) acted as a counterpoint to the changing and 
mobile nature of the battlespace in CPOF. The day might return anew, but it was 
subtly (or radically) different each time, and the nature of the system meant that the 
user was required to orient themselves in time to a constantly altering present. CPOF 
is unlike traditional geographic information systems, which illustrate “static samples, 
synchronic slices taken out of the flow on rapid but nonetheless individually discrete
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data-images of a single m om ent.’^  On CPOF, data is “live,” in that the 
representation onscreen is the underlying information (change to one simultaneously  
alters the other).447 a  unit with a Blue Force Tracker moves, and so does its icon; an 
Intel officer reports the altered location of an insurgent cell on ABCS and the icon 
moves as well. As a result, CPOF was a constantly running record of the present.448 
The mobility of its inputs varied from source to source (some of the demographic 
overlays, for example, were discontinuous in the manner of traditional GIS), but the 
system as a whole continually updated and altered.
In this, CPOF is like the computer systems explored by Knorr-Cetina which 
‘contain’ international monetary exchange markets. As she argues:
As the information scrolls down the screens and is replaced by new information, a new market 
reality continually projects itself. The constantly emerging lines of text at times repeat the 
disappearing ones, but they also add to them and replace them, updating the reality in which 
traders move. The market as a ‘greater being’, as an empirical object of ongoing activities and 
effects, continually transforms itself like a bird changing direction in mid-flight, creating the 
anticipation problem traders confront. From one point of view, a defining characteristic of a 
financial market is its non-identity with itself.449
Similarly, the battlespace of CPOF constantly altered. Limited to be sure by the 
stubborn materiality of the city, the system was nonetheless incapable of being 
demarcated by fixed markers or definite signposts. The temporality of CPOF, then,
446 Sean Cubitt, "Visual and Audiovisual: From Image to Moving Image," Journal o f  Visual Culture 1, no. 
3 (2002): 363.
447 MAYA Viz, "Command Post of the Future Project" (2003),
http://www.mayaviz.com/web/industries/military/industry_mil_darpa_cpof.mtml, 9.
448 Indeed, it is for this reason that military analysts are interested in analysing ‘moments’ from the 
system to seek to understand the operation of command and control in the US Army. See, Kirk 
Dunkelberger et al., "Command and Control Forensics," paper presented at 10th International 
Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, McLean, VA, June 2005.
449 Karin Knorr-Cetina, "From Pipes to Scopes: The Flow Architecture of Financial Markets,"
Distinktion: The Scandinavian Journal o f  Social Theory 7 (2003): 15-16.
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was not only rhythmic but also fluid and processual. CPOF maps were as marked by 
their non-identity with their previous selves as they were by their non-identity with 
other maps.
This non-identity is related to the unfinished nature of the temporality of CPOF: 
because the temporality of CPOF maps was a running record of the present, the 
system could be messy in the extreme. For example, while situation reports were a 
primary method of guiding attention and focus, there were often multiple icons on 
the screen representing the same event (from multiple reports that were as yet 
unreconciled). When alterations were made, however, they were made not as synoptic 
overview was gained (T know this for certain’), but rather as the CPOF user 
encountered more of the moment (T think this is right,’ ‘someone needs to know  
something about this, accurate or not’).
The temporality of CPOF was, then, mobile, but its movement was tempered by 
rhythm. The following discusses how this temporality created a “community of tim e” 
among CPOF users, who were mobilised to navigate multiple battlespaces in a more 
ordered way than might otherwise have been expected in a system as spatially 
distributed, highly mobile, and multifaceted as CPOF. However, this order was not a 
rigid order of sequence or rankings. Rather, thanks to the varying flow of time in 
CPOF and the ‘structure of feeling’ it created (an affective affinity for encountering), 
this order(ing) responded to the ‘event-fulness’ of the battlespace.
Creating a community o f time
Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger articulate the concept of “communities of tim e” in 
their work on global financial markets.450 For the authors, shared temporality is key
450 Knorr-Cetina et al., "Virtual Societies of Financial Markets," 928-32.
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to understanding how highly (spatially) dispersed actors can operate in an orderly 
way in a system  which, as discussed above, is sufficiently fast-flowing that “a defining 
characteristic ... is its non-identity with itself.”451
Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger note a number of features of this temporality which is 
shared with CPOF. Firstly, there is the synchronised, continuous observation of 
events by all members of the user community. These events are presented in the 
system with tem poral im m ediacy . As with traders, CPOF users watched the system at 
the same time and in a continuous manner, for example, with users of both systems 
“having lunch at their desks and asking others to watch when they step out.”452 
Indeed, in some TOCs it was mandated that the CPOF be manned at all times.
Secondly, Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger note a “temporal division of labor, such 
that the community of time extends around the clock.”453 i n financial markets, this 
temporal division of labour is achieved by distributing labour across time zones. In 
command posts in Baghdad night and day staffs (12-hour shifts each) man the system  
continuously. Handover briefings were intended to create an alignment of 
understandings of the battlespace between day and night users of CPOF. However, 
users tended to create and keep their own maps, in addition to sharing some with the 
maps of the alternate shift-user (with those on night shift generally less involved in 
the creation of maps), implying a less than fully continuous operation of the system.
Thirdly, and finally, Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger identify the use of “calendars 
and schedules [which] create an atmosphere of collective anticipation and 
preparation for specific events that pace and interrupt the regular flow of market
451 Knorr-Cetina, "From Pipes to Scopes," 16.
452 Knorr-Cetina et al., "Virtual Societies of Financial Markets," 929.
453 Knorr-Cetina et al., "Virtual Societies of Financial Markets," 929.
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activities. 454 For CPOF, the planning processes of the Division imposed an external 
sense of the passage of time (the Commander’s Update Briefing is but one example of 
this: smaller scale planning meetings, such as those coordinating the distribution of 
air support, were also daily occurrences). During 1st Cavalry’s deployment in 
Baghdad, there were also certain dates which were used to mark significant changes 
in the battlespace and by which 1st Cavalry could schedule activities. In particular, 
these were the handover of sovereignty, the election of representatives to draft a 
constitution, and the referendum on the constitution (see Figure 7 for an example of 
the significance of these dates in marking out the battlespace). In interviews, these 
dates were often used as explanatory mechanisms of some significance.
The creation of a community of CPOF users inculcated in a common temporality 
had two significant consequences. Firstly, users possessed sufficient trust in the 
system to overcome suspicion of the incompatibility and multiplicity created by the 
multiple maps in the system. Without the “community of tim e” (particularly without 
the practices of constant attendance and the temporal division of labour), users would 
have had little faith in the multiple maps presented on the CPOF, and would have 
placed little reliance on the multiplicity represented therein. In the face of a lack of 
common spatiality, users sought reassurance in common temporality. Even as it was, 
however, the changeover from night to day shifts was marked by a distinct period of 
realignment as day users double-checked the accuracy of maps that had been updated 
by night users (considered generally to be less adept with the system). Significantly, 
then, CPOF created a credible (temporally coherent) system within which multiplicity 
could be contained and not erased. Knorr-Cetina makes a similar point in a different 
context, when she argues that:
454 Knorr-Cetina et al., "Virtual Societies of Financial Markets," 929-30.
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Another implication is that — as a form of coordination — the temporality postulated fulfils some of 
the functions Weber associated with rational authority structures. In other words, the theoretical 
argument here is that time-structuring affords a form of coordination that can take the place of 
institutional control and social authority structures.455
Secondly, creating a community of time correlated the actions of users who were 
spatially dispersed by creating a common ‘structure of feeling’ -  an affective affinity 
that enrolled the users in a novel mode of organising violence. To be involved in the 
enaction of the battlespace of 1st Brigade, for example, it was not necessary for other 
Brigade commanders to physically go to Sadr City and leave behind other enactions 
of the battlespace (or bring them along in only subsidiary forms, such as in maps, 
radios, and so on). One could, instead, enact that battlespace and then, with a single 
click, enact an entirely different battlespace. It was the community of time that 
mobilised the ‘clicks’ by which users navigated these multiple enactions, by 
engendering an affect of encountering.
Event-ful battlespaces and the affect o f encountering
The temporality of CPOF structured (enrolled) the user’s interaction with 
multiple battlespaces in two primary ways. Firstly, and more simply, the rhythm of 
CPOF provided a basic structure for the operating the system. For example, rhythm 
allowed for more predictable interaction with other users (knowing when users were 
likely to be on Ventrilo, for example). Similarly, it guided users to particular sections 
of the battlespace at moments when they were more likely to have an impact (the 
monitoring of trouble spots at known hot times). Rhythm also provided a certain 
degree of singularity in the use of the system -  for example, by focussing all users on 
a single map during the daily Commander’s Update Briefings. Yet even this common
455 Karin Knorr-Cetina, "Complex Global Microstructures: The New Terrorist Societies," Theory, Culture 
& Society 22, no. 5 (2005): 220.
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use was often accompanied by the ‘wandering eye’ that marked the effective CPOF 
user. With one eye on the shared screen, the battle captain kept the other on his own 
screens: users continued to track multiplicity even when rhythm dictated singularity 
or predictability.
This ‘wandering eye’ hints at the second way in which the temporality of CPOF 
structured the user’s mode of interaction with the battlespace -  although ‘structure’ 
implies an overly rigid sense of what is being suggested here. Rather, we might follow  
Knorr-Cetina, and refer to a ‘structure of feeling’ through which CPOF operates.456 
The structure of feeling of CPOF was precisely that which set the eye to wandering -  
it was that which mobilises, that which provides an affective relation with the ongoing 
event. It was, in other words, that which mobilised the user to engage multiplicity as 
multiplicity, exploiting it for the benefit of the US Army. In an alternative metaphor, 
we might think instead of the suggestion by Deleuze and Guattari that all assemblages 
are affective (desiring) assemblages -  that “there is no desire but assembling, 
assembled, desire.”457 The assemblage of CPOF-1st Cavaliy-Baghdad assembled 
(mobilised) the CPOF user according to its own affective orientation, one which did 
not repress multiplicity, nor elide it, but which mobilised the user through it and 
across it.
This second argument draws on one made by Knorr-Cetina in her discussion of 
the operation of al-Qaeda. Knorr-Cetina argues that, like financial market users (and, 
indeed, CPOF users), members of al-Qaeda are bound together in a community of 
time, one which uses digital media to overcome the dislocation of spatial distribution. 
The impact of belonging to this community of time (the impact o f ‘having become’ as
456 The concept “structure of feeling” is adapted from Raymond Williams. See, Raymond Williams,
M arxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 197 7 ). Chapter Nine. Cited, Knorr-Cetina, 
"The New Terrorist Societies," 218.
457 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 440.
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she terms it) on one s ‘structure of feeling’ subtly alters the way in which al-Qaeda 
members go about the activities of everyday life:
Thus those who ‘have become’ will still go about the business of everyday life and attend to what is 
demanded of them. But they will do so in a different mode; what has changed, in a term borrowed 
from Williams, is a structure of feeling, and the living of t im e rs
Time, then, is lived by the al-Qaeda member for the coming future (the re­
establishment of an Islamic caliphate, the defeat of the American Empire in the Holy 
Lands). As a result, this futural structure of feeling “grounds modes of affectivity that 
have served al-Qaeda in the past,” such as patience and preparedness .459 That is, the 
structure of feeling for al-Qaeda makes possible their particularly virulent form of 
violence.
This is quite a different structure of feeling to that created by CPOF’s community 
of time, with quite different modes of affectivity. Yet the process is the same: the 
structure of feeling is, to use Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, that which draws together 
the untimely assemblage of the war machine.460 The temporality of CPOF was not 
‘futural’ as is Al-Qaeda’s, but was oriented instead to the constantly changing present. 
This temporality grounded a mode of affectivity that oriented the user to the ‘event­
ful’ battlespace -  to a battlespace constantly marked by new events.
CPOF’s implication in an ‘event-ful’ temporality can be connected to both the 
demand for the constant attention of the user through its running display of the 
present (its ‘present-ing’ of the battlespace), and the simultaneous lack of instruction 
as to which element of the present should be addressed at any given moment. As the 
icons which represent so much of the changing activity on CPOF are referred to as
458 Knorr-Cetina, "The New Terrorist Societies,” 218.
459 Knorr-Cetina, "The New Terrorist Societies," 219.
480 see, Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 445.
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event icons, it is appropriate to think of this as an ‘event-ful’ temporality. Users are 
event-m inded’ in a way that stands in contrast to more traditional interactions with 
command tools, where command staff are more concerned with the fate of pre­
existing plans or predetermined points of effort than with navigating the battlespace 
in search of new events of significance. Where traditional command tools encourage 
an emphasis on singularity in the battlespace, CPOF actively engages the user in the 
utilisation of the battlespace’s multiplicity.
For a sense of this change in the ‘tone’ of 1st Cavalry’s interaction with the 
battlespace, it is useful to return to the starting point for much traditional thinking on 
war, that of Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz took rather a dim view of information 
regarding events in the command process: he described it as “sea [which] breaks its 
fury” on the commander, whose duty is to stand firm in his intent in the face of its 
forced61 By contrast, CPOF does not ‘assault’ the user with reports: its multiple maps 
are accessed by the user moving through  them (to them) as they alter, and not vice 
versa. In fact, the battle captain’s experience of reports of the battle through CPOF 
was more akin to discovery  (or encountering) than battery. Or, to quote Mol and Law 
from an entirely different context, “walking ... is a mode of covering space that gives 
no overview.’^ 62 How, then, did users ‘decide’ to walk between maps? What mobilised 
them? What arrested their attention? The answers to these questions dictate how  
effectively, and to what degree, user’s could exploit battlespace multiplicity for US 
Army success.
Partly, users engaged in a constant surveillance of the changing conditions.
Partly, users were flagged to attend to particular areas by external stimuli, including 
radio calls, CNN reports, or a call via the Ventrilo system. Either way, users
461 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (London: Penguin Books, 1968), 163.
462 Mol et al., "Complexities," 16.
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‘encountered’ an event in the battlespace and tracked its unfolding in time. This 
contrasts with the behaviour encouraged by command tools in Vietnam, where 
information ‘in the present’ was actually less useful in the established command 
process than information about the completed event (it is impossible to categorise 
and form statistics regarding an ongoing event). In fact, in Vietnam, this was such a 
problem that commanders subverted their own established command tools, and used 
helicopters to ‘directly’ witness the battle.463 Yet even this ‘witnessing’ of a battle in 
real tim e was not the same as the affectivity of encountering engendered in CPOF 
users. CPOF users were successful insofar as they could encounter and identify a 
continuing and sim ultaneous p a ra d e  of events of significance in the constantly 
permutating maps on their screens: being present in the moment for one event did 
not give a user licence to ignore others (although it is true that certain non-combat 
activities, such as reconstruction activity, did tend to be deprioritised during the 
event of a firefight). Indeed, it was the user’s -  and, by association, their 
commander’s -  ability to enact multiple battlespaces at any given moment that 
enabled them to intervene in multiple battlespaces at once (nearly), in a way that had 
previously been impossible.464
To give a sense of the nature of event-fulness with which CPOF users were 
dealing, in August 2004, in the Shi’a slum of Sadr City, the number of SIGACTs in the
463 Creveld, Command in War, 255.
464 See, however, other efforts to achieve this effect, including attempts to literally mobilise the body of 
the commander:
Command and Control On The Move (C2OTM) applications enable commanders to receive data-intensive 
information via satellite-downlinked feeds, on the move. Utilizing new generation satellite antennae, designed 
for mobile platforms, Command and control tracked version of the new Future Combat Systems family of 
vehicles C2OTM introduces tactical commanders with new capabilities to deploy their command elements to 
the most critical points, without loosing contact with their tactical operations center (TOC).
Defense Update, "Dismounted and Mobile Command and Control Systems," Defense Update 5, no. 1
(2005), http://www.defense-update.com/features/du-1-05/c4-onthemove.htm.
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area was counted at around 160 a week.465 At over 20 combat incidents a day, the 
CPOF users of 1st Brigade were required to be able to maintain their coverage of 
combat aspects of the battlespace, as well as to identify and begin to address the other 
LOOs which formed part of the battlespace in Sadr City. Users then scanned  the 
battlespace for emerging events, while accepting that the battlespace with which they 
were presently dealing was only ever partially enacted and likely to constantly alter.
Gillian Fuller has identified scanning as a new mode of envisioning movement, 
one that is unique to “a world of movement where variability and instability is 
constant.”466 Linking her analysis to Deleuze’s analysis of control societies, Fuller 
notes that the scan operates in such a way that it is not disciplinary (or concerned 
with outcomes) but controlling (concerned with process). CPOF users scanning the 
battlespace were more concerned with maintaining the battlespace in a state in which 
variations of the battlespace in any given moment (caused by SIGACTs, 
reconstruction activity, and so on) was controlled, than in locating, identifying and 
punishing any particular culprits.467
It is in this context that we can understand one of the stranger features of CPOF, 
the collapse of criminal and enemy activity into the single category of SIGACTs. 
Obviously, in the period after the invasion many incidents likely to be reported on 
CPOF were as easily attributed to the upsurge in criminal activity following the 
collapse of effective state institutions as to enemy activity. For example, icons 
representing enemy fire, friendly Iraqi dead, hijackings, and unidentified explosions,
465 Richard Lowiy, "What Went Right: How the U.S. Began to Quell the Insurgency in Iraq," National 
Review  57, no. 8 (2005): 29.
466 Gillian Fuller, "Perfect Match: Biometrics and Body Patterning in a Networked W o r ld fibreculture: 
the journal 1(2003), http://journal.fibreculture.org/issuei/issuei_fuller.html.
467 See Figure 13, where the primary concern is with altering the conditions that make violence possible 
rather than locating the perpetrators of violence themselves.
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could all refer to activities that were not properly the action of ‘the enemy’ at all. This 
slippage in categorisation would be problematic for traditional commanders in war, 
who would be concerned to understand the enemy’s actions and intentions. However, 
in the context of CPOF, this lack of clarity combined with a mode of interacting with 
the battlespace that saw the priority lie in navigating the city successfully to produce a 
spatialisation of violence that was necessarily mobile. In this context, a hijacking 
became problematic whether it was enemy initiated or not for its impact on traffic 
flows; an explosion was similarly problematic, whether it was a result of people 
stealing petrol from pipelines or whether it was from an IED.
Fuller argues that in a world where variability and instability reign, from the 
point of view of the powerful the smart money is on ensuring that things do not vary 
too much or become too unstable in any given context. Hence General Chiarelli could 
note with satisfaction that SIGACTs in Sadr City had dropped to less than 10 a week, 
“at which point it gets hard to differentiate between crime and insurgent attacks.”468 
It does not matter much whether the activity is criminal or insurgent related: the 
point is whether the more or less ‘normal’ functioning of the area has been restored. 
This gives the vital clue to understanding how the user was mobilised to utilise 
multiplicity for the purposes of military victory: the CPOF user’s affective response to 
the constantly altering p resen t w as to seek out abnorm al functioning and d istorted  
f lo w s. This is what is meant by a mode of event-fulness: an acute awareness of the 
events that disrupt the city’s effective daily functioning.
Here we see 1st Cavalry operationalising complexity in their campaign plan and 
experimentalism in their mode of operation by operating in a way that allowed easy, 
fast access to multiple, conflicting LOOs in the battlespace. It is possible to relate this
468 Lowry, "What Went Right."
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mode of operating to the definition of the battlespace that extends its scope and 
complexity in response to the reformulated contemporary security problematic.
CPOF users did indeed subsume the distinction between civilian and military 
geographies to a broader ordering principle of the ‘event’ (although the event does not 
necessarily respond to the same ordering principle as adaptable networks).
However, limiting the analytical implications of identifying this mode of 
navigating (enacting, utilising) the battlespace multiple to a confirmation of the 
importance of a new security problematic undermines what it is that CPOF enables. 
According to the argument presented here, one of the fundamental features of CPOF 
is that it enables m ultiple  enactions of the battlespace. This mode of navigating 
through multiple battlespaces is a unique result of the particular configuration of 1st 
Cavalry and CPOF in Baghdad (which, by all accounts, was not repeated by 3rd ID, 
which followed), and represented a (more or less self-reflexive) response not 
necessarily to the ascendancy of the ‘new’ security problematic in Baghdad, but 
precisely, as indicated in the first part of this chapter, to the inability of any single 
spatial ordering to dominate the complicated, messy, and noncoherent spatiality of 
the city of Baghdad.
Conclusions: the experimental quality of event-fulness
Previously, this chapter has suggested that, following Law, if “the insistence on 
singularity is productive,” then so might the insistence on multiplicity be deemed 
productive of new kinds or forms of violence.46? This chapter has explored the way in 
which accepting multiplicity (however limited) within its processes led 1st Cavalry to 
engage the city in an entirely different way.
469 Law, After Method, 66.
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CPOF stands, perhaps, at the cusp of being a ‘weapon’ as conceived by Deleuze 
and Guattari, used in the context of the ‘tools’ of the Army. It is useful here, then, to 
return to Deleuze and Guattari, who, in a discussion of productive assemblages of 
violence, discuss the emergence of:
... the new figures of a transhistorical assemblage (neither historical nor eternal, but untimely): the 
nomad warrior and the ambulant worker. A somber caricature already precedes them, the 
mercenary or mobile military adviser, and the technocrat or transhumant analysts, CIA and IBM .... 
M artial arts and state-of-the-art technologies have value only because they create the possibility 
o f  bringing together worker and warrior masses o f  a new type. The shared line o f fligh t o f  the 
weapon and the tool: a pure possibility, a mutation
The use of CPOF to render multiplicity present as itse lf  is perhaps one such shared 
line of flight. The limitations of state violence as identified by Deleuze and Guattari -  
its reliance on police, its reliance on reason -  are hybridised in Baghdad, in CPOF, by 
a creative war machine that renders violence (potentially) unlimited, (potentially) 
untamed by reason.471 Whereas Deleuze and Guattari argue that it is the nomads’ 
capturing of the animal’s projective capacity that makes nomadic violence “durable,” 
we might suggest in the animal’s place that the extension of the possibility of violence 
in CPOF was a result of the system ’s tem porality , of its ongoing presence in the 
moment, and, importantly, of the affective “idea of the motor” -  the ‘wandering eye’ -  
that results from this assemblage.472 Similarly, and as discussed above, the spatiality 
of the system is akin to the nomad in being the spatiality of the intermezzo.
470 Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 445 (emphasis added).
471 For a discussion of the contrast between state violence and the war machine, see, Julian Reid, 
"Deleuze’s War Machine: Nomadism Against the State," Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies 
32, no. 1 (2002). See, also, Chapter One.
472 Deleuze and Guattari discuss this aspect of the war machine when discussing the tendency for 
weapons toward projection:
Whereas in the hunt the hunter’s aim was to arrest the moment of wild animality... what the warrior borrows 
from the [hunted] animal is more the idea of the motor than the model of the prey. He does not generalize the 
idea of the prey by applying it to the enemy; he abstracts the idea of the motor, applying it to himself.
Deleuze et al., A Thousand Plateaus, 437.
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There are, of course, limitations to the creativity engendered by CPOF. The 
temporality of CPOF is partially dictated by rhythm. One cannot help but think of 
Lefebvre here, who argues that: “Space and time thus laid out make room ... for 
liberty. A little room. More of an illusion: dressage does not disappear.”473 The 
narrative singularity of the system, the narrowness of the informational inputs, the 
continued exclusion of alternate enactions of the battlespace from the TOC, not to 
mention the CPOF, all continue to limit the open and creative potential of US military 
behaviour in Baghdad. CPOF may enable the upper echelons of command in 1st 
Cavalry to address multiple textures of the battlespace, but it renders those textures 
in particular ways, with consequences that can be as singularising as they are 
acknowledging of multiplicity. One of these consequences, for example, is the 
increased reach of upper command echelons into levels of the battlespace (or as the 
people who live in it would put it, into textures of the city) previously impervious to 
intentional intervention on the part of the military.
This chapter has demonstrated the multiplicity of battlespaces being enacted by 
1st Cavalry in the city of Baghdad. It has also demonstrated that 1st Cavalry 
operationalise this multiplicity in order to more effectively address the situation in 
Iraq, which they conceive in complex and multiple terms. However, the complexity of 
their narrative is the singularising complexity of science, and the multiplicity they 
embrace is constrained by the power/knowledge/space and rhythm of the system. 
Nevertheless, using CPOF to navigate this multiplicity resulted in a particular mode 
of behaviour — an event-ful orientation to the battlespace — that produced  new kinds 
of violence (rather as al-Qaeda’s embrace of a futural mode of living produced a 
patient, watchful, and painfully unpredictable mode of violence).
473 Henri Lefebvre, Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and E veryday Life (London: Continuum, 1992), 4 0 -
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At this point we might return to Foucault and his concept of 
power/knowledge/space. Was 1st Cavaliy remaking the city in the image of the 
complexity science that so inflects its narrative of the city? Knorr-Cetina makes this 
argument in relation to al-Qaeda:
A second distinction ... needs to be brought back into the picture here: that between a spatial 
arrangement where stability resides in fixed categories and traditions distantiated from one 
another, and temporal processing that integrates things into a global stream. The natural history 
approach, according to Foucault and others, was a spatial arrangement of knowledge. Molecular 
biology (or an experimental stream within it) appears today to be a strongly globally integrated 
stream of processings superimposed on any remaining spatial logic. Al Qaeda distinguishes itself 
from all other terrorist groups that are nationally based by the appearance it gives of having 
become such a global stream.474
However, if it is possible to think of the correlation of the multiplicity of battlespaces 
within CPOF in these terms at all, then it is still an incomplete “globally integrated 
stream .” The viscosity of Liquid Information, the failures of its use, and, not least, the 
stubborn materiality of the city act against such an interpretation. Indeed, to argue 
that multiplicity is fully correlated, or that it can be fully operationalised for US 
military purposes, is to miss the point: if multiplicity could be fully correlated, then it 
would not be multiple anymore.
What we do see, however, is a way of arranging (a partial) multiplicity of 
battlespaces that created new modes of interacting with the battlespace, in addition 
to, alongside of, in contradiction to, other methods of interacting with the battlespace. 
This is but one stoiy among many, albeit one that illustrates the experimental nature 
of the US military enterprise in Iraq. The following chapter will illustrate other facets
474 Knorr-Cetina, "The New Terrorist Societies," 230.
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Being present in Baghdad
*
We need to hold onto the idea that the agent -  the ‘actor’ or the ‘actor- 
network’ is an agent, a center, a planner, a designer, only to the extent that 
matters are also decentered, unplanned, undesigned. To put it more strongly, 
we need to understand that to make a center is to generate and to be generated 
by a noncenter, a distribution of the conditions of possibility that is both 
present and not present.475
Figure 14.1st Cavalry (‘First Team’) crest. (Courtesy of 1st Cavalry Division, 
http://www.hood.army.mil/istcavdiv/)
Introduction: absence and presence in the contemporary 
battlespace
The previous chapter explored how 1st Cavalry turned its face to multiple 
battlespaces in a novel and experimental way during its engagement in OIF II. This
475 John Law, Aircraft Stories: Decentering the Object in Technoscience (Durham NC: Duke University 
Press, 2002), 112-13.
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chapter explores a different texture of the spatial operation of violence. Rather than 
looking at how 1st Cavalry engaged ‘the battlespace’ as a (multiple) whole, this chapter 
explores the spatial relations of absence and presence in which a given military unit is 
implicated. Points of presence, and not planes of space, form the subject of this 
chapter’s inquiry.
Specifically, this chapter asks: What does it mean for a unit to be ‘here’ and not 
‘there’? As suggested in Chapter Two, the answers to this question may seem  
straightforward. As Callon and Law note:
In common sense it is obvious: an object or a person is either here or there, and not in two places at 
the same time. Hard on the heels of this first self-evidence comes a second, the idea that if things 
are not chaotic then this is because they are contained within something larger, a whole. In which 
case, complex though it might be, there is indeed an order. Things are somewhere, and some are 
bigger than others.476
However, as noted in the previous chapters, those truths are far from self-evident -  
tactical levels were not contained within the strategic, complex systems did not add 
up, and this chapter will show that being here and not there is not straightforward 
either. Indeed, asking these questions opens up a host of practical and pressing 
concerns for the US military, whose own intellectual engagement with the 
information and communication technology (ICT) revolution has seen an attempt to 
re-engineer their modes of absence and presence in order to move beyond traditional 
spatialities of military endeavour such as the massing of force and the movement of 
manoeuvre.47? This chapter explores a different texture of 1st Cavalry’s engagement in 
Baghdad, one which again exposes both the 1st Cavalry’s attempt to operationalise an
476 Michel Callon and John Law, "Absence-Presence, Circulation, and Encountering in Complex Space," 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 22, no. l (2004): 3.
477 See, in particular, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Swarm ing and the Future o f Conflict (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000).
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alternative real (here, a real with complicated relations of absence and presence), and 
the continual disruption of 1st Cavalry’s orderings by those relations.478
The idea that the opportunities for ‘virtual’ presence offered by ICTs might 
disrupt the traditional orderings of near and far, here and there, absent and present, 
and so on has not been limited to the military field of endeavour. Geographers of all 
stripes have attempted to theorise the implications of the ICT revolution in terms of 
the disruption it poses to the spatial orderings that underpin our society. Stephen 
Graham, for example, locates at least three schools of thought regarding how virtual 
presence in ICTs impacts on traditional relations of absence and presence. Firstly, he 
identifies what he terms a discourse of “substitution and transcendence,” by which 
presence in the medium of an ICT can be taken as negating the necessity (or 
undermining the possibility, depending on the author’s ideological bent) of relations 
of ‘physical’ presence.479 Absence and presence are reconfigured in this discourse 
solely through the medium of electronic connection. According to this discourse, the 
complicated everyday relations of absence and presence in the ‘real world’ lose their 
meaning in virtual space (being ‘here’ in Adelaide is unimportant when one is also 
‘here’ on MySpace.com).
Secondly, Graham identifies a strong trend against this simplified understanding 
of the implication of virtual presence, with more recent work aiming to understand:
478 importantly, whereas the past chapter relied very strongly on a narrative voice of ethnography ( ist 
Cavalry did this or that in this circumstance when using CPOF), this chapter is more generic in its 
phrasing. It performs an analysis that is closer to Mol’s description of a praxiography that relies on the 
“materials and methods section of scientific articles.” This chapter brings together the many materials 
and methods used to keep units present, discussing the interactions and interferences that are kept 
strictly invisible at the pointy end of practice (logistics chains, for example, are excluded from the TOC). 
See, Annemarie Mol, The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2002), 158 (emphasis added).
479 Stephen Graham, "The End of Geography or the Explosion of Place? Conceptualizing Space, Place and 
Information Technology," Progress in Human Geography 22, no. 2 (1998): 167.
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... how the social production of electronic networks and ‘spaces’ co-evolves with the production of 
material spaces and places, within the same broad societal trends and social processes.480
This discourse emphasises the way in which virtual presence can mimic and inflect 
more traditional configurations of absence and presence. This body of work often 
discusses the highly uneven dynamics of ICT infrastructure development, with 
privileged enclaves of society (certain networked suburbs of a city, for example) able 
to exploit the advantages proffered by virtual presence in the pursuit of enterprises 
(particularly economic activities) which have profound impacts on the way in which 
people carry out their everyday lives. It could be said that in this understanding, 
virtual presence and absence are another way of transmitting the spatial orderings 
that dominate our society.
Finally, Graham identifies the response made by Actor-Network Theory (ANT) 
and material semiotics to the impact of virtual presence. Here, while acknowledging 
the importance of the claims of the second strand of thought, the emphasis is on 
socio-technical hybrids which stress the:
... multiple, contingent worlds of social action, underlining the difficulties involved in achieving 
social ordering ‘at a distance’ through enrolling complex arrays of technological artifacts. In it, 
humans emerge as more than just subjects whose lives are to be ‘impacted; as more than bit- 
players within macrolevels of global structural change.481
Virtual presence and absence here are seen as being (only a) part of the highly 
complicated and emergent spatial assemblages in which, and through which, a 
slippery and uncertain real is produced. This thesis tends toward the third 
understanding of the nature of virtual presence as enabled by ICTs, and the main 
body of this chapter explores some of the ways in which virtual presence disrupts and 
reorders the spatialising practices of violence.
480 Graham, "The End of Geography?", 171 (emphasis original).
481 Graham, "The End of Geography?", 180.
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Issues of absence and presence, virtual or otherwise, are also of primary concern 
to the US m ilitaiy, which must constantly address practical questions regarding what 
it means to be ‘here’ in the everyday life of its operation as a complicated, 
multifaceted organisation operating in a complex, difficult environment such as 
Baghdad. Command and control, for example, is always a difficult and contingent 
process of making the absent commander ‘present’ to the unit in the battlespace, 
allowing him to guide and shape events that he cannot physically see and in which he 
cannot physically participate.
Recent military theorising has suggested that the vastly increased networking 
capacities of the US military might enable entirely new forms of configuring absence 
and presence, radically altering the spatial operation of violence. For example, some 
theorists advocate the use of networking technology to enable ‘swarming.’ Swarming 
is promoted by its advocates as an alternative to the clearly defined relations of 
absence and presence in more traditional m ilitaiy configurations. In particular, 
swarming is distinguished from the massing of forces, where relations of absence and 
presence are defined in terms of whether a unit is physically present in a demarcated 
area, and from manoeuvre warfare, where the mobility of the army demands that a 
unit’s militarily effective presence be determined by a fixed relation to other, more 
distant, units (for example, present on the left flank, in front, or behind, other 
units).482
Swarming introduces a flickering relation of absence and presence, whereby a 
unit is ‘here’ for the purpose of attacking the enemy, but then, (almost?)
482 gee, Arquilla et al., Swarming and the Future o f Conflict, Chapter 1.
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simultaneously, ‘not here’ for the purpose of evading attack. Arquilla and Ronfeldt 
put it this way:
[Swarming is] the systematic pulsing of force and/or fire by dispersed, internetted units, so as to 
strike the adversary from all directions simultaneously. This does not necessitate surrounding the 
enemy, though swarming may include encirclement in some cases. Rather emphasis is placed on 
forces and fires that can strike at will -  wherever they will.^s
Absence and presence, then, are not in fixed relation with anything in particular -  
with either friendly troops, or the enemy, or a particular piece of land. Rather, this 
approach to war is about configuring absence and presence so that a military force 
can be ‘virtually’ present anywhere, even if it is only ‘physically’ present in a series of 
discrete unit locations. The key to enabling such flickering relations of absence is both 
the extreme mobility of units and their ability to communicate with one another, 
allowing coordination of effort without the massing of force. While the more extreme 
predictions of Arquilla and Ronfeldt and their intellectual brethren -  including 
images of a battlespace crawling with semi-autonomous robots swarming like bees on 
enemy forces -  are far from reality, let alone far from being part of mainstream  
contemporary military doctrine, nonetheless swarming serves as a useful reminder 
that the military is mindful of rethinking issues of absence and presence as highly 
practical and significant for the purpose of winning battles.
Following the general methodological impetus of this thesis, this chapter 
explores how CPOF inscribes a unit in a series of relations of absence and presence 
that have significant consequences — both intended and unintended — for the 
behaviour of that unit. This example illustrates that attempts to exclude (to make 
absent) certain aspects of a unit from meaningful presence in the battlespace are 
often unsuccessful, and that, conversely, the success of making a unit present in the
483 Arquilla et al., Swarming and the Future o f  Conflict, 8-9 (emphasis added).
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battlespace for the purpose of command is always a contingent and reversible 
achievement. It also illustrates how agency emerges through practice in the 
battlespace, and explores the US military’s attempts to self-consciously re-engineer 
the scope of a unit’s agency in response to the elusive and sometimes haunting 
relations of absence and presence in which a unit in CPOF exists. The previous 
chapter articulated a texture of CPOF where the behaviour of the CPOF user was key 
in correlating 1st Cavalry’s engagement in multiple aspects (and at multiple levels) of 
the battlespace. This chapter, however, interrogates a different texture of the 
battlespace, one which explores how (in what ways) the ‘unit-in-CPOF’ is present in 
the battlespace in the first place. This opens out a series of insights into the 
unpredictable and experimental spatial operation of violence in Baghdad.484
Throughout this chapter it will become apparent that it is difficult, and no doubt 
undesirable, to distinguish too firmly between conventional understandings of 
absence and presence as being physically ‘here’ or physically ‘there,’ and the more 
fluid and/or multifaceted notions of absence and presence proposed by the study of 
material semiotics (of which the ‘virtual’ presence created when using ICTs is just 
one). In particular, it is argued that there are a number of different ways for a unit to 
be meaningfully present, many of which are acknowledged by apparently 
conventional organisations such as the military — and some of which form part of 
their openly stated ambitions for reconfiguring the real according to their need for 
victory. In this, then, this chapter continues the previous chapter’s theme of the US
484 The ‘unit-in-CPOF’ is by no means the only centre of presence on the multiple maps of CPOF as 
explored in the previous chapter, but is a manageable point of interrogation for understanding how 
CPOF is implicated in distributing absence and presence in the battlespace. In fact, it is possible to view 
each of the multiple maps explored in the previous chapter as a point of presence. However, as discussed 
in Chapter Two, exploring things in one register often precludes their exploration in another, and as a 
result the previous chapter focused not on what multiple maps excluded, but how they related to each 
other. The spatial operation of violence in Baghdad emerges from the overlapping (pinboard effect) of all 
of these textures coming together to form a messy and imperfectly realised world.
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military attempting to operationalise the more fluid, textured account of the world 
outlined in Chapter Two.
Actualising a unit in the military: the enaction of presence
The epigraph to this chapter suggests that all acts of centring, of present-ing, of 
making something be ‘here’ and not there, generate and are generated by  a 
distribution of potentialities, virtualities, or conditions of possibility that are not 
present, are not here, or are necessarily excluded in this particular ‘act-ualisation.’488
In his work, John Law suggests a number of ways in which ‘centres’ are 
always/already implicated in/generated by non-centres, identifying a number of 
textures and registers in which this process of centring/decentring takes place. For 
example, in A ircraft Stories, Law identifies how the ‘centre’ that is a written formula 
used to calculate the wing design of an aircraft is also a decentring of a number of 
different conditions of possibility. These range from the exclusion of the material 
networks required to formulate and maintain the validity of the expression, to the 
Othering of the fear of the Soviet Union that prompted the design of the aircraft in the 
first place.486 In later pieces, Law emphasises the way in which these different kinds 
of absences are held in different kinds of relation to the presence (from the fixed 
patterns of networked relation to the flickering behaviour of the return of the 
excluded).487
485 Act-ualisation because each actualisation is an act, an achievement, and not simply a pre-existing 
condition.
486 See, Law, Aircraft Stories, Chapter Five.
487 See, in particular, John Law and Annemarie Mol, "Situating Technoscience: An Inquiry Into 
Spatialities," Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 19 (2001); John Law, "And if the Global 
Were Small and Noncoherent? Method, Complexity, and the Baroque," Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space 22, no. 1 (2004).
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This section describes a similar process by which a unit is ‘centred’ in CPOF. 
Unlike the previous chapter, which explores the role of CPOF in producing an 
actionable world out of multiple battlespaces, this chapter does not attempt to draw 
boundaries between the world ‘in CPOF’ and the world ‘outside CPOF.’ The previous 
chapter utilises the work of Karin Knorr-Cetina on the flow architecture of financial 
markets, which emphasises the role the computer system plays as an interface. This 
analysis provides a useful perspective for understanding how users utilised CPOF as a 
tool of correlation  (loosely, coordination) for addressing multiple aspects of the 
battlespace.488 This chapter, however, examines a different texture of CPOF use, one 
which turns its attention from the question of what happens where multiple 
battlespaces meet (a question of boundaries and plane surfaces) to how something in 
the battlespace becomes present at all. This has the result of focusing attention away 
from fixed boundaries  (the screen as interface) toward poin ts  (and their 
accompanying field of formation) 489 This moves attention toward the relation 
between the centre and the non-centre, the relation between the absent and the 
present. As a result, the boundary between the screen and the world ‘out there’ loses 
its significance as an analytical tool for the purposes of this chapter.
To enable the discussion of points of presence in the battlespace, this chapter 
begins with a discussion of the importance of ‘naming’ units to a successful command 
process, before proceeding to a technical description of the process by which units are
488 gee, in particular, Knorr-Cetina’s discussion of the screen:
As an omnipresent complex ‘Other’, the market on screen takes on a presence and profile in its own right with 
its own self-assembling and self-integrating features its own calculating routines and self-historicizing 
properties .... The electronic programs and circuits which underlie this screen world assemble and implement 
on one platform the previously dispersed activities of different agents; of brokers and bookkeepers, of market- 
makers (traders) and analysts, of researchers and news agents. In this sense, the screen is a building site on 
which a whole economic and epistemological world is erected. It is not simply a ‘medium’ for the transmission 
of pre-reflexive interactions.
Karin Knorr-Cetina, "From Pipes to Scopes: The Flow Architecture of Financial Markets," Distinktion: 
The Scandinavian Journal o f  Social Theory 7 (2003): 13 (emphasis added).
489 For a discussion of the textures and complexities of boundaries, see, Annemarie Mol and John Law, 
"Boundary Variations: An Introduction," Environment and Planning D 23, no. 5 (2005).
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named as icons on the CPOF screen. It concludes by exploring the different kinds of 
relations of absence and presence that are brought about by this naming.
Making a unit present through naming
The point of presence under investigation in this chapter is the unit. As defined 
by the Department of Defense, a unit is:
l. Any military element whose structure is prescribed by competent authority, such as a table of 
organization and equipment; specifically, part of an o r g a n i z a t i o n . 4 9 0
Tables of organisation & equipment (TOEs), in turn, are used to describe the ‘go to 
war’ components of the military, prescribing their normal mission, organisational 
structure, and personnel and equipment r e q u ir e m e n t s .4 9 1 So, according to the 
military, a unit exists when it can meet these definitional elements: purpose, 
structure, and content.
Figure 15, for example, shows an excerpt from a TOE describing the constitution 
of the company responsible for running a Brigade. Note the way in which the table 
listing ‘equipment’ draws no distinction between personnel and equipment (an 
Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm is ‘ontologically equal’ to a Chemical Operations 
Sergeant). In a TOE, a unit is an amalgam of human and technological components, 
brought together within a prescribed context of mission and structure. It has certain 
capabilities (including, for example, the defence of the post in the event of attack by 
all personnel except the chaplain), certain responsibilities, certain dimensions 
(35,494 pounds and 2,933 cubic feet), and certain relationships with other units. 
(Here, note, certain can mean both ‘particular’ and ‘fixed.’)
490 Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Department o f  Defense Dictionary o f  
M ilitary and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2002), 461.
491 Globalsecurity.org, "Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE)" (n.d.),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/toe.htm.
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TOE 87042C100/20/ HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, BRIGADE
DESIGNATION: 87042L100 HEADQUARTERS, BRIGADE, ARMORED DIVISION
1. MISSION.
THE HEADQUARTERS PROVIDES COMMAND, CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OF THE TACTICAL OPERATIONS 
OF THE BRIGADE AND ATTACHED UNITS. THE HEADQUARTERS COMPANY PROVIDES UNIT 
ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE BRIGADE STAFF SECTIONS.
2. ASSIGNMENT. ORGANIC TO A HEAVY DIVISION, TOE 87000L.
3. CAPABILITIES.
A. AT LEVEL 1, THIS UNIT:
(1) COMMANDS ATTACHED ELEMENTS OF THE DIVISION'S COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS 
IN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS.
(2) ACCEPTS OR RELEASES ATTACHED ELEMENTS ON SHORT NOTICE.
(3) CONDUCTS BRIGADE OPERATIONS ON SUSTAINED 24-HOUR A DAY BASIS.
(4) SUPERVISES THE MOVEMENT AND SECURITY OF ATTACHED OR SUPPORTING ADMINISTRATIVE 
ELEMENTS.
(5) CAN BE DESIGNATED TO ACT AS EMERGENCY SUCCESSOR OPERATIONAL HEADQUARTERS FOR 
THE DIVISION IN THE EVENT OF DESTRUCTION OR NEUTRALIZATION OF DIVISION COMMAND AND 
CONTROL CAPABILITIES.
(6) PROVIDES OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF UP TO FIVE MANEUVER BATTALIONS ON A SUSTAINED 
BASIS. CAN CONTROL UP TO SEVEN MANEUVER BATTALIONS FOR A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME NOT TO 
EXCEED 24 HOURS.
(7) PROVIDES FOOD SERVICE SUPPORT FOR ASSIGNED AND SUPPORTING PERSONNEL FROM THE 
DIVISIONAL Ml BATTALION, SIGNAL BATTALION AND CHEMICAL COMPANY IN 87042L100/200. PROVIDES 
FOOD SERVICE SUPPORT FOR ASSIGNED AND SUPPORTING PERSONNEL FROM THE DIVISIONAL Ml 
BATTALION, SIGNAL BATTALION, CHEMICAL COMPANY, AND BRIGADE RECONNAISSANCE TROOP 
(17087F000) IN 87042L300/400.
E. INDIVIDUALS OF THIS ORGANIZATION, EXCEPT THE CHAPLAIN, CAN ASSIST IN THE COORDINATED 
DEFENSE OF THE UNIT AREA OR INSTALLATION.
F. THIS UNIT PERFORMS UNIT MAINTENANCE ON ORGANIC EQUIPMENT IN 87042L100/200. AND 
PERFORMS UNIT MAINTENANCE ON ORGANIC EQUIPMENT AND EQUIPMENT ORGANIC TO THE BRIGADE 
RECONNISSANCE TROOP (17087F000) IN 87042L300/400.
G. THIS UNIT IS DEPENDENT ON:
(1) APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS OF THE DIVISION OR CORPS FOR COMBAT HEALTH SUPPORT, LEGAL, 
FINANCE, AND PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES.
(2) GENERAL SUPPORT AVIATION BATTALION, TOE 01305A, FOR COMMAND AND RECONNAISSANCE 
HELICOPTER SUPPORT.
4. BASIS OF ALLOCATION.
A. TWO ARMORED BDE, HHC, TOE 87042L100 OR 87042L300 AND ONE INFANTRY (MECHANIZED) BDE, 
HHC, TOE 87042L200 OR 87042L400 PER ARMORED DIVISION, TOE 87000L100.
B. TWO INFANTRY (MECHANIZED) BDE, HHC, TOE 87042L200 OR 87042L400 AND ONE ARMORED BDE, 
HHC, TOE 87042L100 OR 87042L300PER INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED) TOE 87000L200.
5. CATEGORY. THIS UNIT IS DESIGNATED A CATEGORY I UNIT. ...
6. MOBILITY.
A. THIS UNIT IS CAPABLE OF TRANSPORTING 71,320 POUNDS (3,800 CUBIC FEET) OF TOE EQUIPMENT 
WITH ORGANIC VEHICLES.
B. THIS UNIT HAS 35,494 POUNDS (2,933 CUBIC FEET) OF TOE EQUIPMENT REQUIRING 
TRANSPORTATION.
C. THIS UNIT REQUIRES 100% OF ITS TOE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES TO BE TRANSPORTED IN A 
SINGLE LIFT USING ITS AUTHORIZED ORGANIC VEHICLES. (SOURCE: FM 71-3)
7. DOCTRINE. THE FOLLOWING DOCTRINAL PUBLICATIONS ARE APPLICABLE TO THE OPERATION OF THIS 
UNIT:






















01 04 INTELLIGENCE SGT
-  - RADIO OPR-MAINTAINER 
ALARM CML AGENT AUTO
01 A72260 A ANTENNA RC-292
F i g u r e  15. Excerpts from a Table o f Organization and Equipment (TOE) for a Brigade HQ 
Company, Armored Division. (Adapted from GlobalSecurity.org, “TOE 87042C100/200,” (no date)
http://www.gl0balsecurity.0rg/military/library/p0licy/army/t0e/87042L100.htm).
236
Yet it would be naive in the extreme to assume that this is actually a sufficient 
description of how a unit is constituted in the Army. As it happens, shortages of both 
personnel and equipment regularly occur, and the inevitable working of human 
relationships can form shadow command structures and sideways networks, 
undermining the prescribed structure of the unit. The ‘battle captain,’ for example, is 
not a position described in any TOE, yet it is central to understanding the working of 
a company such as this, acting as a focus point between the commander and his 
subordinate staff. Units, therefore, exist despite varying from their constituting TOEs 
-  often to quite a substantial degree.
There is an echo here of Mol and Law’s discussion of the Zimbabwean bush 
pump, which changes shape from place to place and yet continues to ‘work’ as a bush 
pump, despite, or, as Mol and Law argue, because of varying criteria for success, 
varying configurations of the pump within social systems, and the varying 
construction of the pump itself.
There is a sameness, a shape constancy, which does not depend on any particular defining feature
or relationship, but rather on the existence of many instances which overlap with one another
partially. 492
Units in the US Army are made present through their resemblance to TOEs (and, 
implicitly, other units so constituted), but not through their identical coexistence.
This, however, poses a problem for the US Army. For units to be able to be placed 
into relation with one another, to be commanded, to be moved, indeed to act, they 
need to have at least a partially known  existence within the Army.493 w ith  4,451
492 Lawet al., "Situating Technoscience," 614.
493 Van Creveld, for example, emphasises the absolute importance in command of “gathering 
information on the state of one’s own forces -  a problem that should not be underestimated.... Martin
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individual combat units in the Army (including the Army Reserve and National 
Guard), all no doubt varying from their prescribed TOE in one way or another, it is 
im possible to plan actions on the basis of knowledge of each individual unit.494 So, 
rather than acknowledging variance, the Army makes a place for this fluidity through 
the convenient ‘fudge’ of nam ing units. By naming a unit as a particular kind of unit, 
its fluidity is covered over, and it is possible for the unit to act as  a unit within the 
Army structure without having to account, each time it acts, for the presence of the 
entire contents and structure prescribed by the TOE. This is not to say that this 
fluidity can be effaced entirely: without sufficient similarity to the TOE, a unit simply 
cannot function as intended (if there are no radios working at all, for example, due 
either to an absence of radios or perhaps no ‘Radio Opr-Maintainer,’ then there is no 
possibility for the Brigade HQ company to exercise command over absent troops, 
unless a workaround can be found).495 However, slippage can often be effaced for the 
purposes of Army action by simply ignoring it. It is possible, for example, to treat all 
platoons as though they were identical and therefore equal in capability, simply by 
requiring that all things that resemble platoons be named as platoons by relevant 
people (those who stand in relation to the platoon) and things (signs outside a 
barracks or a command post, for example).
Naming is a complicated process. In addition to names that indicate the ‘kind’ of 
unit, units have specific identifiers — and often, nicknames and special crests that 
indicate the individual identity of the particular unit as well. 1st Cavalry, for example, 
is not only a heavy-armoured Division within the meaning of the relevant TOE, but is
van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 7. This is a rather 
Foucauldian assessment of the problem of first knowing oneself.
494 See, GlobalSecurity.org, "Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE)".
495 Workarounds are another important way in which the Army fudges the fluidity of ‘the unit’ as 
defined. They are also much despised by Army hierarchies, which view them as complicating and 
ultimately inefficient.
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also called the First Team, and membership of the Division gives soldiers the right to 
wear the arm patch (Figure 14) and to participate in associated 1st Cavalry behaviour 
(including the rather disconcerting habit of greeting each other by shouting ‘First 
Team!’). Hence, while names can be used to efface difference, as when the standard 
qualifier ‘Brigade’ is attached, names can also be used to create difference.
Fifth Brigade “Red Team” in 1st Cavalry is an interesting example in this regard, 
being formed from a patchwork assemblage of different units, and kept in an 
unconventional command arrangement due to short-staffing and lack of fu n d in g ^  
Nevertheless, it was nam ed  as a Brigade and treated by those outside and inside it as 
though it had the capabilities prescribed in the Brigade TOE. As a result of its unusual 
constitution, however, interviewees sometimes suggested that, despite a seeming 
equality of capability, there was a serious deficiency of competency in their operations 
in OIF II. Here, covering over difference by calling all things that roughly come close 
to constituting the TOE of ‘a Brigade’ had the paradoxical result of creating a 
difference in quality rather than kind. All of this indicates that making a unit present 
is more than simply meeting a TOE requirement -  it also includes naming it a unit, 
which can in turn efface some differences but create others.
In the Army, naming a unit takes place over and over again. Through the arm 
patch worn by unit members, through the ritual behaviours that identify soldiers as 
members of the group, and through the material infrastructure that identifies this as 
a particular unit, and tha t as a different unit (street signs, for example, that point to a 
particular unit’s headquarters), in all of these ways a unit is continuously re-named, 
and in the process, continuously re-enacted as a unit, as a militarily relevant agent.
4 9 6  5 t h  Brigade has since been inactivated, and its attached units redeployed within the Division. See, 
GlobalSecurity.org, "5th Brigade Combat Team 'Red Team"' (2005),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/1cd-5bde.htm.
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This enaction is a m aking p resen t of the unit and is an uncertain, difficult and 
contingent process. For example, when a unit moves from the homefront to a war 
zone, it is loaded onto ships in the continental United States and taken to the theatre 
of combat. But when the people disembark, when the equipment is unloaded and so 
on, there is a doctrinally prescribed period during which the unsettled configuration 
of relations that form the unit are stabilised through training and acclimatisation 
exercises. Often this involves training exercises outside of the immediate theatre of 
war, perhaps in a neighbouring country.497 That is, after the highly disruptive process 
of dismantling and transport the unit, it has to be reconstituted before it can act as  a 
unit.
Recognising the necessity of this continual process of naming is simply another 
way of stating the point made in Chapter Two that thing-ness, agency, and 
subjectivity emerge in practice, through enaction.498 it is the contention of this 
chapter that each time a unit is nam ed, the unit is enacted in a particular way, 
act-ualising the unit as a set of competencies and capabilities that are generated by 
the “distribution of the conditions of possibility” to which Law refers (and therefore 
keeping other competencies and capabilities ‘un-actualised,’ or virtual).499 It is further 
the contention of this chapter that, despite the best intentions of the US military as an 
organisation, such naming never enacts precisely the unit it thinks it is enacting, with 
the distributed conditions of possibility continually interfering with, and slipping
497 Anthony S wofford, for example, describes how nearly the entirity of his deployment for Operation 
Desert Storm was made up of such exercises in neighbouring Saudi Arabia. Anthony Swofford, Jarhead: 
A Soldier’s Story o f Modern War (London: Scribner, 2003).
498 See, in particular, 101-104.
499 There are, of course, other ways of enacting a unit that do not involve naming it. However, the focus 
of this chapter is on a case which relies on enacting a unit as named, largely because this is often the 
starting point for enacting a unit in official Army procedures.
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beyond, the control of the military.500 This is a particularly important point, as units 
are named and enacted for the purpose of creating m ilitarily effective agency. 
Uncontrollable and experimental qualities of violence, therefore, may well be 
explicable at least partly with reference to the slipperiness of this naming process.
This chapter explores the enaction of a unit at one particular moment, identifying 
how a unit is made present in a particular circumstance, those things made 
deliberately absent during this process, the potentialities of being for that unit which 
are excluded by this presence but nevertheless continually interfere with its enaction, 
and so on. In other words, this chapter explores what it means for a unit to be present 
here, in CPOF, and what this means a unit can do in terms of the spatialising 
practices of violence.
Naming a unit-in-CPOF: iconography and presence
For the purposes of command and control, naming a unit is particularly vital to 
enable the positioning of that unit within the military effort. More traditional 
methods of command and control (particularly in the last century) have utilised the 
positioning of military symbols on paper maps to make units present to the 
commander. Symbols were positioned according to assumptions made by planners, 
who extrapolated from knowledge of a unit’s mobile capabilities and the instructions 
they had been given to come up with provisional locations. They were also positioned 
on the basis of knowledge garnered from radio communications updating unit 
locations (either as a result of a direct inquiry via radio or from the passive
5°° in fact, and with reference to the previous chapter, it is obvious that the US Army never acts in a 
single capacity and with a single intent to enact the unit at all. Rather, it would be closer to the truth to 
say that there is a multiplicity of units being enacted by a multiplicity of US Armies. Nonetheless, and as 
stated previously, this chapter is focused less on multiplicity and more on single points of enaction, and 
so this multiplicity must be effaced for the purposes of the narrative of the chapter.
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monitoring of radio communications between all levels of the force). In either case, 
however, locating units via radio was a slow and cumbersome process, pulling 
together only a piecemeal picture of the battlefield.s01
In CPOF, naming units is an automated process that operates to locate them in 
real time. Tracked via a GPS emitter in ‘real’ space and ‘real’ time, units are present in 
CPOF in a manner that is unprecedented in the history of warfare: (mostly) they are 
made present where and when they ‘really’ are. We have already seen in the previous 
chapter the limitations of the geographic base (the map that locates where the unit 
‘really’ is) that forms the background in CPOF. For the moment, however, let us turn 
aside considerations of that base and think instead of the icon formed on it. How is 
that icon located, made present, in the commander’s battlespace? The answer is to be 
found in the Blue Force Tracker/Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below 
(BFT/FBCB2 ).5°2
It begins with a GPS emitter that is installed on tactical vehicles, weapons 
platforms, and aviation platforms. For 1st Cavalry, BFT/FBCB2 was primarily 
installed on Abrams tanks (usually as part of the M1A2 SEP upgrade) and Bradley 
Fighting Vehicles (usually as part of the M2A3 upgrade). 1st Brigade, for example, 
had two armoured battalions, each with 44 BFT/FBCB2 equipped Abrams tanks, and
501 To give a sense of the scale of arrangements required to locate units via radio, it is useful to consider 
the US military in World War II. Here, the mobility of troops in the western European theatre led to the 
development of the Signal Information and Monitoring Company (SIAM), containing about 500 men, 
whose job was to monitor all radio communications in order to track blue forces (as well as maintain the 
security of radio networks). Working at the Division/Corps level, SIAM was a ‘ useful tool for the field 
commander” in bypassing normal, slower command channels to gain a sense of units’ locations on the 
battlefield, but was nonetheless far from an organic component of the command structure capable of 
providing real-time information as required. John Patrick Finnegan, Arm y Lineage Series: Military 
Intelligence (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1998), 89.
5°2 The difference between BFT and FBCB2 is related to the level of security achieved in the transmission 
and reception of the signal. Operating on L-Band, FBCB2 is the more secure version of the system. See, 
Figure 8.
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one mechanised infantry battalion equipped with 44 BFT/FBCB2 capable Bradley 
Fighting Vehicles.503 Each of these battalions was divided into three companies, 
divided in turn into three platoons, each equipped with four of the major fighting 
platforms (either the Abrams tank or BFV) .5°4
The signal from any given platform, shown in the bottom left corner of Figure 16, 
is routed through an L-Band transceiver before passing through a complicated array 
of hardware and software and being received back in the FBCB2, where it emerges as 
an icon on a screen, located according to GPS coordinates on maps that have been 
standardised according to GPS locations.505
Despite its complexity, Figure 16 is an oversimplification of the entire 
BFT/FBCB2 process. This chapter will primarily focus on only one step that is elided.
s°3 It is worth noting that the deployment of BFT/FBCB2 is at once an ad hoc process in response to 
deployment orders to OIF, and also a part of the continuing modernisation of 1st Cavalry as part of the 
Army’s Force XXI process. First Brigade is used as an example here because its story holds the most 
‘regular’ or even deployment of the technology, being the earliest recipient of the full upgrade packages 
and the only Brigade to receive them in full prior to the decision to invade Iraq. GlobalSecurity.org, "1st 
Brigade (Iron Horse) - 1st Cavalry Division" (2005),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/militaiy/agency/army/icd-ibde.htm; Cavalry OutPost, "Force XXI: The 
Challenge of a New Century" (Cavalry OutPost Publications, 2005), http://www.first- 
team.us/journals/forcexxi/chapt_i5.html.
5°4 The seeming mismatch in numbers of major fighting vehicles here (three platoons per company at 
four tanks/BFVs each, with three companies per Battalion, gives 36 tanks/BFVs per Battalion) can be 
accounted for by the fighting vehicles utilised for C2 at each level of command, giving a total of 4 4  
tanks/BFVs per Battalion. See, Federation of American Scientists, "US Army Table of Organization" 
(Federation of American Scientists, 2000), http://www.fas.org/man/dod- 
101/army/unit/toe/toenum.htm.
5°5 This process of standardising maps so that GPS coordinates can be located on top of them is more 
complicated and controversial than might be thought. See, for example, the controversies that raged 
inside the US military regarding even the most fundamental of questions of cartography, such as how to 
determine the shape of the earth. Deborah J. Warner, "Political Geodesy: The Army, the Air Force, and 
the World Geodetic System of i960," Annals o f Science 59, no. 4 (2002); John Cloud, "Imaging the 
World in a Barrel: Corona and the Clandestine Convergence of the Earth Sciences," Social Studies o f  
Science 31, no. 2 (2001); John Cloud, "American Cartographic Transformations During the Cold War," 
Cartography and Geographic Information Science 29, no. 3 (2002).
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The transposition of an emission signal into an icon is an act of naming worthy of 
consideration, and performs a similar function in making a unit, or, here, a platform, 
‘present’ as the acts of naming described briefly above. It is the purpose of this 
chapter to explore how this naming of a platform (and/or unit) through the 
iconography of CPOF performs these platforms (and/or units) as ‘centres’ of 
presence, while excluding other possibilities in the actualisation of that platform.
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F i g u r e  16. Diagram illustrating the communication links required to enable FBCB2. [Office 
of Force Transformation (OFT), A Network-Centric Operation Case Study: US/UK Coalition Combat 
Operations During Operation Iraqi Freedom, (Washington, DC: Office of Secretary of Defense, 2005), 
3-7l
Military symbols are constructed according to a series of logical and progressive 
rules. Constructing a symbol involves starting at the beginning of a series of rules and 
using them to add to the symbol until all facets of an entity (capable of description 
through the rules) have been described (see Figure 17). Emphasis is laid on features 
such as: the basic function of a unit (that is, infantry, reconnaissance, armor, and so 
on); its size (platoon, company, battalion, and so on); particular kinds of equipment 
present; whether the unit in question is reinforced or reduced from its TOE
2 4 4
capability, the level of command at which this unit is operating; direction of travel; 
and the unit’s speed.
As nil example, we will build the symbol for a friendly unclear, bi ological, or chemical (NBC) reconnaissance 
unit equipped with the FOX and M21 long-range sensor.
STEP 1. First choose the frame (friendly) and graphic for the basic function o r
branch of the unit, labeling field "A,” In this example, the basic function is NBC. f \
STEP 2. Choose the graphic modifier for the secondary function or capability , 
labeling field “ A, " (possibly from the list of modifiers). In this example, th e 
secondary function and first modifier is reconnaissance.
STEP 3. Choose the graphic modifier for the next capability, labeling field ‘‘A 
In this example, the tertiary (third function or capability) is wheeled armore d 
veliicle.
STEP 4. Choose the graphic modifier for any other capability, labeling field ” A 3”
Tliis example requires no more graphic modifiers.
STEP 5. If necessary to fully dist inguish the unit from another type of unit, include 
a text abbreviation, labeling field "A inside the symbol frame. In tliis example, 
a text abbreviation “RS” is added inside the symbol to show that this unit is 
specially equipped w ith the M21 sensor. Unit size indicators, shown in Figure 4-5, 
are placed at the top center of the symbol frame in field " B."
Figure 17. An example o f building unit symbols. [Excerpt from Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, and US Marine Corps, FM 101-5-1/MCRP 5-2A Operational Terms and Graphics, (US Army and US 
Marine Corps, 1997), 4-5]
In the BFT/FBCB2 system, this symbology (whose reading and construction is 
second nature to most staff planners) is largely automated, with the transceiver 
em ission identifying the symbol/icon that should be used to represent the platform’s 
location on the map.506 This, however, has the potential to create an enormous 
number of icons on any given screen (at least 132 for 1st Brigade alone). This 
proliferation of BFT/FBCB2 emitters is useful at a tactical level, enabling platoons to 
manoeuvre near each other with greatly reduced concern of fratricide.50? For
506 Automation of blue force icons on CPOF is not prescriptive, with users retaining the ability to tailor 
individual icons, add notes to describe the unit better, or colour-code icons to indicate membership of a 
particular group of units.
507 See, for example, a description of the impact of FBCB2/BFT on the tactical behaviour of 3rd ID during 
the battle of As Samawah. John E. Tisserand, Volume III: Network Centric Warfare Insights (Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership, 2006), 3 7 -5 3 -
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commanders utilising CPOF, however, this granularity is problematic. In particular, 
the figh tin g  p la tform  is not coterm inous w ith  the unit as defined above: in fact, as is 
obvious, the fighting platform is only one of many components required to form a 
unit. If a commander using CPOF does not wish to micro-manage a battle (and given 
that CPOF was only deployed at the lowest to Battalion level in 1st Cavalry, monitoring 
and intervening at an individual platform level would be considered micro­
management), then the commander needs different icons that represent meaningful 
levels of operation for his purposes. There is, then, a process of selection that takes 
place so that the emitter-signal can be named a unit for the purposes of command.
This occurs by locating a ‘lead’ platform, usually the unit commander’s vehicle, 
which is taken to identify the unit as a whole. The location identified by the 
transceiver emission from that single vehicle will indicate a cluster of vehicle 
platforms, and this will be achieved through the use of an appropriate symbol (the 
symbol indicating a company, for example, rather than an individual BFV). 
Information about the unit portrayed by each icon is then available through a ‘drill- 
down’ facility, in which a separate table illustrates important details such as the 
component strength of each unit (see Figures 18 and 19).
This technical description of the process by which a unit is enacted in CPOF, 
however, is insufficient to explain the kind  of presence established for that unit. The 
rest of the chapter describes how an icon on CPOF enacts a unit as a point of physical 
presence, and the kind of agency with which the unit is imbued as a result. In 
particular it argues that enacting the presence of the unit-in-CPOF is always/already 
accompanied by a distribution of exclusions and absences, which both help determine 
the nature of a unit’s presence and act to disrupt its ongoing enaction. In particular, 
this chapter explores the presence of the unit-in-CPOF in terms of its physical
246
location and mobility -  in terms of its enaction as what is termed a. po in t o f  mobile 
possib ility .
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F ig u r e  1 8 . CPOF display showing drill-down table of information regarding unit 
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F ig u r e  19 . Drill-down table o f information as used on Personal Digital Assistant.
[Both figures reproduced from Pittsburgh Pebbles PDA Project, "Command Post of the Future," 
(Carnegie Mellon University, 2005), http://www.pebbles.hcii.cmu.edu/cpof/]
Physical presence (and absence) of the ‘unit-in-CPOF’
Before continuing, it is helpful to address what might seem to be a commonsense 
objection to this line of inquiry: how can an icon on a screen enact physical presence 
at all? The icon on the screen is, after all, only present in cyberspace, or, at best, 
present in the square half-inch or so of physical space of the plasma screen it covers. 
To explain this, let us return to the above description of the way in which the ‘real’ 
physical unit is named as the icon on the screen. We have already seen that naming a 
unit is an important and continuing process in the US military, without which the 
unit could not exist as a meaningful entity but would instead be a collection of people 
and machines without a defined shape or presence. Further we have seen that naming 
a unit for the purposes of enacting it as a point of presence often takes place in the 
command process, and in this the icon in CPOF is no exception. The icon in CPOF
2 4 7
nam es  a unit, making it present both for commanders and for the unit itself (units 
without access to their command chain are barely units at all, and certainly are units 
with vastly different capacities and agency). The icon may be remote from the 
physical presence of the unit in the sense that it is often some kilometres from the 
unit, but it is integral to the enacting of the unit as  a unit with certain properties of 
physical presence.
This chapter works from the assumption, then, that the icon in CPOF is an 
enaction of the unit that is highly militarily relevant, impacting greatly on the 
battlespace around it, for example, by naming the unit as something that can be 
commanded (an important first step in the organisation of violence at any level), but 
also by enabling particular kinds of agency on behalf of both the commander (who 
can see unit position ‘in-transit’ and thus demand different things of the unit) and o f  
the unit itse lf  This unintuitive conclusion, in which an icon that is ostensibly 
generated out o f  the physical presence of the unit nonetheless generates the 
conditions of possibility fo r  the physical presence of the unit, results from the 
commingling of matter and meaning discussed in Chapter Two as marking the nature 
of the ‘alternative’ real which guides this thesis. This commingling is not the excessive 
capabilities of the body disrupting orderings (meanings) imposed from ‘outside,’ as 
described by Lefebvre and Foucault. Rather, this is more akin to a Deleuzo- 
Guattarian assemblage, in which it is not sensible to distinguish between matter and 
meaning -  here, it is not sensible to make a qualitative distinction between the icon 
as ‘representation’ and the unit as ‘physically present.’ Rather, icons and units are 
enrolled in the same ‘desiring assemblage,’ one which organises itself according to 
affective tonalities.
Put another way, we might follow Lorraine Daston’s discussion of the ‘thingness 
of things,’ in which she argues that “some things speak irresistibly, and not only by
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interpretation, projection, and puppetry.” In other words, she urges us not simply to 
analyse things like icons as meaningful ‘representations’ operating according to the 
semiotics of human language, but as things that are obdurately material, with their 
own mode o f ‘speaking’ as well.508 Perhaps the unit-in-CPOF (the icon and  its 
associated unit) is one such thing, and we should look beyond the icon as a 
representation created through the guiding hand of man (although it is likely the 
symbology of the icons would indicate much about a discourse or semiotics of 
violence). Rather, and as becomes clearer below, the unit-in-CPOF is a composite 
thing which ‘speaks’ (and ‘acts’) of its own accord, and -  as Heidegger might have it -  
“gathers” other elements “into something that stays for a while: this thing, that 
thing.”509 Exploring the process of this gathering, the practice of this speaking, is, of 
course, the purpose of the praxiographic analysis of CPOF that follows, and one which 
explores CPOF as an assemblage where materiality is meaningful, and vice versa.
Physical presence: the ‘t rack-and-trace ’ unit
The icon on CPOF enacts the unit as physically present in a manner that is novel 
in modern war, as a precise location (with exact longitude and latitude) in real time. 
This contrasts sharply with previous modes of enacting the physical presence of units, 
which tended to ignore the specific location of a unit at any given moment in favour of 
emphasising its progress from a start point toward an end point. As Schmitt and 
Klein note in their study of pre blue force tracking command behaviour in the Marine 
Corps:
508 Lorraine Daston, "Speechless," in Things That Talk: Object Lessons From A rt and Science, ed.
Lorraine Daston, 9-24 (New York, NY: Zone Books, 2004L 14•
s°9 Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 197 t)> 172; Daston,
"Speechless," 16.
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... a good portion of message traffic is more about relieving anxiety than it is about actual command 
and control. Where are you now? Are you in position yet? Have you reached Checkpoint 35? Tell 
me when you get there.s10
In this case, the physical presence of a unit is linear and progressive. It moves fro m  A  
to  B, often with limited in-transit visibility. During the last century, some militaries 
took this to the extreme of issuing detailed schedules commanding where a unit 
should be at particular intervals in order to arrive at their destination on time 
(intervals calculated, it might be added, according to engineering considerations of 
artillery range and maximum speed of movement, and not on the basis of ongoing 
and altering enemy activity and situational context).511 It is in this context that van 
Creveld uses the term the “timetable war” to refer to World War 1.512 However, even 
in the context of the more flexible command structure utilised by the Germans in 
World War II, and the Israelis in 1967 and 1973, where units were issued with mission 
objectives and then allowed to pursue them with relative freedom, the physical 
presence of the unit remained remarkably end-to-end oriented. As Israeli General 
Mordechai Gur argued in 1978:
The ID F... is like a smart bomb being released on the basis of general data, without the target even 
being seen. Later, after a few miles, the bomb identifies the target and is locked on it. From this 
point it flies on accurately until the objective is r e a c h e d .s ^
In a different context, Thrift refers to this linear and progressive mode of physical 
presence as a mode of “sequential order.” The modern world can show up as
510 John F. Schmitt and Gary A. Klein, "Fighting in the Fog: Dealing with Battlefield Uncertainty,"
Marine Corps Gazette 80, no. 8 (1996): 63 (emphasis original).
s11 Recall the description of the British in the Battle of the Somme above, n. 102.
si2 Creveld, Command in War, Chapter Five.
513 Quoted, Creveld, Command in War, 195. It is useful to note that the model of C2 cited here was 
adopted by the Israelis in direct response to the almost complete lack of hierarchically imposed planning 
on force behaviour in the war of 1956, which saw the Israelis dogged by mishap, uncoordination, and 
fratricide. Creveld, Command in War, 196-98.
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confident and in charge courtesy of a series of technologies, knowledges, and 
behaviours that enable repetition, such as timetables, standardised addresses, 
postcodes, and so on.514 After reviewing some of the elements of a history of address, 
Thrift notes that:
Though these are clearly only notes towards a more general history of knowledges of position and 
juxtaposition ... what is clear is that the goal was to produce a general configuration based on exact 
and countable sequencing which could roll over seamlessly into the future.... Everything would be 
in the right place a t the right tim e rs
It is Thrift’s argument that this series of specific “knowledges and competencies 
concerned with position and juxtaposition” constitute society’s ‘technological 
unconscious’:
... whose content is the bending of bodies-with-environments to a specific set of addresses without 
the benefit of any cognitive inputs, a prepersonal substrate of guaranteed correlations, assured 
encounters, and therefore unconsidered anticipations, s16
Thrift distinguishes between the sequential ordering of the modern world, found 
emerging from at least the 17th century, and a contemporary emergence of a ‘track- 
and-trace’ mode of spatial ordering. He examines a series of factors which have 
brought about this new way of organising position and juxtaposition: new  
technologies, such as GPS, lasers, and wireless ICTs, which can continuously monitor 
the position of people and things; “formalised and integrative knowledges of 
sequence,” including scheduling approaches, which enable a much more 
sophisticated arrangement of multiple and complicated items; and new possibilities
514 Nigel Thrift, "Remembering the Technological Unconscious by Foregrounding Knowledges of 
Position," Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 22, no. 1 (2004): 178 (emphasis added), 
176.
515 Thrift, "Remembering the Technological Unconscious," 181 (emphasis added).
516 Thrift, "Remembering the Technological Unconscious," 177.
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for calculation, including those made possible by spreadsheets, which allow the 
making of calculations about the future in a way that was previously too difficult to be 
practicable.517 According to Thrift, these factors have led to three important shifts in 
the m odes of ordering operating in contemporary society. Firstly, addresses have 
become mobile and attached to both human and non-human actants (for example, 
through SIM cards in mobile phones, and bar codes). Secondly, computing -  and 
particularly computing that can calculate location -  has slipped into the environment 
and become a part of everyday life. Thirdly, these two developments (combined with 
the ICT revolution) allow for ‘micro-coordination’ or ‘hyper-coordination.’ Here, an 
actant’s location, trajectory, and so on, are constantly revised according to 
calculations (often made by computers located in the environment) that respond to a 
defined criteria of need and/or efficiency.518
This new mode of ordering is characterised by a number of features that resonate 
with Deleuze’s vision of a control society.
Thus what we see is a different kind of repetition, which allows things to show up differently with 
different kinds of opportunities associated with them. Through the application of a set of 
technologies and knowledges (the two being impossible to separate), a style of repetition has been 
produced which is more controlled and also more open-ended, a new kind of roving empiricism 
which continually ties up and undoes itself in a search for the most efficient ways to use the space 
and time of each m om ent.^
In particular, the constant alteration in pursuit of efficiency is evocative of Deleuze’s 
description of control as a “self-transmuting molding continually changing from one 
moment to the n e x t ... .”520 Yet, as Thrift astutely notes, the track-and-trace model, 
marked as it is by objects positioning themselves in relation to other objects, is only
517 Thrift, "Remembering the Technological Unconscious," 182.
518 Thrift, "Remembering the Technological Unconscious," 185.
519 Thrift, "Remembering the Technological Unconscious," 186 (emphasis original).
520 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, 1972-1990 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1 9 9 5 ), 178.
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made possible against a background ‘standardisation’ of space: “a carefully 
constructed absolute space begets this relative space.”521 This background 
standardisation of space and its concomitant track-and-trace mode of ordering give 
som e clues as to the way in which a unit is enacted as physically present in CPOF.
As noted in the previous section, the GPS signal locating a particular vehicle 
platform according to its GPS coordinates is transmitted to a central server, where it 
is laid over a map that has been standardised according to GPS locations.522 It is only 
in the context of the constant calculation and recalculation of absolute position in this 
space that units enact themselves as mobile, agile, and responsive. Without the 
certitude of a unit’s positioning within Euclidean space in real time and, importantly, 
the certitude of the positioning of other friendly units, a unit would be unwilling to 
move in response to unfolding events without a preconceived demarcation of territory 
and/or careful sequencing for fear of fratricide. Similarly, units are reluctant to move 
flexibly outside pre-existing plans without accurate knowledge of their position in 
relation to the demarcations of the city for fear a wrong turn might lead them into a 
neighbourhood requiring vastly different forms of force protection.525
The physical presence of the unit-in-CPOF, against a backdrop of standardised, 
calculable space, is one of real space/real-time presence, which enacts a highly mobile
521 Nigel Thrift, "Movement-Space: The Changing Domain of Thinking Resulting From the Development 
of New Kinds of Spatial Awareness," Economy and Society 33, no. 4 (2004): 592. 
s22 See above, n. 509.
523 Despite the availability of GPS, however, ‘wrong turns’ have still played a substantial role in OIF. In
particular, the wrong turn taken by 507th Maintenance Company into the heart of Nasiriyah led to a
series of ambushes that caused 20 casualties and saw seven soldiers captured, including, famously,
Private Jessica Lynch. Poorly trained, poorly led, but also -  critically, according to General Peter
Schoomaker -  without GPS, this wrong turn was a turning point in public perception of the war in the
US. See, Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American M ilitary Adventure in Iraq (London: Allen Lane,
2006), 119.
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agency.524 Whereas traditionally units were physically present in fixed relation to a 
pre-existing plan (A re you in position yet?  H ave you reached Checkpoint 35?), units 
are present in CPOF as mobile potentialities. They are physically present at a discrete 
point at any given time, in known relation to both other units and reported SIGACTs. 
These trajectories are capable of constant revision in light of the event-fulness of the 
battlespace. The mobility of these other forms of presence provides impetus for the 
unit to constantly recalibrate its own motion in response to operational need.525
‘Physical absence’ : centring a unit, decentring a network
The physical presence of the unit-in-CPOF, then, is centred on the location of 
vehicle platforms as they move through the battlespace. The transceivers used to 
locate these vehicles, however, are only turned on when weapons platforms are in 
use, a designation which does not cover activities such as maintenance or movement 
that occurs within a Forward Operating Base. This means that the unit’s presence in 
CPOF, its effective agency as enacted there, is circumscribed by what it is possible for 
a transceiver to do: to be on or off, moving or still. As described above, courtesy of 
new assemblages of technology and knowledge, the unit-in-CPOF is highly mobile 
and adaptable in terms of location and movement, but ultimately, it is still capable 
only of moving its weapons platforms through the streets and making contact with 
the enemy in a way that can be represented as a SIGACT. There are, in fact, entire 
registers of a unit’s behaviour that cannot be accounted for by this emphasis on the 
physical presence of the unit as part of a track-and-trace mode of ordering.
524 The phrase ‘unit-in-CPOF’ is used to acknowledge that this enaction of a unit is only one of many, 
albeit a particularly powerful one (given its significant presence in the command chain).
525 por a detailed description of the impact of BFT/FBCB2 on the movement of 3ID in As Samawah that 
indicates similar effects, see, Tisserand, Volume III: Network Centric Warfare Insights, 3 7 _5 3 -
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This chapter argues that moments of presence, of centring, are necessarily 
accompanied by a decentring of different possibilities for actualisation. Put another 
way, this chapter argues that the virtuality of a thing is only ever partly actualised in 
any given moment or setting, and that this actualisation is never as firm or complete 
as we might think. In light of the previous discussion of a unit’s presence in CPOF as a 
mobile potentiality, this section seeks to identity which kinds of things are excluded 
by this emphasis on the unit as being physically centred in real space and real time.
Given that the physical presence of the unit-in-CPOF is limited to the location of 
vehicles, often the location of a single ‘representative’ command vehicle, it is apparent 
that physical presence in CPOF excludes quite a lot. For one, it excludes the location 
of the soldiers of a unit, who may not be in the vehicles at all. Another, more 
complicated exclusion, is the exclusion of the network of human and non-human 
actants required to link the GPS emitter to the CPOF screen. This is not simply a 
matter of excluding the software and hardware requirements illustrated in Figure 16, 
but of excluding an entire assemblage of human and non-human infrastructure 
dedicated to maintaining the network’s connectivity. For example, Captain John 
Transue of the 13th Signal Battalion speaks of 100 manholes and 10 kilometres of 
conduit infrastructure required in Camp Liberty alone to give the TOC sufficient 
bandwidth to operate CPOF.s26 Without this network to hold the signal stable from 
transceiver to screen, a unit’s physical presence in real time and real space is 
unreliable, even impossible. There is, to use Thrift, an “unconsidered anticipation” 
that this network will hold stable, and, by and large, it does. When it does not, 
however, one of the excluded potentialities for the enaction of a unit its enaction as 
a presence at an uncertain location — comes to the fore.
526 John Transue, "Upgrades Enhance Operational Communications," SIGNAL (2005),
http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/anmviewer.asp?a=9o8&print=yes.
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There is a further network whose exclusion haunts the presence of units in CPOF 
in ways that are neither anticipated nor imagined. This is the network of people, 
knowledge, and things required to help a unit keep its shape  as it moves. To put it 
another way, if the physical presence of CPOF enacts a mobile agency, then it 
sim ultaneously covers over the presence of this network whose operation is 
absolutely necessary to the achievement of that mobility. Mobility is a tricky issue: the 
US military demands that its units be mobile, in order to be able to send them out 
into the battlespace and do their work, but it also requires those units to maintain a 
known configuration while moving. In fact, as John Law notes in a rather different 
context, what is really sought in things that will project force over a distance is not 
only m obility  but also durability, the capability  to exert force, and, most importantly, 
the capacity  to return .527 Perhaps, then, we could return to the articulation of the 
physical presence of a unit-in-CPOF outlined above and suggest that the latter 
qualities be added to the physical presence of mobile possibility: assumed in this 
physical presence is the ability of that unit-in-CPOF to maintain its shape, exert force 
over its environment, and have sufficient mobility to return to its base.
Law’s discussion took place in 1986 in the early days of Actor-Network Theoiy  
(ANT), when he was discussing the question of how ships in the Portuguese imperial 
fleet could act as effective agents of imperial power. Law framed the problem like this:
Vessels may move to and fro with relative freedom. Like faithful servants they may thus be seen as 
candidate means for those who wish to exercise long-distance control. However, before they can be 
so used, they have themselves to be controlled. They have to be able to retain their integrity under a
527 John Law, "On the Methods of Long Distance Control: Vessels, Navigation, and the Portuguese Route 
to India" (Centre for Science Studies, Lancaster University, 1986), 
http://comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/soco504jl.html, 5.
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range of circumstances. Their structure — but also their means of navigation -  these are two of the
features that define the envelope within which they come and go like faithful servants.528
For a military unit patrolling the city of Baghdad there is a similar problem. If a unit 
is enacted as a point of mobile presence, there is nonetheless a series of relations and 
m echanism s required to keep the unit ‘internally’ stable as it moves through the 
environment (to keep the ‘point’ together, as it were). For Portuguese sailing ships, 
the network keeping them stable might consist of “hulls, spars, sails, winds, oceans, 
sailors, stores, navigators, stars, sextants, Ephemerides, guns, Arabs, spices, and 
m oney -  and a lot more besides.”529 For units in Baghdad, the network consists of an 
enormous and varying number of people and things, including: Combat Support 
Services (CSS), which, among other things, maintain tanks and BFVs that are worn 
down by the extreme heat and sandy conditions; tank spare parts, built in the 
continental United States and shipped over on pallets built at large warehouses 
throughout the country; bottled water, needed to keep soldiers hydrated; and email 
access and American movies, provided at Forward Operating Bases to keep soldiers 
happy and capable in the face of deprivation and homesickness. By focusing the 
enaction of the unit-in-CPOF on the point of physical presence of a mobile vehicle, 
this entire network is excluded, made absent, but, as discussed shortly, is never 
completely excluded.
One of the interesting implications of analysing how things maintain their shape 
using the method suggested by John Law and other early ANT proponents is that, on 
closer examination, it becomes apparent that in addition to the traditional Euclidean 
space of physical presence at certain longitudes and latitudes, there is at least one 
other kind of space in which the ship is operating. The ship is also operating in a 
networked space, where presence is not a result of physical presence at a particular
528 Law, "On Long Distance Control," 7.
529 Law et al., "Situating Technoscience," 611.
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location, but of the strength and stability of a network of relations. In fact, as Mol and 
Law note, it is precisely the interference  between the ship’s participation in both 
network and Euclidean spaces that affords the ship its special properties -  its ability 
to keep its shape as it m oves.530 This discussion of the interference between different 
kinds of spatiality is useful here, if in a complicated way.531
Firstly, the notion of interference allows us to undermine the traditional notion 
of presence in physical space as being the place of ‘real’ presence. While many 
commentators would no doubt agree that there is a network elaborated to maintain a 
unit’s presence and mobility, they would nonetheless argue that the unit is only really  
present at its physical location in space, and, further, that this presence is complete 
and whole in the sense that there is nothing unexpected, varying, or elusive about it. 
Such a commentator might say: ‘A unit is present here, at the corner of this street, 
according to these coordinates. The logistics involved are of course important in 
getting the unit here, but ultimately, the unit’s presence here is w h at m atters .’ Mol 
and Law’s analysis suggests that the unit’s presence ‘here’ is not the real or sole form  
of presence, but rather that it is a result of an interference between two different 
kinds of presence: the physical presence of a GPS emitter at a particular location, and 
the presence of that GPS emitter as part of a network of relations that hold the unit 
together as a u n it  Without the continual operation of the latter, the former would 
have no (or radically different) meaning.
Secondly, the notion of interference allows us to think about the ways in which 
alterations to one kind of spatiality might impact on the other. This is another way of 
framing the issue of the “distribution of the conditions of possibility” to which John
530 Law et al., "Situating Technoscience," 611.
531 For a more complete discussion of the way in which ‘events correspond to the interference between 
different spatialities, see, Tiago Moreira, "Surgical Monads: A Social Topology of the Operating Room, 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 22, no. 1 (2004): 53-56.
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Law refers in the epigraph of this chapter: if the physical presence of a unit in real 
space/real time on CPOF is seen as its ‘centre,’ then it is generated at least partly by 
this decentred and variable network spatiality. To take a simple example from above, 
when the information network joining the GPS emitter to the CPOF fails, the unit is 
enacted in CPOF as an unknown, ‘out of date,’ or otherwise inaccurate location. The 
unit is no longer enacted as a mobile potential with physical presence at a precise 
location.
Alterations in the networks that hold units stable are more common than 
perhaps first suggested by ANT-style analyses. Whereas early ANT analyses tended to 
emphasise a fairly stable series of relations (the relation of the ship to the ocean to the 
captain to the sailors and so on), close examination of the network of relations 
maintaining the constancy of the unit’s shape in CPOF suggests a rhythm ic  alteration 
in the network. In particular, the network is marked by the difference between the 
relations of a unit on patrol, and the relations of a unit on base (at rest).
Given that the network in question is the network required to maintain a unit’s 
stability while m oving, it may seem strange to focus on the network in play when a 
unit is at rest (and, not incidentally, entirely invisible to CPOF). However, the 
network of the unit-at-rest is intimately tied to the network of the unit while moving, 
to the extent that they should not be viewed as separate systems but modulating 
versions of the same network. This is particularly the case because the effective 
functioning of units requires the ‘work’ that is done while at rest: some of this work is 
maintenance and repair, some of it is training, and some of it is a kind of mental 
rehabilitation for soldiers to enable them to return to their duties the following day.532 
All of this occurs in the ‘off-cycle’ of the network, and without it, the unit would not be
S32 Interviewees often described ways in which they used their private time to ‘maintain their sanity.’
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able to maintain its shape as it moved through Baghdad: soldiers would not follow  
their commanders, tanks would not move as required, pre-planned formations 
keeping the unit together would be broken.
So the physical presence of a unit-in-CPOF is generated not only by the 
interference of a network spatiality with its presence at a GPS-specified Euclidean 
location, but by the interference of an altering, pulsing  network spatiality. As the 
network alters, so too does the way in which physical presence is actualised. In the 
m ost obvious sense, this is because when the network is configured as being ‘at rest,’ 
the physical presence of the unit disappears altogether from CPOF. Further, 
alterations in the network-at-rest have ongoing im pacts in the enaction o f  the 
m obility , durability, and forcefu l capacities o f  a unit-in-CPOF. When maintenance 
fails, when training is improved, when soldiers lose morale, all of these things impact 
on the enaction of the unit-in-CPOF as a competent entity capable of moving through 
the battlespace at will.
A haunting absence: centring a unit, Othering its potential
Centring the unit-in-CPOF on its point of mobile presence excludes the actor 
network articulated to maintain its stability (its durability) in more than one way. In 
the first way, considered above, this centring merely defers consideration of the 
support network, passing it on to different points of control within the command 
structure (to the officer in charge of logistics, for example). Despite this deferral, this 
network maintains continuity with the unit-in-CPOF — indeed, CSS uses a tool that is 
much like BFT/FBCB2 to track its convoys as they move throughout I r a q .533 it is 
possible to move analytically from the unit’s point of track-and-trace presence to the
533 This tool is the Defense Tracking, Reporting, and Control System (DTRACS). See, Tisserand, Volume 
III: N etw ork Centric Warfare Insights, 85-89.
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other ‘nodes’ in the network that hold a unit’s presence stable without altering the 
‘register’ or ‘texture’ of one’s analysis at all.
The second kind of exclusion of the actor network, however, suggests that 
perhaps ‘network’ is not the right term at all. This exclusion is not one of distance or 
deferral (where the network is continuous and connected to the unit, but 
acknowledgement or consideration of its presence is distanced and/or deferred from 
the enactment of that centre); this exclusion is an exclusion of alterity, of Otherness. 
In the words of Mol and Law:
Our answer is that we are not simply dealing with one part of a materially heterogeneous (actor) 
network. For putting it this way loses sight of the fact that the enactment is a complex association  
between that which is p re se n t... and that which is not. In short, it loses sight o f  Otherness. And, as 
part of this, it loses sight of the irreducible discontinuity between what appears on the paper and 
what does not. 534
Centring presence in CPOF on the mobile unit, and, in particular, on its GPS emitter, 
makes Other the alternative kinds of presence/agency with which a unit is imbued as 
part of its participation in the ‘actor network,’ alternative kinds of agency which are, 
in fact, discontinuous with -  irreconcilable and Other to -  an icon on the screen, and 
which nonetheless haunt the presence of the unit-in-CPOF.
In particular, the centring of presence in CPOF on the mobile unit excludes the 
agency that results from the unit’s configuration at rest, while in the Forward 
Operating Bases (FOBs). This perhaps seems sensible and straightforward: units are 
agents when they are in the battlespace under orders, and they are not really units at 
all when they are at rest, not being commanded, not fighting. This is, in fact, why the 
unit-at-rest is excluded from enaction in CPOF. Apart from participating in formal
534 Law et al., "Situating Technoscience," 617 (emphasis original).
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training, the unit-at-rest has no recognisable structure or agency — it cannot really be 
nam ed as a unit as it does not organise itself in a way that is continuous with, for 
example, a Table of Organization and Equipment. Units-at-rest, of course, maintain a 
highly rigid and structured form; however, this form is not continuous with the unit 
in the battlespace, consisting of different human and non-human actors, often in a 
highly dispersed arrangement that makes it impossible to pinpoint a single point of 
presence for that unit (a unit’s officers will sleep in different barracks to its NCOs and 
soldiers, for example). A unit-at-rest is simply Other to the effective military agency 
enacted by the unit-in-CPOF.
Yet the following is from one of the world’s leading counterinsurgency experts, 
extracted from an article detailing 28 cardinal rules for company commanders 
preparing to deploy to Iraq:
So your f ir s t  order o f  business is to establish presence. If you cannot do this throughout your 
sector, then do it wherever you can. This demands a residential approach  -  living in your sector, 
in close proxim ity to the population, rather than raiding into the area from  remote, secure bases. 
Movement on foot, sleeping in local villages, night patrolling: all these seem more dangerous than 
they are. They establish links with the locals, who see you as real people they can trust and do 
business with, not as aliens who descend from an armored box. Driving around in an armored 
convoy -  day-tripping like a tourist in hell -  degrades situational awareness, makes you a target 
and is ultimately more d a n g e r o u s . 5 3 5
According to Kilcullen, the golden rule determining a unit’s presence in 
counterinsurgency (COIN) is not one of mobile possibility but the demand that units 
“be there.”536 For 1st Cavalry during OIF II, this basic tenet of COIN was disregarded
5 35 David J. Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counter-Insurgency"
(2006), http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/articles/Twenty-EightArticles-Editioni.pdf, 4
(emphasis added).
536 Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles," 4.
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(and until recently has barely been utilised by US troops at all, with the marginal 
exception of the operations of the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul in 2003 -2004 ).537
The converse of this argument is that basing arrangements which emphasise 
large, highly protected FOBs are implicated in enacting the unit as more than/Other 
than simply a mobile potential: even when the unit is at rest, it is enacted as a 
combatant in the battlespace, but a kind of combatant that is unfamiliar and 
unrecognisable to the US military command process. Lack of presence has an agency 
all of its own. So the presence of the unit-in-CPOF does not simply exclude the unit- 
at-rest and its support network through deferring consideration of this network 
within the command chain, it doubly excludes this network through the discontinuity  
that exists between the presence that can be actualised in CPOF and alternative forms 
of agency enacted through this assemblage.
This discontinuity or Otherness suggests another way in which it is useful to 
think about presence as the result of the interference of different kinds of spatiality. 
For if the unit-in-CPOF operates in a physical (Euclidean) space of longitudes and 
latitudes, and also operates in a network space where presence is the result of a stable 
(if pulsating) network of relations, then the unit-in-CPOF is also  present in a third 
kind of space, a space in which effects that are discontinuous with the unit-in-CPOF
537 Ricks, Fiasco: The American M ilitary Adventure in Iraq, 228-32. Interestingly, Lt. Col. Kilcullen 
(cited above) is a member of a team of PhD-equipped advisers supporting the new US commander in 
Iraq, Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, whose plan includes increasing basing arrangements for US troops that 
stress living among the population. Thomas E. Ricks, "Petraeus’ Iraq Staff Armed with Lots of Ph.D.S, 
The Washington Post, February 10, 2007. Similarly, in 2006 UK troops in the troublesome Helmand 
province of Afghanistan utilised a tactic called the “platoon house,” which involves setting up residence 
in the centre of remote villages to establish presence. Lack of troops to cover the enormous Area of 
Operations, however, made this tactic difficult to sustain, and it has subsequently been abandoned. 
Simon Jenkins, "Talk to Mullah Omar, if it Saves British Soldiers’ Lives," The Guardian, September 6, 
2006.
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are excluded fro m  the enaction o f  the unit-in-CPOF, but nonetheless persisten tly  
return as a necessary presence fo r  that enaction.
Mol and Law refer to this as a fire spatiality, in which presence and absence 
flicker backward and forward, kept mobile by the continuing need for centres of 
presence to incorporate that which they exclude. In practical terms this means that 
although the US military would like to exclude the agency of the unit-at-rest from the 
presence of the unit-in-CPOF, it is nonetheless continually faced with the return of 
that which is excluded and discontinuous. This return can be seen in the form of, on 
the one hand, a hostile population who resent the unit for “day-tripping like a tourist 
in hell,” and, on the other hand, a unit whose form and functionality depends on their 
sequestering in FOBs.538 This is not to say that the US military has no choice but to 
operate out of large FOBs, it is just to acknowledge that in so doing they provide the 
current conditions which give a unit its stability, mobility, capacity to exercise force 
and so on. These conditions might also be provided by smaller, in-community basing 
arrangements, but the unit would then be forced to be configured differently (there 
would be more difficulty with maintenance of vehicles, for example).
Mol and Law first identify fire spatiality in their discussion of the formalism, 
m entioned earlier, used to calculate the optimum shape for an aircraft’s wing:
The expression takes us beyond itself. It has other connections. In order to establish the 
significance of each of its terms, and indeed to establish the best wing design, it is necessary to go 
beyond the page. Indeed, it is necessary to go elsewhere. It is necessary to go to places that are 
absent from the page. Places which are therefore, or so we want to suggest, Other to the presence of 
the sheet of paper and its symbols. 539
538 Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles," 4.
5 3 9  Law et al., "Situating Technoscience," 617 (emphasis original).
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One of these “elsewhere” places to which the authors refer is the place where the 
limiting values of the formalism have been decided. Maximum allowable gust 
response, for example, is a figure derived from experiments where pilots have ended 
up throwing up, disoriented, perhaps even unconscious. There is no continuity 
between the events of those experiments and the number present on the page, yet 
while effacing (covering over) the existence of those experiments the numbers on the 
page nonetheless depend on their existence. As Mol and Law put it:
Look at it. Present is a figure for tolerable G [gust response]. It is there, on the paper. But that 
figure depends precisely upon what is absent -  a sickened and frightened pilot. Depends upon that 
which is absent (so it is present) but (in an additional twist) at the same time depends upon making 
it absent: because there is certainly no room for a pilot and his vomit in the network of relations 
pencilled on a sheet of paper by an aerodynamicist in a clean office. And it is this pattern (we might 
think of it as an oscillation or a. flickering  between present-presence and absent-presence, though 
perhaps this gives away too much to time) which is the key to what is distinctive about the 
enactment of this object, the key to giving it a relatively stable and determinate sh ap ed 0
By using this discussion as a guide we can be more specific about the way in 
which the absence of the unit-at-rest haunts the unit-in-CPOF. Firstly, it is apparent 
that the unit-in-CPOF depends upon that which is absent, the unit-at-rest, which has 
the paradoxical effect of making the unit-at-rest present in a strange way, as Mol and 
Law note. But the unit-in-CPOF also depends upon making that unit-at-rest absent, 
because the unit-at-rest is not a named, recognisable, or commandable entity in a 
sense that can be acknowledged by CPOF. There is no room, no space, for the unit-at- 
rest to be present in the unit-in-CPOF.
The flickering between absence and presence, then, is the flickering between the 
unit-at-rest being present (for the purposes of the functioning of the unit), and the
540 et al., "Situating Technoscience," 617-18 (emphasis original).
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unit-at-rest being made absent (for the purposes of the effective functioning of 
CPOF). What is interesting here is that this flickering does not enact a “relatively 
stable and determinate shape,” as in the case of the formalism. For, unlike the 
experiments on pilots, which have come and gone, the unit-at-rest is an ongoing 
process, one with a continuing possibility for variation and interruption. Making the 
unit-at-rest present for the purposes of the effective functioning of the unit, then, 
opens the unit-in-CPOF to other, less intended, effects of the unit-at-rest. This 
includes effects such as those outlined by Kilcullen above, where the unit-at-rest has 
agency  beyond that of actualising the unit-in-CPOF as intended (as a mobile point of 
presence), and this slippery, excessive -  virtual -  agency haunts the unit-in-CPOF, 
disrupting its smooth and firm enaction. This is a flickering and  a haunting, then, 
with the US military unable to control and determine the enaction of the unit-in- 
CPOF as ‘simply’ a point of mobile possibility.
Creating presence through interference: the “distr ibution o f the conditions of 
possib il ity” that make presence possible
The centring of the unit-in-CPOF on the mobile presence of a GPS emitter at a 
specific location has the effect of creating a series of absences. This chapter argues 
that the specific qualities of this centring are possible because of the interference of at 
least two different kinds of spatiality: the unit’s presence in Euclidean space and the 
unit’s presence as part of an actor network responsible for maintaining the unit’s 
mobility, durability, capacity to exert force, and its capacity to return. Having 
introduced the idea that a presence can be the result of the interference of different 
kinds of spatialities, this chapter expands the scope of inquiry to include other, less 
obvious, spatialities that are also significant in enacting the unit-in-CPOF. In 
particular, it explores the fire space in which the support network and the unit-at-rest 
are both excluded and included in the enaction of the unit-in-CPOF.
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No doubt there are other forms of spatiality, other distributions of absence and 
presence, involved in the enaction of the unit-in-CPOF as well. In fact, we have 
already seen one m entioned previously. Naming units to enact varying points of 
presence as though  they are singular in order to enable meaningful action is another 
distribution of presence (this kind  of unit is present) and absence (this particu lar  
unit’s configuration is made absent). Mol and Law refer to this as a topology of 
fluidity:
Shape invariance is secured in a fluid topology in a process of more or less gentle flow. It is secured 
by displacement which holds enough constant for long enough, which resists rupture. A topology o f  
flu id ity  resonates with a world in which shape continuity precisely demands gradual change: a 
world in which invariance is likely to lead to rupture, difference, and distance. In which the attempt 
to hold relations constant is likely to erode continuity. To lead to death.54*
It would be possible to explore how the topology of fluidity impacts on the agency of 
the unit-in-CPOF in much the same way as the interference of fire space.
Such an exploration might begin with the drill-down tables illustrated in Figures 
18 and 19. These tables articulate a much less comprehensive enunciation of the 
necessary components of a unit (usually numbering the major weapons platforms, 
and perhaps including the number of personnel) than that articulated in a TOE. As a 
result, these tables enact the unit as named in a way that effaces the differences 
between the unit-in-CPOF and the unit as defined by the TOE. In particular, these 
tables enunciate the ‘militarily necessary’ components of the unit for the purposes of 
command, covering over differences that are deemed irrelevant altogether. These 
drill-down tables are, then, a necessary component of maintaining the unit-in-CPOF 
by articulating its ‘capabilities,’ but are also participants in the fluid topology of 
varying unit definition, if only through their role in disguising it.
541 Law et al., "Situating Technoscience," 614 (emphasis original).
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What is interesting in this example is that, again, the interference of one form of 
spatiality with another to form a point of presence is never fixed or certain, but is 
always contingent and the result of hard work which can come undone. For example, 
the US Army deployed many of its troops to Iraq without Interceptor body armour, 
despite it being officially ‘issued’ to all soldiers and civilians working in Iraq.542 This 
discrepancy between the unit-in-CPOF and the stated TOE is just one among the 
many that are usually capable of being covered over by the process of naming the unit 
as a unit with this combat relevant equipment (ignoring the absence of this other 
irrelevant equipment that is prescribed by TOEs). However, as troops came under 
fire, public concern grew that units were not sufficiently protected from enemy 
activity. The unit-in-CPOF’s enaction as a point of mobile presence was in this case 
undermined by the variability of that fluid space -  by the unit’s ‘failure,’ in this case, 
to hold “constant enough” and resist rupture in the absence of body armour.
Similarly, the unit-in-CPOF is an agent of simplification in a complex world, and 
part of its distribution of absence and presence is the exclusion of the ‘m ess’ of the 
real world. While Law has focused on the formalism (and also the spreadsheet) as a 
tool for simplification, here it is the icon which simplifies a world of baroque 
complexity. The icon distributes the material network required to support the unit, is 
haunted by the Otherness of the unit-at-rest, and also simply excludes the things that 
do not need to form a part of the icon for the purposes of the unit’s enaction.545 Pain, 
blood, heat, sand, wind: they all form a flickering configuration of absence and 
presence that is different to the haunting presence of the unit-at-rest identified above.
542 For a discussion of the failure of the logistics network in this regard, see, General Accountability 
Office (GAO), Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability o f Critical Items During 
Current and Future Operations (Washington, DC: United States General Accountability Office, 2005).
543 See, John Law, "Economics as Interference," in Cultural Economy: Cultural Analysis and
Commercial Life, ed. Paul du Gay and Michael Pryke, 21-38 (London: SAGE Publications, 2002).
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This flickering presence forms a more “stable and determinate shape” by virtue of the 
(relatively) fixed relation these things bear to the presence on the screen (pain is 
translated into Medivac requests, sand is translated into higher maintenance 
requirements for trucks, and so on).
Conclusions
This chapter explores the way in which presence is always a partial and 
contingent achievement, one that, to return to Law once more, generates and is 
generated by a field of the conditions of possibility. This field interferes with the 
actualisation of the point of presence at any given moment. This chapter explores this 
field through the lens of the different kinds of spatial relations that are required to 
generate presence, and the ways in which interfering spatialities can alter and vary to 
generate unexpected and often unwanted aspects of presence. The spatialisation of 
violence is shown to be experimental and open in the sense suggested by the first 
chapter.
What is interesting is that in exploring the spatial operation of violence through 
this prism, we again see an attempt by the US military to engineer a more mobile and 
flexible response to the battlespace, this time through the novel forms of distribution 
of absence and presence — and an associated form of agency — that are enabled in 
CPOF. The unit-in-CPOF is enacted as part of a constantly changing effort, with its 
icon often reflecting that role even to the extent of being shaded a particular colour to 
reflect membership of a particular mission. Further, the unit-in-CPOF is enacted with 
an individual agency not possible previously courtesy of the technologies of 
coordination described by Thrift. Yet, as with the US military’s attempts to coordinate 




Did we ever doubt, on that fateful day, that the horrors unfolding before our eyes would not be met 
with an American reign/rain of fire? The terrifying uncertainty of the exceptional event and its 
interpretation has proved to be a chimera. The meaning and interpretation of the event are now 
thoroughly incorporated into a regime of legitimation for exceptional sovereign practices. Perhaps 
the processes and prerogatives that named and interpreted the event had a hold on it before it even 
happened, awaiting its capture with a well-established discourse of threat, urgency, emergence and 
exception. The ‘new’ appears to have only reaffirmed the ‘same: the permanence of the prerogatives 
of exceptional sovereign power.544
It is the task of this thesis to disrupt this simple affirmation of the ‘same’ (the 
permanence of exceptional sovereign powers) by the ‘new’ (the events of 9/11, the 
subsequent Global War on Terror). In other words, this thesis is concerned with 
identifying and then explaining the emergence of difference in the realm of military,
544 Andrew W. Neal, "Foucault in Guantanamo: Towards an Archaeology of the Exception," Security 
Dialogue 37, no. 1 (2006): 35.
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and ultimately, security activities — difference which can found the possibility of 
political action.545
In many ways, the events of 9/11 interrupted the gentler soul-searching of the 
post Cold War period being conducted by critical security studies, providing a sudden 
imperative to identify, understand, and ultimately ‘unpick’ the (re)emergence of 
military realities that are (still) bloody, immediate, and objectionable.546 Yet critical 
security studies has not necessarily lived up to this task. Instead of articulating a 
space (and tim e) for analysis that allows us to think difference with respect to security 
-  in other words, to think politically -  critical security studies approaches have relied 
on familiar tropes that can re-energise the very power structures they seek to 
undermine.
Andrew Neal, for example, examines one of the m ost celebrated critiques of the 
US Global War on Terror, Giorgio Agamben’s arguments relating to the state of the 
exception.547 Neal argues that critical security approaches that utilise the sovereign 
declaration of the state of exception to explain the operation of contemporary security 
agendas remain trapped in an analysis that legitimises the very sovereign power they
545 This reflects the project of ontological politics articulated in Chapter Two, where an attitude of doubt 
toward asserted ontological coherence, and openness toward alternative ontologies, are pre-requisites 
for acknowledging both the importance of promoting alternative, less harmful enactions of reality, and 
the partial and ongoing nature of any such promotions.
546 This is not to say that difference in security did not and could not emerge prior to the events of 9/11; 
rather, 9/11 has provided renewed urgency to the task of identifying and encouraging difference in this 
field.
547 The exception is a philosophical construct that explores the limits of sovereign power that is 
expounded by authors as diverse as Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben. As Agamben terms it:
On the other hand, if the law employs the exception -  that is the suspension of law itself -  as its original means 
of referring to and encompassing life, then a theory of the state of exception is the preliminary condition for any 
definition of the relation that binds and, at the same time, abandons the living being to the law.
Giorgio Agamben, State o f  Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 1. See, Carl Schmitt,
The Nomos o f  the Earth in the International Law o f  the Jus Publicum Europaeum  (New York, NY: Telos
Press, 2003).
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seek to critique. In the process of this analysis security is actually depoliticised -  
taken from the realm where qualitative difference can emerge. Neal argues that even 
a formally deconstructive approach such as that of Waever which utilises the 
exception as a category of analysis:
... still treats security as a special category: security is still distinguished from politics, and the
exception is still distinguished from the n o r m .548
Neal argues that the emergence of the state of exception as a tool of both analysis and 
of sovereign power has ushered in nothing new for either field: “The new, the rupture, 
the event, the exception, has been used to reveal the continuing sameness of 
sovereign power. ”549
This thesis agrees that critical security approaches have been inadequate in both 
identifying and generating analysis of spaces where sovereign power has in fact been 
ruptured. Yet while Neal’s response is to return to an ‘archaeological’ (discursive) 
analysis of the conditions of possibility for the state of the exception, this thesis 
pursues a praxiography of security practices that demonstrates the messy, multiple, 
and experimental way in which those conditions emerge.550 It is this approach that 
opens ‘security’ as an ongoing and political process, and which forms the core value of 
this thesis.
Interestingly, Neal actively rejects an emphasis on praxiographic study of 
security, arguing that praxiographies of violence simply reinforce the status of the
548 Neal, "Foucault in Guantanamo," 33.
549 Neal, "Foucault in Guantanamo," 35.
550 Archaeology refers to an early approach of Foucault’s that, in subtle distinction to the work examined 
here, placed more emphasis on examining ‘statements that form the archive. See, Michel Foucault, The 
Archaeology o f  Knowledge (London: Routledge Classics, 2002).
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exception and security — as Other to (as exceptional from) politics. For example, he 
argues:
It would be simple to describe exceptionalism as a special field constructed, bounded and 
continually reinforced by violent practices of exclusion, but this is what is already offered by 
Schmitt, Agamben and securitization theory. Rather than simply understanding the politics of 
discourses as ‘the violent or surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules’ ... or ‘the hazardous 
play of dominations’ ..., archaeology places more emphasis on relations between objects, subjects, 
concepts and strategies, the conditions under which each of these categories is constituted, and the 
way they interact and supply authority to each other.551
Problematically, it is apparent in Neal’s argument that for him violence is entirely 
bounded (ordered) by the logic of its enaction (in this case, violent practices of 
exclusion). In this analysis, violence cannot play a part in constituting, varying, and 
disrupting “relations between objects, subjects, concepts and strategies,” and so on. 
Indeed, Neal’s inability to conceive of violence in open and creative terms is made 
apparent in his phrasing: “It would be sim ple  to describe . . . .” As has been argued 
here, very little about the praxis of violence turns out to be simple.
Neal’s approach is unsurprising as his argument draws strongly on Foucault, and 
in particular, on the early works of Foucault. As noted in Chapter One, Foucault’s 
analysis stops short of allowing violence any creative agency, a fault that is only 
exacerbated by his refusal to think through the duration (the temporality) of violence. 
This thesis argues that while Foucault is an important starting point in rendering 
violence amenable to analysis by way of its spatiality, his limitations upon the 
creativity of violence require an account that is supplemented. One supplementary 
account provided here is that of Lefebvre, who makes it possible to think of the 
spatio-temporality of eveiydayness in a way that allows for the emergence of
551 Neal, "Foucault in Guantanamo," 39.
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difference. Another is the work of Deleuze, whose understanding of the war machine 
renders violence as a changeable part of its own conditions of possibility.552
The first two chapters of this thesis form a substantial case that possibilises 
thinking violence as open and undetermined through a careful examination of its 
spatial operation. The spatiality of violence has not been ignored in the realm of 
critical security studies, with a number of examinations of issues such as the shifting 
discourse of geopolitics, or the shifting location of violence to the urban 
environment.553 However, these approaches have tended to explore the discursive 
aspects of space, and have not set out to explore ‘real’ (as opposed to discursive) space 
on the axes outlined in the first chapter -  that is, to explore space as relational, 
emergent, and political.554 Using the three iterations of the relationship between 
violence and spatiality provided by Foucault, Lefebvre, and Deleuze, these first two 
chapters argue for a new kind of critical security analysis, one which can locate the 
fissures in seem ingly hom ogenous security discourses through paying close attention 
to spatial praxis.
552 As Reid argues of Deleuze vis-a-vis Foucault:
Both Deleuze’s theory of desire and his theory of war are not necessarily susceptible to Foucault’s line of 
critique. Both defy the virtuosity that Foucault assumes power to possess in respect of its capacity to subsume 
forms and forces that display any kind of alterity towards it. Deleuze does not contest that it is a capacity of the 
state to codify and regulate forms and forces that might otherwise undermine it, yet he challenges Foucault on 
the extent to which the strategy of power achieves its aims.
Julian Reid, "Deleuze's War Machine: Nomadism Against the State," Millennium: Journal o f
International Studies 32, no. 1 (2002): 75.
553 See, for example, Susan Roberts, Anna Secor and Matthew Sparke, "Neoliberal Geopolitics," Antipode 
35, no. 5 (2003); Stephen Graham, ed., Cities, War and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics 
(London: Blackwell Publishing, 2004); Julian Reid, "Architecture, Al-Qaeda, and the World Trade 
Center: Rethinking Relations Between War, Modernity, and City Spaces After 9/11," Space and Culture 
7, no. 4 (2004). Similarly, Michael Dillon’s analysis of a biopolitics of war has emphasised the role of the 
network, although this is often as a mobilising ‘figure’ rather than a concrete spatial apparatus. See, 
Michael Dillon, "Global Security in the 21st Century: Circulation, Complexity and Contingency," in 
International Security Program m e/N ew Security Challenges Programme Briefing Paper 05 /02 , 2-3 
(London: Chatham House, 2005).
554 The opposition o f‘real’ to ‘discursive’ space is, of course, misleading. As implied in Lefebvre’s analysis 
in particular, concrete space is a productive conjunction of abstract spatial concepts (discourse) 
interacting with spatial practice.
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The political impetus o f exploring space and violence
This is why, at the end of the day, I profoundly disagree when macrosocial romantics tell me that 
refusal to acknowledge large-scale social structures is self-indulgent or quietist. Indeed, quite to the 
contrary, the refusal opens up a politics of scaling and size that lies far beyond the conditions of 
possibility set by the romantic understanding of complexity. But to see this way one needs to sense 
that there are realities which can only be caught, associatively and indirectly, at the edges of 
perception ...: that there are things that do not and could never fit the romance between complexity 
and explicit emergence.555
John Law challenges us to locate the political possibilities found in the messy, 
overlapping, and multiple nature of the world in which we operate. Whereas Neal 
rejects the use of praxiography to study exceptionalism because “exceptionalism is a 
much wider problem than can be found through a genealogical analysis of 
technologies of power alone,” Law breaks down the seeming homogeneity of the 
problem which we f a c e . 5 5 6  This is particularly significant for the field of security 
studies which, as Neal rightly notes, has been stymied by the “continuing sameness of 
sovereign p o w e r .  ”557 Paradoxically, however, Law’s approach (and the approach of 
material semioticians) has been rarely applied in this area, with scholars shying away 
from a subject whose connection to the familiar realms of STS seems fa r -fe tch ed .sss
555 John Law, "And if the Global Were Small and Noncoherent? Method, Complexity, and the Baroque," 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 22, no. 1 (2004): 25.
556 Neal, "Foucault in Guantanamo," 41.
557 Neal, "Foucault in Guantanamo," 35.
558 Reid argues that, far from being an exceptional condition of political thought, security (strategy) 
should simply be thought of as another of those ‘sciences’ which form (and are formed from) the 
conditions of possibility for our society -  that is, as another exercise of power/knowledge. He draws a 
line of analogy, for example, between Canguilhem’s famous analysis of the reformulated 
power/knowledge of medicine at the beginning of the modern era, and Foucault’s analysis of
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This thesis has located a number of junctures in which an ontological politics of 
security can be founded. In particular, the US m ilitaiy’s self-conscious (partial, often 
unsuccessful) incorporation (operationalisation ) of a number of the themes of the 
alternative real identified above demonstrates the importance of thinking in a 
nuanced way about security -  and the dangers of assuming homogeneity and 
similitude across an apparatus as large, diverse, and complex as the US military.
These themes -  the abandonment of the notion of fixed subjectivity, the 
obduracy of materiality, and the experimental as a mode of operation -  could be 
taken to demonstrate an ontological shift in the nature of security, along the lines 
proposed by Bratich:
The New Normal is a m anaged insecurity, an experiment in uncertainty and incessant 
modification of programs and plans. Deleuze (1977) stresses that even the ‘most centralized State is 
not at all the master of its plans, it is also an experimenter,’ and it is not the only experimenter (p. 
146).... Homeland Security’s stability into a structure is not only not guaranteed, it is not even the 
operative principle -  its dynamic is more of a distributed destabilization/restabilization network. 
Secrecy and/as security acts as a deterrent, as enclaved strategy of reassurance, as its own set of 
experiments in the midst of the New Normal’s imperatives.559
However, arguments such as Bratich’s fall into the trap of “continuing sam eness” 
identified by Neal. Attempts to capture new security arrangements as simple 
instramentalisations of a ‘control society’ or ‘networked biopolitics of security’ are 
hom ogenising and defeatist. Rather, while there is certainly an identifiable shift in the 
discourse of security, in practice the relationship between war and politics is a more
Clausewitz’s reformulation of war as an extension of politics. Julian Reid, "Foucault on Clausewitz: 
Conceptualizing the Relationship Between War and Power," Alternatives 28, no. 1 (2003).
559 jack Bratich, "Public Secrecy and Immanent Security: A Strategic Analysis," Cultural Studies 20, no. 
4-5 (2006): 507.
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complicated one that cannot be captured simply in the context of security discourse. 
The ‘rea l’ o f  security is not equivalent to its discourse.
The latter half of this thesis, then, utilises the impetus of the first two chapters to 
question the enaction of military practices, seeking to identify how war is implicated 
in providing a space for politics -  that is, in promoting and engendering difference as 
well as enabling its repression. The third and fourth chapters, for example, examine 
how 1st Cavalry faced onto a battlespace multiple, engaging textures and senses of the 
battlespace that had previously been distributed away from command processes; 
correlating and ultimately mobilising multiplicity to produce a new mode of 
interaction with the battlespace, one driven by the affectivity of the event. This almost 
playful mode of approaching war has to be distinguished from the operation of other 
elem ents of the US military (often acting, it should be said, contemporaneously in 
adjacent areas). Stephen Graham argues that:
The inculcation of racialized aggression works rather to obliterate understanding of the real places, 
and bodies, destroyed by military assault. It is widely recognized that the crude behaviour of the 
invading Anglo-American forces -  search-and-destroy raids, arbitrary arrests, opening fire on 
demonstrations -  was an important factor in stimulating the resistance in Iraq>°
If Graham is correct then there is a political importance to identifying practices 
that are less likely to lead to such destructive outcomes. The affective sense of the 
encounter promoted by CPOF may, on the one hand, destroy the understanding of 
‘real places and bodies’ by virtue of being a (kind of) simulacrum, but, on the other 
hand, it does not resonate strongly with the crude and arbitrary behaviour he 
describes. Rather, orientation to the event leads to a lighter hand (albeit one that 
controls lightly across more dimensions). Indeed, 1st Cavalry’s engagement in Sadr
560 Stephen Graham, "War and the City," New Left Review  44 (2007): 132.
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City has been considered one of the few successes of the war, despite their being 
constantly undermined by the inept political actions of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority.
This is not to imply that 1st Cavaliy engaged in a better kind of violence, nor in 
fact to suggest that it engaged in a ‘single’ kind of violence at all. As demonstrated in 
the fifth chapter, attempts to operationalise units as fluidly-constructed points of 
mobility that emerge in relation to one another (and a standardised background 
space) were consistently confused and at tim es haunted by the operation of those 
things 1st Cavaliy attempted to exclude. Indeed, one possibility for promoting the 
enaction of ‘better’ kinds of violent assemblages (better in that they produce different 
and better things) is to highlight through critical engagement those things the 
military tries to make absent when enacting the presence and agency of its troops. 
One of those aspects, for example, is the interpenetration of the mobile agency of 
troops with the civilian geographies of the city -  the ceaseless movement of Humvees 
driving civilian cars from their own streets. If appropriately highlighted, the crude 
behaviour identified by Graham might then be seen as a military liability, leading to 
its alteration. One of the interesting conclusions of this thesis has been that the US 
military is more open to change than we might have imagined: operating in a 
modality of experimentalism leaves it open to change in a manner that would have 
been incomprehensible in the rigidly demarcated, highly hierarchical apparatus of the 
Cold War.
Finding a way forward for critically engaging violence
The politics of interference is especially difficult in the area of violence and war. 
The subject matter is bloody and objectionable. Violence seems to beget more 
violence, and it is hard to begin to think how the ending of somebody’s life, the
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shearing off of their limbs, the destruction of their means of living and their social 
networks, can ever be the subject of productive intervention. Yet to ignore violence’s 
productive potential is to cede the debate before it has begun. As Deleuze and 
Guattari argue, violence is an integral part of the politically vital assemblages in 
which we operate. It may ultimately be reterritorialised by power, but it is our duty to 
make sure that we encourage its operation as a force that promotes our sense of the 
good.
However, this thesis also shows that any such intervention is subject to the 
obstinate, reversible, and ultimately experimental nature of violence. There is no 
‘final’ good when it comes to promoting ‘this’ violence over ‘that’ -  something for 
which we should perhaps be profoundly relieved, given the difficulties the often 
pacifistic approaches of critical security studies have in addressing some of the more 
pointed questions posed by their realist counterparts (What would you do about the 
Nazis? Rwanda? What about Sudan?). This thesis is an opening volley, and no more 
than that, in making it possible to think about violence in this way.
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